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Markets, Information, and Benevolence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2009

Timothy J. Brennan
Timothy J. Brennan
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
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Extract

In the January 6, 1991, issue of the Washington Post Magazine, reporter Walt Harrington wrote a profile of Bryan Stevenson. Mr. Stevenson is a 31-year-old working-class African-American from Delaware who graduated from Harvard Law School and the Kennedy School of Government. Like the typical graduate of Harvard Law School, Mr. Stevenson had the opportunity to join the worlds of six-figure corporate law or high-visibility politics. Rather than follow his colleagues, however, Mr. Stevenson works seven-day, eighty-hour weeks as director of the Alabama Capital Representation Center. He appeals death sentences, handling twenty-four death-row cases himself, supervises five other lawyers who cover about thirty cases, and raises federal government and foundation funding. He does this living a Spartan existence on a salary of $24,000, refusing even the $50,000 directorship salary offered to him.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , October 1994 , pp. 151 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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