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Democracy v Human Rights? The Strasbourg Court and the Challenge of Power Sharing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2016

Stefan Graziadei
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Abstract

Tension between ‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ principle in highly political cases – ECtHR’s wide margin of appreciation on elections put into question by recent cases – Sejdic-Finci v Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH): ethnic criteria for standing in election violate Convention – Zornic v BiH: candidate’s exclusion from standing in election on account of her self-chosen identity violates P-12 – Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium overruled? – ‘Integrative democratic tolerance’ approach: five legal and political principles to reconcile ‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ principle in highly political cases.

Keywords

European Court of Human Rightsmultinational states
Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , May 2016 , pp. 54 - 84
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016 

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Footnotes

*

PhD candidate at the Universities of Antwerp and Graz. This research was financially supported by the University of Antwerp (BOF) as well as earlier grants from the University of Graz. The author would like to thank Patricia Popelier, Josef Marko, the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their insightful comments. Any remaining errors and mistakes remain the sole responsibility of the author.

References

1 ECtHR [GC] 22 December 2009, Case Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 ECtHR 15 July 2014, Case No. 3681/06, Zornic v BiH.

3 For a more global enquiry on the right to difference, see Foblets, M. C. et al. (eds.), Cultural Diversity and the Law: State Responses from around the World (Bruylant 2010)Google Scholar.

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7 Id. at p. 16 (electronic publication).

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11 Ibid.

12 ECtHR [GC] 22 December 2009, Case Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia-Herzegovina; ECtHR 9 December 2010, Case No. 7798/08, Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v Croatia.

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20 ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium.

21 Delmartino, F. et al., ‘Kingdom of Belgium’, in L. Moreno and C. Colino (eds.), Unity and diversity in federal countries (McGill-Queen’s University Press 2010) p. 47Google Scholar at p. 65.

22 Issacharoff, supra n. 17, p. 242.

23 ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, para. 57.

24 Ibid.

25 ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, joint dissenting opinion of Judges Cremona, Bindschedler-Robert, Bernhardt, Spielmann and Valticos.

26 Ibid.

27 The composition of the community and regional parliaments was changed by the special law of 16 July 1993 aimed at achieving the federal structure of the state.

28 Belgian Constitutional Court, 90/94, 22 December 1994 (paras B-4 to B-4.24). Up to 2003, the Belgian Constitutional Court was known as ‘Court of Arbitration’. For semantic simplicity I nonetheless refer to it as a constitutional court.

29 ECtHR 4 April 2006, Case No. 44081/02, Bompard v France; ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, para.para. 54. For a more in depth analysis, see Lécuyer, Y., The Right to Free Elections (CoE Publishing 2014)Google Scholar.

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31 ECtHR [GC] 6 October 2005, Case No. 74025/01, Hirst v UK (No 2); ECtHR 22 June 2004, Case No. 69949/01, Aziz v Cyprus; ECtHR [GC] 18 February 1999, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v UK.

32 ECHR 15 April 1996, Case No. 25035/94, Silvius Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei v Italy.

33 ECtHR [GC] 8 July 2008, Case No. 10226/03, Yumak and Sadak v Turkey.

34 Id., para. 121.

35 Id., para. 144.

36 ECtHR 30 January 2007, Case No. 10226/03, Yumak and Sadak v Turkey.

37 ECtHR [GC] 27 April 2010, Tanase v Moldova, para. 174. O’Connell, R., ‘Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy’, 61(3) NILQ (2010) p. 275Google Scholar. For a critical review: Timmer, A., ‘Tănase v Moldova: multiple readings of a case concerning multiple nationality’, Strasbourg Observers, <strasbourgobservers.com/2010/05/12/tanase-v-moldova-multiple-readings-of-a-case-concerning-multiple-nationality>>Google Scholar, visited 15 February 2016.

38 ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, joint dissenting opinion of Judges Cremona, Bindschedler-Robert, Bernhardt, Spielmann and Valticos.

39 ECtHR 9 April 2002, Case No. 46726/99, Podkolzina v Latvia.

40 ECtHR 21 September 2010, Case No. 39426/06, Birk-Levy v France.

41 ECtHR 12 December 1985, Case No. 11100/84, Fryske Nasjonale Partij v Netherlands.

42 ECtHR, 13 May 1982, Case No. 8873/80, X v UK.

43 ECtHR [GC], 18 February 1999, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v UK.

44 HL Deb 14 March 2002, vol. 632, col. 938 (the competent minister said that ‘the Channel Islands are outside the European Union and, as such, extending the European Parliament franchise to them is not possible’).

45 Weller, M., ‘Effective Participation of Minorities in Public Life’, in M. Weller (ed.), Universal Minority Rights (Oxford University Press 2007) p. 477Google Scholar at p. 515.

46 Berry, S., ‘The siren’s call? Exploring the implications of an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights on national minorities’, 23 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2016) p. 1385CrossRefGoogle Scholar (accepted).

47 ECtHR (plenary) 23 July 1968, Case No. 2126/64 and others, Relating to certain aspects of the law on the use of languages in education in Belgium v Belgium.

48 Marko, J., ‘Five Years After: Continuing Reflections on the Thematic Commentary on Effective Participation. The Interplay between Equality and Participation’ in T. Malloy and U. Caruso (eds.), Essays in Honour of Rainer Hofmann (Brill 2013) p. 97Google Scholar.

49 Dissenting opinion of judge Borrego, para. 2, in ECtHR [GC] 13 November 2007, Case No. 57325/00, D. H. v Czech Republic.

50 ECtHR [GC] 22 December 2009, Case Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Sejdic and Finci v BiH.

51 ECtHR 15 July 2014, Case No. 3681/06, Zornic v BiH.

52 Szasz, P., ‘The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement’, 30 Cornell International Law Journal (1997) p. 759Google Scholar (an analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement and why it will not work).

53 Frowein, J. and Bank, R., ‘The Participation of Minorities in Decision Making Processes’, 61 ZaöRV/HJIL (2001)Google Scholar.

54 Grewe, C. and Riegner, M., ‘Internationalized Constitutionalism in Ethnically Divided Societies: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo Compared’ in A. Von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Brill 2011) p. 1Google Scholar at p. 32.

55 Marko, J., ‘Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A First Balance’, 7 EDAP (2004)Google Scholar.

56 Feldman, D., ‘Renaming Cities in Bosnia’, 3 ICON (2005) p. 649Google Scholar at p. 655.

57 Article VI(1)a of the Bosnian Constitution.

58 Mansfield, A. Morawiec, ‘Ethnic but equal: the quest for a new democratic order in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 103 Colum L Rev (2003) p. 2052CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 Begic, Z. and Delic, Z., ‘Constituency of peoples in the constitutional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Chasing fair solutions’, 11(2) ICON (2013) p. 447Google Scholar.

60 Bosnian Constitutional Court, U-5/98-III, 1 July 2000.

61 F. Palermo, ‘Bosnia-Erzegovina: la Corte costituzionale fissa i confini della (nuova) società multietnica’ [Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Constitutional Court sets the boundaries of Bosnia’s (new) multi-ethnic society], IV Diritto Pubblico Compara. to ed Europeo [European and Comparative Public Law] (2000) p. 1479.

62 For more, see commentary on the preamble in Steiner, C. and Ademovic, N. (eds.), Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Commentary, translated by D. Čolaković (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2010) p. 37Google Scholar; as well as Hodzic, E. and Stojanovic, N., ‘New/Old Constitutional Engineering?’ (Analitika 2011)Google Scholar.

63 Marko, J. and Railic, D., ‘Minderheitenschutz im östlichen Europa: Bosnien und Herzegowina’ (Institute for East European Law at Cologne University 2005)Google Scholar.

64 Bosnian Constitutional Court, U13/05, 26 May 2006, para. 10.

65 Bosnian Constitutional Court, AP-2678/ 06, 29 September 2006.

66 Ibid, para. 22.

67 ECtHR, Case No. 41939/07, Pilav v BiH (pending). Statement of facts <caselaw.echr.globe24h.com/0/0/bosnia-herzegovina/2013/09/02/pilav-v-bosnia-and-herzegovina-126684-41939-07.shtml>, visited 15 February 2016.

68 Dissenting opinions of judge Grewe in U-13/05 and AP-2678/06 (Pilav); concurring opinion of Feldman in the same judgments.

69 Feldman in Pilav, id.

70 Bardutzky, S., ‘The Strasbourg Court on the Dayton Constitution: Judgment in the case of Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 6(2) EuConst (2010) p. 309-333Google Scholar.

71 See O’Leary and McCrudden supra n. 5. Bell, C., ‘Power-sharing and human rights law’, 17(2) International Journal of Human Rights (2014) p. 204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 Id., para. 44.

73 Anagnostou, D. and Psychogiopoulou, E. (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of Marginalised Individuals and Minorities in National Context (Brill 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peroni, L. and Timmer, A., ‘Vulnerable groups: The promise of an emerging concept in European Human Rights Convention law’, 11(4) ICON (2013) p. 1056Google Scholar.

74 Popelier and Van De Heyning, supra n. 15, at p. 230. O’Connell, R., ‘Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy’, 61(3) NILQ (2010) p. 263Google Scholar.

75 Marko, supra n. 48, at p. 97.

76 ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium; ECtHR 15 September 1997, Case No 23450/94, Polacco and Garofalo v Italy; ECtHR 15 July 1965, Case No. 2333/64, Inhabitants of Leeuw-St-Pierre v Belgium.

77 ECtHR 11 January 2005, Case No. 66289/01, Py v France, para. 64.

78 ECtHR 15 July 2014, Case No. 3681/06, Zornic v BiH.

79 Sandic-Hadzihasanovic, G., ‘Historic Census Pushes Bosnians To Decide Who They Are’, Radio Free Europe, 1 October 2013, <www.rferl.org/content/bosnia-census/25123381.html>>Google Scholar, visited 15 February 2016.

80 Electoral code of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 4.19(7).

81 Ibid., Article 4.19(6). See also a recent case on self-classification that reached the Bosnian Constitutional Court, decision AP-66/15, 10 February 2015.

82 ECtHR (plenary) 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, joint dissenting opinion of Judges Cremona, Bindschedler-Robert, Bernhardt, Spielmann and Valticos.

83 ECtHR 15 July 2014, Case No. 3681/06, Zornic v BiH.

84 Id. para. 31.

85 Id. para. 43.

86 Thomas Burri had argued that the Dayton Constitution made Bosnia a special case with limited impact on other Convention states: ‘The Rigidity of Structures to Protect Minorities – Hidden Facets of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Sejdic and the Banjul Commission’s decision in Endorois’, in D. Thürer (ed.), International Protection of Minorities – Challenges in Practice and Doctrine (Schulthess 2014) p. 201.

87 O’Leary and McCrudden, supra n. 5, p. 146.

88 The Court’s press release, however, mentioned that there exist other Convention-compatible power-sharing systems that could be applied in Bosnia.

89 Interview with Faris Vehabovic, Bosnian judge at the European Human Rights Court and member of the Chamber who decided Zornic. ‘Vehabović: U slučaju “Zornić” traži se izmjena Ustava BiH’[Vehabovic: The Zornic case is about changing the BiH Constitution], Vijesti, 25 December 2015, <vijesti.ba/clanak/252118/vehabovic-u-slucaju-quot-zornic-quot-trazi-se-izmjena-ustava-bih>, visited 29 February 2016.

90 Hodzic, E. and Stojanovic, N., ‘New/Old Constitutional Engineering?’ (Analitika 2011)Google Scholar.

91 Bieber, F., ‘Ungovernable Bosnia – From the Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights on the Sejdic-Finci Case to the Government Crisis’, IEMed Yearbook (2014) p. 186Google Scholar.

92 Council of the European Union (Foreign Affairs), ‘Council Conclusions on Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Brussels, 15 December 2014.

93 Section 3(7) of the Standing Orders of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

94 Section 16(3) Northern Ireland Act (as enacted).

95 Annex A, Agreement at St. Andrews between the Irish and British governments, and Northern Irish political parties.

96 McCrudden, C. and O’Leary, B., ‘Courts and Consociations, or How Human Rights Courts May De-stabilize Power-sharing Settlements’, 24(2) EJIL (2013) p. 477CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 494.

97 Opinion of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on the Assembly and Executive Reform Bill, 2 November 2015, at <www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/NIHRC_ADVICE_Assembly_and_Executive_Reform_Bill_(FINAL).pdf>, visited 7 February 2016.

98 Anthony, G., ‘Public Law Litigation and the Belfast Agreement’, 8(3) European Public Law (2002) p. 401CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anthony, G. and Morison, J., ‘The Judicial Role in the New Northern Ireland: Constitutional Litigation and Devolution Disputes’, 21 European Review of Public Law (2009) p. 1219Google Scholar.

99 With the reform of 2001, Ladin speakers can accede to the presidency or vice-presidency of the Council and be nominated to the provincial government irrespective of the proportional strength of their language group. However, a Ladin speaker can only take the position allocated by statute to a German or Italian speaker subject to the agreement of a majority of assembly members from the respective language groups. Articles 48 and 50, Statute of Autonomy for the Region Trentino-South Tyrol (as modified by constitutional law of the Italian Republic of 31 January 2001, nr .2).

100 The question on the compatibility of the South Tyrol system with Convention and EU law was put to the ECJ by the labour court of Bozen/Bolzano. In ECJ 24 April 2012, Case C-571/10, Kamberaj, the ECJ declined to answer whether EU law trumped fundamental principles of the constitutional system of the concerned member state, in this case minority protection, because such question was not material to the case at hand.

101 Velaers, J., ‘De pariteit in the Minsterraad (artikel 99, tweede lid van de Grondwet)’ [The parity in the council of ministers – article 99.2 of the Constitution], 1 TBP (2015) p. 4Google Scholar at p. 12. According to Article 99 of the Constitution, the Council of Minsters has an equal number of French- and Dutch-speaking ministers. Linguistic affiliation is determined by the language group one represents in parliament. Report Chabert, parliamentary documents of the Chamber BZ1968, 10-nr. 25/2, p. 2.

102 Special Law on the Brussels Region (12 January 1989), Article 17(1). Hugues Dumont and Sébastien van Drooghenbroek argued that the Brussels parliament election law would not stand up to the proportionality test of the Strasbourg Court, in ‘L’interdiction Des Sours-Nationalités À Bruxelles’, Administration Publique Trimestriel (2011) p. 201 at p. 215-6.

103 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative’, CDL-AD (2005) 004, Venice, 11 March 2015.

104 Ringelheim, J., ‘Identity Controversies before the European Court of Human Rights: How to Avoid the Essentialist Trap?’, 3(7) German Law Journal (2002) p. 167Google Scholar.

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106 Id., referring to R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15. For a clarifying but applauding comment, see K. Monaghan, ‘Case Comment: R (E) v Governing Body of JFS & Ors [2009] UKSC 15’, <ukscblog.com/case-comment-r-e-v-governing-body-of-jfs-ors-2009-uksc-15/>, visited 15 February 2016.

107 Ginsburg, supra n. 105 (ICON blog).

108 Martens, P., Théories du droit et pensée juridique contemporaine (Larcier 2003) p. 256Google Scholar.

109 Belgian Constitutional Court, 23 May 1990, no. 18/90, at B.9.1, B.9.2.

110 Judge Levitis in ECtHR 17 June 2004, Case No. 58278/00, Zdanoka v Latvia.

111 Arai-Takahashi, Y., The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002) p. 236Google Scholar.

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113 Issacharoff, supra n. 17, p. 234. Pildes, Richard H., ‘Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions: A Dynamic Perspective’, in S. Choudry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford University Press 2008) p. 173Google Scholar.

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115 Harvey, C. and Schwartz, A. (eds.), Rights in Divided Societies (Hart Publishing 2012)Google Scholar.

116 Martens, W., Mémoires pour mon pays [Memories for my country] (Racine 2006) p. 404Google Scholar [citing the divided opinion of the French and Dutch-speaking Council of State chambers (delivered on 15 June 1988) on the normative meaning of the constitutional concept of language regions.]

117 See Belgian parliamentary discussions reproduced in Council of Europe, 1965 ECHR Yearbook (Martinus Nijhoff 1967) p. 471 at p. 481.

118 Issacharoff, supra n. 17, at p. 242.

119 For a rich account of the judicial politics behind Belgian Linguistics, see Bates, E., The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2010) at p. 225-238CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

120 ECtHR [GC] 16 March 2006, Case No. 58278/00, Zdanoka v Latvia.

121 Tushnet, M., ‘Institutions for Implementing Constitutional Law’, in I. Shapiro et al. (eds.), Rethinking Political Institutions (New York University Press 2006) p. 241Google Scholar at p. 250.

122 van Dijk, P.. and van Hoof, G. J. H., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer 1990) p. 589Google Scholar.

123 Bossuyt, supra n. 14.

124 Spano 2014, supra n. 15, p. 487.

125 See different contributions in Popelier, P. et al. (eds.), ‘The role of courts as regulatory watchdogs’, 3 Legisprudence – special issue (2012)Google Scholar.

126 Popelier and Van De Heyning, supra n. 15, at p. 230.

127 Popelier, P., ‘Preliminary Comments on the Role of Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs’, 6(3) Legisprudence (2012) p. 257CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 260.

128 ECJ 8 June 2010, Case C-58/08, Vodafone and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.

129 Lenaerts, supra n. 15, at p. 3.

130 Arai-Takahashi, Y., The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002) p. 236Google Scholar.

131 O’Leary and McCrudden argued that the inclusive nature of the Belgian consociation usefully distinguishes it from the Bosnian case; supra n. 5, p. 138-142.

132 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, Case No. 25579/05, A, B and C v Ireland; discussed in Popelier and Van De Heyning, supra n. 15, at p. 260.

133 ECtHR [GC] 6 April 2000, Case No. 27644/95, Athanassoglou and Others v Switzerland; ECtHR [GC] 26 August 1997, Case No. 67/1996/686/876, Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland (in both cases the applicants unsuccessfully sought a judicial remedy against the Federal Council’s decisions to prolong the licenses for nuclear power plants).

134 ECtHR (plenary) Mathieu Mohin, para. 57. See also the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Terje Wold in Belgian Linguistics (merits).

135 Belgian Council of State advice, n° 51.214/AG of 2 May 2012, parliamentary documents Senate n°1560/2 (2011/12), p. 6-7.

136 See for instance Belgian Constitutional Court, 90/94, 22 December 1994 (paras B-4 to B-4.24)

137 Belgian Constitutional Court, 23 May 1990, no. 18/90, at B.9.1, B.9.2.

138 Hilpold, P., ‘South Tyrol’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 329Google Scholar.

139 A. Zilic, ‘The Dayton Agreement: Challenges of Change’, presented at the international conference on Interethnic Relations in the Western Balkans. Berlin, 12-13 September 2003. The Dayton Agreement is legally valid but has limited democratic legitimacy.

140 McCrudden and O’Leary, supra n. 96, p. 492-493.

141 This is also one of the main suggestions of McCrudden and O’Leary, supra n. 96, p. 499-500.

142 The Vice-President of the French Council of State expects the ECtHR to provide clear, consistent and well-reasoned case law positions. J. M. Sauve, ‘Subsidiarity: a two-sided coin?’ Strasbourg, 30 January 2015 (ECtHR seminar), <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_Seminar_JMSauvé_ENG.pdf>, visited 15 February 2016.

143 ECtHR, 22 June 2004, Case No. 69949/01, Aziz v Cyprus.

144 ECtHR [GC] 22 December 2009, Case Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Sejdic and Finci v BiH; partly dissenting and party concurring of judge Mijovic, joined by judge Hajiyev.

145 Bosnian Constitutional Court, 29 September 2006, AP-2678/06 (Pilav); Grewe and Riegner, supra n. 54, p. 31.

146 Feldman, D., ‘Sovereignties in Strasbourg’ in R. Rawlings et al. (eds.), Sovereignty and the Law – Domestic, European, and International Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 213CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 223.

147 Bosnian Constitutional Court, 29 September 2006, AP-2678/06 (Pilav); Grewe and Riegner, supra n. 54, at p. 31.

148 Italian Council of State, judgment no. 439 of 7 June 1984.

149 Italian Constitutional Court, judgments no. 285/1987, no. 768/1988 and no. 260/1993.

150 Legislative decree modifying the Decree of the President of the Republic of 26 July 1976, n. 752, on the declaration of belonging or affiliation to a linguistic group in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano; <www.landtag-bz.org/de/datenbanken-sammlungen/bestimmungen-autonomiestatut.asp?somepubl_action=300&somepubl_image_id=115437>(German), visited 15 February 2016.

151 Lantschner, E. and Poggeschi, G., ‘Quota System, Census and Declaration of Affiliation to a Linguistic Group’, in J. Woelk et al., Tolerance Through Law – Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Brill 2008) p. 219Google Scholar.

152 J. Marko, ‘The nature and implications of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina’, paper presented at the conference Place and role of the Others in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and future constitutional solutions for Bosnia and Herzegovina, University of Sarajevo, 3 February 2010, at 9.

153 Lantschner and Poggeschi, supra n. 151. For instance, the Italian Supreme Court accepted that a candidate could declare his linguistic identity at the time when running for office. Before that, the right to run for office was restricted to the sole candidates who declared their identity jointly with the population census. In its proportionality analysis, the Italian Court found that the ad hoc declaration served the same purpose while being less burdensome for the applicant. (Corte di Cassazione, judgment no. 11048 of 24 February 1999, Ivan Beltramba).

154 Phone interview with a former judge of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, 20 August 2015. On file with the author.

155 ECtHR [GC] 16 March 2006, Case No. 58278/00, Zdanoka v Latvia, para. 135.

156 Sejdic, para. 19-23.

157 Pallaver, G., ‘South Tyrol’s Consociational Democracy: Between Political Claim and Social Reality’, in Woelk et al., supra n. 151, p. 303Google Scholar.

158 CC U-14/12 of 26 March 2015, para. 75. See M. Dicosola, ‘The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina declares the system of ethnic federalism of the Entities inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination: much ado about nothing?’, Diritticomparati, 2 July 2015, <www.diritticomparati.it/2015/07/the-constitutional-court-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-declares-the-system-of-ethnic-federalism-of-the-e.html#sthash.6EKtDjrf.dpuf>, visited 15 February 2016.

159 Ibid.

160 Belgian Constitutional Court, 73/2003 of 26 May 2003.

161 Epstein, L. et al., ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’, 35 Law & Society Review (2001) p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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166 Epstein et al., supra n. 161.

167 See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1301 (2002), para. 23, ‘calling on the Kingdom of Belgium to fully implement, without further delay, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 23 July 1968 …’ (author’s emphasis). The last effort to implement the judgment stems from 2014 (Belgian Chamber, doc. 54K0151).

168 Bogaards, M., Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies – Exploring Consociational Parties (Palgrave 2014)Google Scholar.

169 Bardutzky defined the judgment as promising but difficult to implement. This holds particularly true for the presidency, which has control over armed forces. Bardutzky, supra n. 70, p. 333.

170 Feldman, D., ‘Sovereignties in Strasbourg’ in R. Rawlings et al. (eds.), Sovereignty and the Law – Domestic, European, and International Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 213CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 223.

171 Marko, J., ‘Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005-2006’, 5 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2006/07) p. 207CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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173 Section 39 of the Constitution of South Africa.

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175 Marko, supra n. 48.

176 In Sejdic, the Court put some weight on the opinion of the Venice Commission, which had found that Bosnia’s ethnic system did not produce integration but ethnic entrenchment. ‘Amicus Curiae Brief in the Cases of Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia-Herzegovina pending before the ECtHR’, 483/2008, Strasbourg, 22 October 2008, para. 33. See also the remarks of Pallaver on South Tyrol, supra n. 157.

177 See, inter alia, Popelier, supra n. 127, at p. 260.

178 Ginsburg, supra n. 105.

179 Bell, C., ‘Power-sharing and human rights law’, 17(2) International Journal of Human Rights (2014) p. 204CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 229.