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Romantic Love and Knowledge: Refuting the Claim of Egoism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Gary Foster
Gary Foster
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
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Abstract

Romantic love and its predecessor eros have both been characterized as forms of egoistic love. Part of this claim is concerned specifically with the relation between love and knowledge. Real love, it is claimed, is prior to knowledge and is not motivated by it. Romantic love and eros according to this view are egoistic in that they are motivated by a desire for knowledge. Agapic love characterized by bestowal represents a true form of love unmotivated by selfish desires. I argue that such an emphasis on bestowal at the expense of knowledge or appraisal of the beloved is problematic. The knowledge dimension of romantic love, rather than contributing to selfishness, can be a means of freeing us from egoism when we understand identity in its relational or social form.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , Spring 2008 , pp. 235 - 251
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

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References

Notes

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4 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 283–302.

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