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Two Forms of Dualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2011

David Sosa
David Sosa*
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Austin
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: I distinguish two sorts of motivation for dualism. One motivation is driven by the distinctive character of conscious phenomenology. The other is driven by the special character of normativity: Is rationality an even “harder” problem than consciousness? There is no dramatic climax in which I show that these two dualist currents have a common source; in fact, I think they are relatively independent.

RÉSUMÉ: Je distingue deux sortes de motivations pour le dualisme. La première de ces motivations est entraînée par le caractère distinctif de la phénoménologie consciente. La seconde est entraînée par le caractère particulier de la normativité : le problème de la rationalité serait-il un problème “plus difficile” que celui de la conscience? Il n’y a pas de point culminant où je montre qu’il existe une source commune à ces deux courants dualistes; en fait, je pense qu’ils sont relativement indépendants.

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Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 2: Special Issue / Numéro spécial: Normativity: Epistemic, Mental and Moral Aspects / La Normativite : aspects epistemiques, mentaux et moraux , June 2011 , pp. 307 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

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