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Causal effects and counterfactual conditionals: contrasting Rubin, Lewis and Pearl

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2021

Keith A. Markus Open the ORCID record for Keith A. Markus [Opens in a new window]
Keith A. Markus*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, 524 West 59th Street, New York, NY10019, USA
*
Email: kmarkus@jjay.cuny.edu
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Abstract

Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can help to guide applications, further develop each theory, and better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses.

Keywords

Causationcounterfactual conditionalscomparative research
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , November 2021 , pp. 441 - 461
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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