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THE PARITY VIEW AND INTUITIONS OF NEUTRALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2007

MOZAFFAR QIZILBASH
MOZAFFAR QIZILBASH*
Affiliation:
University of York
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Abstract

One response to Derek Parfit's ‘mere addition paradox’ invokes the relation of ‘parity’. Since parity is a form of ‘incommensurateness’ in John Broome's terms, three doubts which Broome raises about accounts involving incommensurateness in Weighing Lives pose a challenge for this response. I discuss two of these. They emerge from a discussion of various intuitions about ‘neutrality’. I argue that an account based on parity may be no less consistent with Broome's intuitions than is his own vagueness view.

Type
Symposium
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2007 , pp. 107 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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