Memory and Reconciliation in Japanese History

Abstract

Japanese history is a part of the long history of Northeast Asia. Since Japan began to form a unified nation from the time of Shotoku-Taishi (AD. 574-622) in the early seventh century, it continued to cultivate a rather independent culture. In its long history, the most catastrophic era was the Asian-Pacific War in 1931-45, ending with the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The recovery from the aftereffects and trauma of the War Japan has initiated is the topic I would like to write here as a problem of memory and reconciliation with other countries involved in the War.

In 2006, Prime Minister Jyun-ichiro Koizumi, when he worshiped at Yasukuni Shrine, spoke in the meeting of news reporters that “The freedom of the heart is protected by our Constitution, and cannot be violated by anyone.” It was completely unspeakable to me that Mr. Koizumi, in his official role as Prime Minister, made use of the Japanese Constitution for the purpose of defending his personal right to worship at Yasukuni Shrine. A half of the nation, however, accepted this way of speaking. As long as we Japanese insist on and are not liberated from Yasukuni Shrine, we cannot become reconciled and co-exist with other nations, because this shrine is seen as the symbol of the Japanese past militarism which was centered on the Emperor.

But the situation around Yasukuni becomes more complex if we go probe beneath the political dimension, because memory is always deeply connected with the problem of identity regard-less of whether it is personal or collective. For some conservative groups, the formation of modern Japan starts from the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which seeks to center the identity of the modern state in the Emperor, rather than in the democracy starting from the end of the War on August 15, 1945. The difference in the memory of the starting points of modern Japan between conservatives and others shapes the different identities in present-day Japan, sometimes becoming a hindrance to form a civil society. I will call this situation “Yasukuni fundamentalism” in today’s Japan.

The purpose of the present paper is to propose a way to overcome this Yasukuni fundamentalism by developing a public philosophy and by its application to today’s civil society.