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The Relocation of the Legality Principle by the European Courts’ Case Law

An Italian Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2015

Nicola Lupo  and
Giovanni Piccirilli
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Abstract

Rule of law and the legality principle – Legality principle in the Italian legal system – ‘Prescribed by law’ – Legality in supranational dimension – ‘Democratic disconnect’ – Margin of appreciation – Concepts of ‘law’ and ‘legislation’ – Democracy-based legislation – Quality of legislation – ‘Political constitutionalism’ versus ‘legal constitutionalism’

Keywords

Principle of legalityEUECHRItaly
Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , May 2015 , pp. 55 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Full professor of Public Law, LUISS University of Rome

**

LUISS University of Rome and Emile Noel Fellow at the Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, NYU School of Law (Fall semester, 2013/2014).

A draft version of this paper has been presented in the seminar ‘Toward a Multipolar Administrative Law. A Theoretical Perspective’, held on 9 and 10 September 2012 at the New York University School of Law. The authors are grateful to the organisers, Prof. Joseph H.H. Weiler and Prof. Sabino Cassese, the discussant, Prof. Gráinne de Búrca, and participants for their insightful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

References

1 The meaning of ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ (or ‘thick’ and ‘thin’) meaning of legality will be explained below. In order to avoid any confusion, we adopted these adjectives in compliance with the use made of the same words by the ECtHR: see, for instance, ECtHR 17 July 2001, Case No. 39288/98, Ekin Association v France, also reported later in more detail.

2 On such lack of agreement, it may be appropriate to recall the well-known paradox of Böckenförde, according to which the contemporary secular State relies on premises that it is not able to justify: E.W. Böckenförde, ‘Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisierung’ (1964), now in Kirche und christlicher Glaube in den Herausforderungen der Zeit (Lit-Verlag 2004) p. 213-230.

3 Carlassare, L., ‘Legalità (principio di)’ [Legality principle], Enciclopedia giuridica, XVIII, (Treccani 1990) p. 4Google Scholar.

4 A vivid summary of this debate can be found in a famous cross-talk between Andrea Orsi Battaglini and Sabino Cassese originated by the former through the editorial in the opening issue of the journal Diritto pubblico, Battaglini, A. Orsi, ‘In limine’, Diritto pubblico (1995) p. IIIGoogle Scholar, which received a harsh reply by the latter, who contested the idea of granting priority in the new journal to the investigation of the legality principle, considering it to be ‘a passe-partout notion’, still used ‘due to tiredness’. And again A. Orsi Battaglini, ‘Il puro folle e il perfetto citrullo (Discutendo con Sabino Cassese)’ [The pure mad and the perfect fool (Debating with Sabino Cassese)], Diritto pubblico (1995) p. 639-651.

5 Cassese, S., ‘Alla ricerca del Sacro Graal. A proposito della rivista Diritto pubblico’ [Hunt for the Holy Grail. About the Journal Diritto pubblico], Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico (1995) p. 789Google Scholar at p. 794.

6 McCormick, N., ‘Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law’, Juristen-Zeitung (1984) p. 65-70Google Scholar.

7 Besselink, L. et al., ‘Introduction: Legality in Multiple Legal Orders’, in L. Besselink et al. (eds.), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 2011) p. 3-10Google Scholar.

8 Loughlin, M., Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 312CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sordi, B., ‘Révolution, Rechtsstaat, and the Rule of Law: historical reflections on the emergence of administrative law in Europe’, in S. Rose-Ackerman and P.L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2011) p. 23-36Google Scholar.

9 Pizzorusso, A., ‘Sistema delle fonti e forma di Stato e di governo’ [System of the sources of law, form of State and form of government], Quaderni costituzionali (1986) p. 217-235Google Scholar; Delpérée, F., ‘Constitutional Systems and Sources of Law’, in A. Pizzorusso (ed.), Law in the making. A comparative survey (Springer Verlag 1988) p. 88-102CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See, critically, the literature quoted by Waldron, J., The dignity of legislation (Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 7-35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Besides, among others, Cassese, S., ‘Die Zukunft war früher auch besser’, in C. Franchini and B.G. Mattarella (eds.) Sabino Cassese e i confini del diritto amministrativo [Sabino Cassese and the boundaries of administrative law] (Editoriale Scientifica 2011) p. 92Google Scholar.

11 Ex multis, Waldron, J., ‘Legislation and the Rule of Law’, Legisprudence (2007) p. 91-123Google Scholar.

12 Bellamy, R., Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007) p. 52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 L. Carlassare, Regolamenti dell’esecutivo e principio di legalità [Government regulations and the legality principle] (CEDAM 1966). This position, and that of Cheli quoted in the subsequent footnote, will be better clarified in the last part of this essay, when examples of case law of the Italian Constitutional Court are quoted.

14 Cheli, E., ‘Ruolo dell’esecutivo e sviluppi recenti del potere regolamentare’ [Role of the executive and recent developments of regulatory power], Quaderni costituzionali (1990) p. 53Google Scholar at p. 65.

15 Zagrebelsky, G., Manuale di diritto costituzionale. Il sistema delle fonti del diritto [Handbook of constitutional law. The system of sources of law] (UTET 1988) p. 53Google Scholar.

16 Tamahana, B.Z., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 2004) p. 91-101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ginsburg, T. and Moustafa, T., ‘Introduction: The functions of Courts in authoritarian regimes’, in T. Ginsburg and T. Moustafa (eds.), Rule by law. The politics of Courts in authoritarian regimes (Cambridge University Press 2008) p. 1-22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Rescigno, G.U., ‘Sul principio di legalità’ [On the legality principle], Diritto pubblico (1995) p. 247Google Scholar at p. 262.

18 Lindseth, P.L.,‘Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-Polity’, in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford University Press 2002) p. 151Google Scholar; Lindseth, P.L., Power and Legitimacy. Reconciling Europe and Nation-State (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 234CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Again, Lindseth, P.L., ‘Of the people. Democracy, the Eurozone and Lincoln’s threshold criterion’, 22 The Berlin Journal (2012) p. 4-7Google Scholar.

20 Sweet, A. Stone and Keller, H., ‘Introduction’, in A. Stone Sweet and H. Keller (eds.), A Europe of Rights. The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2008) p. 13-15Google Scholar.

21 Nevertheless, the technique of the pilot judgments introduces relevant elements of abstractness, being based on consideration of the legal framework rather than on the concrete case.

22 V. Zagrebelsky, ‘La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo sessant’anni. Pensieri di un giudice a fine mandato’ [The ECtHR after 60 years. Thoughts of a judge at the end of his term], <www.csfederalismo.it/images/pdf/lecture_spinelli_2011.pdf>, visited 7 July 2014, p. 6.

23 Gallo, F., ‘Rapporti tra Corte costituzionale e Corte EDU’ [Relationships between Constitutional court and ECtHR]Google Scholar, <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/relazioni_internazionali/RI_BRUXELLES_2012_GALLO.pdf>, visited 7 July 2014, p. 4.

24 This situation might change in the near future, depending on whether and how the members of the Council of Europe implement the contents of the Brighton Declaration, signed on 20 April 2012 and specifically its point 12 d), according to which a system close to the preliminary reference should be established also for the ECtHR. For a (strongly debated) decision of the Italian Constitutional Court underlining the differences between the role and the powers of the ECtHR and the national Constitutional Courts, see Corte Costituzionale 19 November 2012, Sentenza 264/2012, ‘Considerato in diritto’ para. 5.4, according to which only the latter operate a comprehensive (and not an isolated) assessment of the values involved in each litigation.

25 Although not related to EU law stricto sensu, a slight difference could be found with reference to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the so called ‘Fiscal Compact’), at least concerning the provision of its Art. 3.2, where member states are required to pass ‘provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional’ (emphasis added). However, the same provision continues as follows: ‘or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes’, thus confirming what is claimed in the text. In the literature, see Besselink, L. and Reestman, J.H., ‘The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: “Europe Speaking German”’, 8 EuConst (2012) p. 1Google Scholar at p. 7.

26 This testifies to the founders not having wanted the functioning of the institutional framework to be bound by strict relationships of consistency among acts deriving from its different institutions; see Bieber, R. and Salomé, I., ‘Hierarchy of norms in European Law’, 33 Common Market Law Review (1996) p. 907-930Google Scholar at. p. 911.

27 Bast, J., ‘New categories of acts after the Lisbon reform: dynamics of parliamentarization in EU law’, 49 Common market law review (2012) p. 885-227Google Scholar at p. 887 n. 8, lists the 16 possible matches of categories and types of legal acts.

28 Schütze, R., ‘Sharpening the Separation of Powers through a Hierarchy of Norms? Reflections on the Draft Constitutional Treaty’s regime for legislative and executive law-making’, EIPA Working Paper 2005/W/01, p. 1-17Google Scholar.

29 Craig, P., ‘Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New Comitology Regulation’, 5 European Law Review (2011) p. 671-687Google Scholar.

30 Bast, J., 2012, supra n. 27, at p. 890Google Scholar. Later on, at p. 894, the same author defines the legislation in the Treaty of Lisbon as a ‘voluntaristic concept’, in the sense that it reflects ‘the will of the Treaty drafters’.

31 EComHR 16 May 1977, Case No. 7360/76, Zand v Austria.

32 ECtHR, 26 April 1979, Case No. 6538/74, The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom.

33 O’Donnel, T.A., ‘Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 4 Human Rights Quarterly (1982) p. 474-507CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Specifically on the case (and on the follow-up in the UK legal system): Wong, W.M., ‘The Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression Versus English Contempt-of-Court Law in the European Court of Human Rights’, 17 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (1984) p. 35-76Google Scholar.

34 ECtHR 10 March 1972, Case Nos. 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium.

35 ECtHR 17 July 2001, Case No. 39288/98, Ekin Association v France.

36 ECtHR 2 August 2001, Case No. 37119/97, N.F. v Italy.

37 ECtHR 17 February 2004, Case No. 39748/98, Maestri v Italy.

38 The guidelines were in fact limited to the expression ‘the membership raises delicate problems’, without specifying either the nature or the entity of the sanction.

39 See Maestri, supra n. 37, para. 40.

40 ECtHR 28 April 2009, Case Nos. 17214/05 42113/04 20329/05, Savino and Others v Italy.

41 Almost immediately after the decision, the regulation, as modified in order to comply with it, was integrally published (for the first time) in the Official Journal.

42 Cicconetti, S.M., ‘Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo e autodichia parlamentare’ [ECtHR and parliamentary autonomy], Giurisprudenza Italiana (2010) p. 1271-1279Google Scholar; C. Fasone, ‘L’autodichia delle Camere dopo il caso Savino. Una condanna (lieve) da parte della Corte di Strasburgo’ [Parliamentary autonomy after the Savino case. A (light) sentence from the ECHR], Diritto Pubblico Comparato e Europeo (2009) p. 1074-1089.

43 Letsas, G., A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Benvenisti, E., ‘The Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression Versus English Contempt-of-Court Law in the European Court of Human Rights’, 31 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (1999) p. 843-854Google Scholar.

45 Lindseth, P.L. 2010, supra n. 18, p. 75Google Scholar.

46 Walker, N., ‘The rule of law and the EU: necessity’s mixed virtue’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds.), Relocating the rule of law (Hart 2009) p. 119-130Google Scholar.

47 Sweet, A. Stone, The judicial construction of Europe (Oxford University Press 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Weiler, J.H.H., ‘The transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) p. 2403CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 2431.

49 Esteban, M.L Fernandez, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution (Kluwer Law International 2009) p. 159Google Scholar.

50 Pizzorusso, A. 1986, supra n. 9, p. 217Google Scholar.

51 ECJ 26 April 1986, Case C-294/83, Partie ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament.

52 See, again, Walker, N., supra n. 46, p. 126Google Scholar.

53 Les Verts, supra n. 51, para. 23. The French version of the same decision uses the expression ‘communauté de droit’.

54 ECJ 29 October 1980, Case C-138/79, Roquette Frères v Council.

55 Chiti, M.P., ‘I Signori del diritto comunitario. La Corte di giustizia e lo sviluppo del diritto amministrativo europeo’ [The Masters of Community Law. The ECJ and the development of European administrative law], Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico (1991) p. 796Google Scholar at p. 798.

56 ECJ 26 March 1986, Case C-45/86, Commission v Council; ECJ 4 October 1991, Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council.

57 Weber, A., ‘Art. 5. Principles on the Distribution and Limits of Competences’, in H.-J. Blanke, S. Mangiameli (eds.) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). A Commentary (Springer 2013), p. 255-286Google Scholar. Tesauro, G., Diritto dell’Unione europea [EU Law] (CEDAM 2012), p. 116Google Scholar.

58 For example, in the Italian literature, Starita, M., I principi democratici nel diritto dell’Unione europea [Democratic principles in the EU law] (Giappichelli 2011)Google Scholar foresees an increasing division of legislative work between the European Parliament and the Council.

59 So, again, Bast, J. 2012, supra. n. 27, p. 893-894Google Scholar.

60 See, Fabbrini, F. and Granat, K., arguing in favour of a scrutiny strictly related to respect for the subsidiarity principle, ‘“Yellow Card, but No Foul”: The Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike and the Reaction of the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol’, 50 Common Market Law Review (2013) p. 115-143Google Scholar. For the opposite solution, see Lupo, N., ‘National parliaments in the European integration process: re-aligning politics and policies’, in M. Cartabia et al. (eds.), Democracy and Subsidiarity in the EU (Il mulino 2013) p. 107-132Google Scholar.

61 In this second case, the Commission did not proceed to withdraw the proposal, submitting a detailed impact analysis in order to justify its maintenance.

62 Just to quote the leading case on the matter, Corte Costituzionale 18 December 1973, No. 183/1973, ‘Considerato in diritto’ para. 8, where Community Regulations were recognised as not incompatible with the mechanisms of the riserva di legge just because the latter cannot be applied to norms stemming from another legal system.

63 On this distinction see Blauberger, M., ‘National Responses to European Court Jurisprudence’, West European politics (2013) p. 1-18Google Scholar, according to whom the anticipatory obedience usually occurs ‘if legal uncertainty is particularly costly for the supporters of the regulatory status quo’, whereas the ‘contained compliance’ is pursued ‘if the challengers of the regulatory status quo have to carry the main burden of legal uncertainty’.

64 On the dialogue between the national courts of the Italian legal system (and the Constitutional Court, in particular) and the European courts, see Martinico, G. and Pollicino, O., The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems: Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws (Edward Elgar 2012), p. 87-96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65 Specifically on these two decisions, see Monte, F. Biondi Dal and Fontanelli, F., ‘Decision Nos. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: the Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian Legal System’, 9 German Law Journal (2008) p. 889-931Google Scholar; Pollicino, O., ‘The Italian Constitutional Court at the Crossroads between Constitutional Parochialism and Co-operative Constitutionalism. Judgments No. 348 and 349 of 22 and 24 October 2007’, 4 EuConst (2008) p. 363-382Google Scholar.

66 On the first preliminary reference to the ECJ by the Italian Constitutional Court, see Fontanelli, F. and Martinico, G., ‘Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice’, 16 European Law Journal (2010) p. 345-364CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Martinico, G., The tangled Complexity of the EU Constitutional Process (Routledge 2012), p. 142Google Scholar.

67 On the dual preliminarity see Martinico, G., ‘Multiple loyalties and dual preliminarity: the pains of being a judge in a multilevel legal order’, 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2012) p. 871-896CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Pollicino, O., ‘From Partial to Full Dialogue with Luxembourg: The Last Cooperative Step of the Italian Constitutional Court’, 10 EuConst (2014) p. 143-153Google Scholar.

68 Italian Court of Cassation (Joint Criminal Sections) 21 January 2010, No. 18288.

69 Zagrebelsky, G., ‘La dottrina del diritto vivente’ [The doctrine of the diritto vivente], 6 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (1986) p. 1148-1166Google Scholar.

70 The content of the decision is deeply analysed by F. Biondi, ‘La decisione delle Sezioni Unite della Cassazione ha lo stesso “valore” della fonte del diritto scritto? Quando l’interpretazione conforme alla CEDU pone dubbi di costituzionalità’ [Do decisions of the Joint Sections of the Court of Cassation have the same value as written law? When conforming with the interpretation of the ECHR raises issues of constitutional compliance], Osservatorio sulle fonti (2010) p. 1-7.

71 See Court of Cassation (Joint Criminal Sections) 27 April 2011, No. 16543.

72 See Italian Constitutional Court 8 October 2012, Decision No. 230, ‘Considerato in diritto’ para. 7.

73 An evolution in this direction might be found in the decision, subsequent to that released by the Italian Constitutional Court quoted in the text, of ECtHR 21 October 2013, Case no. 42750/09 Del Rìo Prada v Spain.

74 See, at least, ECtHR 30 May 2000, Case No. 31524/96, Belvedere Alberghiera s.r.l. v Italy; ECtHR 30 May 2000, Case No. 24638/94, Carbonara and Ventura v Italy; later see ECtHR 29 March 2006, Case No. 36813/97 Scordino v Italy.

75 The provision was incorporated in the decree of the President of the Republic adopted on 8 June 2001, no. 327.

76 See Italian Constitutional Court 4 October 2010, Decision No. 293, ‘Considerato in diritto’ para 8.4.

77 G. Piccirilli, ‘Una sentenza non conclusiva sul rapporto tra Costituzione e CEDU in tema di espropriazioni indirette. Spunti per uno studio sul concetto di ‘legge’ nella Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo’ [A non definitive decision on the relationship between ECHR and the Constitution about indirect expropriations. Hints for a study of the concept of ‘law’ in the European Convention of Human Rights], Giurisprudenza italiana (2010) p. 2003 at 2006.

78 Rescigno, G.U., supra n. 17, p. 262Google Scholar.

79 De Siervo, U., ‘Conclusioni’, in M. Cartabia et al. (eds.), Gli atti normativi del Governo tra Corte costituzionale e giudici [Government normative powers between the Constitutional court and judges] (Giappichelli 2011), p. 553-559Google Scholar.

80 See, at least, Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions Nos. 232/2010, 248/2011, and 200/2012.

81 See, for instance, Decisions Nos. 391/1995 and 148/1999; and, more recently, 237/2013.

82 Lupo, N., ‘Emendamenti, maxi-emendamenti e questione di fiducia nelle legislature del maggioritario’ [Amendments, maxi-amendments and the question of confidence in majority legislatures], in E. Gianfrancesco and N. Lupo (eds.), Le regole del diritto parlamentare nella dialettica tra maggioranza e opposizione [Parliamentary rules in the dialectic between majority and opposition] (LUISS University Press 2007), p. 41-112Google Scholar; Piccirilli, G., L’emendamento nel processo di decisione parlamentare [Amendments in the parliamentary decision-making process] (CEDAM 2008), p. 291Google Scholar; Manetti, M., ‘Procedimenti, controlli costituzionali e conflitti nella formazione degli atti legislativi’ [Procedures, constitutional oversight and conflicts in parliamentary law-making], in Decisione conflitti controlli. Procedure costituzionali e sistema politico [Decision, conflicts, oversight. Constitutional procedures and the political system] (Jovene 2012), p. 3-45Google Scholar.

83 Echoes of this problem can be found in the above-quoted Decisions No. 230/12 of the Italian Constitutional Court (see supra n. 72), where it is affirmed that the legality principle in criminal matters assumed by the ECtHR is narrower than that incorporated in the Italian Constitution, since the former does not take into account principles affirmed by the Constitutional Court’s case law (see Decision Nos. 487/89 and 394/06), according to which the law-making in such a field has to be the prerogative of Parliament, as that is the body elected through general suffrage and which decides after an open deliberation process that includes the opposition and, albeit indirectly, the public opinion.

84 For this distinction, see again R. Bellamy, supra n. 11, p. 1-12, whose analysis – probably because of the need clearly to state the differences between the two approaches – risks emphasising the elements of divergence even too much, perhaps underestimating the chances of a possible combination.

85 See. Dogliani, M., ‘Il principio di legalità. Dalla conquista del diritto all’ultima parola alla perdita del diritto alla prima’ [The legality principle, from the conquest of the right to the last word to the loss of the right to the first], Diritto pubblico (2008) p. 1-28Google Scholar; and Zagrebelsky, G. and Marcenò, V., Giustizia costituzionale [Constitutional Justice] (Il mulino 2012), p. 102-108Google Scholar, according to whom the balancing among constitutional principles is a task to be exercised first of all by the political process, although with the limit of reasonableness, the protection of which is the responsibility of Constitutional justice, but only ex post factum (not ex ante).