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INTERVAL VALUES AND RATIONAL CHOICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2018

Martin Peterson
Martin Peterson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77840, USA. Email: martinpeterson@tamu.edu. URL: www.martinpeterson.org
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Abstract:

Decision theorists have suggested that it is sometimes appropriate to represent the value of certain options as intervals of real numbers. In this note I show that doing so is incompatible with some deeply held intuitions about rational choice.

Keywords

Pasadena problemOscillating gambleInterval value
Type
Reply
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , March 2019 , pp. 159 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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