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THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA AS A LOTTERY PARADOX*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2007

IGOR DOUVEN  and
JAN-WILLEM ROMEIJN
IGOR DOUVEN
Affiliation:
University of Leuven
JAN-WILLEM ROMEIJN
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam
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Abstract

List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence of votes.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 23 , Issue 3 , November 2007 , pp. 301 - 319
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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