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When state capacity dissolves: Explaining variation in violent conflict and conflict moderation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2017

John Gledhill
John Gledhill*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Department of International Development, University of Oxford
*
*Correspondence to: John Gledhill, University of Oxford - International Development, 3 Mansfield Rd, Oxford, OX1 3TB, United Kingdom. Author’s email: john.gledhill@qeh.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

When state capacity dissolves, we ordinarily assume that violent conflict will break out, and then spiral towards a high degree of intensity. However, this is not always the case. Rather, on occasion, states suffer a sharp and severe loss of capacity, but little or no collective violence follows. And, on other occasions, violent conflict erupts, but that conflict does not escalate into civil war; rather, it plateaus, and then recedes. This article offers an analytic framework for explaining such variation in the presence, absence, and intensity of violent conflict following a dissolution of state capacity. I argue that the strength of state and societal organs prior to a loss of state capacity shapes the broad trajectory of violence after such a loss. In making that claim, I associate three state-society dynamics before state dissolution with three levels of violent conflict, post-dissolution. Drawing on multi-country fieldwork, I illustrate the proposed framework by presenting three diverse cases of dissolving state capacity and conflict: Georgia (1991–3); Albania (1991–2); and Yemen (2011–13).

Keywords

State CapacityCivil ConflictState-Society RelationsConflict Management
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 153 - 178
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2017 

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66 This draws on Hanson and Sigman, ‘Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions’, pp. 6–7.

67 For a discussion of how extractive capacity can be measured, see Soifer, ‘Measuring state capacity in contemporary Latin America’, pp. 594–5.

68 See discussion in Hanson and Sigman, ‘Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions’, p. 4.

69 Since the UCDP has not recorded any conflict fatalities in the case of Albania (due to the low level thereof), I do not report UCDP figures for that case.

70 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2008 (University of Heidelberg, 2008), p. ii.

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75 Interview with a local political analyst, Tbilisi.

76 Interview with a Georgian political activist, Tbilisi.

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87 Despite assumptions of a legislative void in Georgia, a member of Gamsakhurdia’s government told the author that he and his colleagues did pass a significant number of laws during their limited time in power. Interview, Tbilisi.

88 Interview with a former Unit Director of the Supreme Soviet, Tbilisi.

89 Baev, ‘Civil wars in Georgia’, p. 131.

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96 Interviews with a Georgian expert in organised crime, and a local political analyst, Tbilisi.

97 Based on author interviews with a former senior defence official, and local political analysts, Tbilisi. Also see discussion in Driscoll, Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States, ch. 4.

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101 For an overview of the resistance in Samegrelo, see Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed Books, 1994), ch. 5. For a selection of contemporaneous reports, see ‘Separatist unrest corrodes Georgia’s hope for future’, The Guardian (22 August 1992); Liam McDowall, ‘Georgian troops clash on retreat from Abkhazia’, Associated Press Worldstream (1 October 1993).

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105 See Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars, ch. 5; Baev, ‘Civil wars in Georgia’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Georgia/Abkhazia’.

106 Available at: {http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/372} accessed 27 September 2016.

107 Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars, pp. 142–3, reports that the Abkhaz conflict cost up to 10,000 lives, the South Ossetian war saw 500–600 deaths, and the confrontation between Zviadists and the Mkhedrioni / National Guard saw around 2,120 fatalities.

108 See Tishkov and BKZ in supplementary material for Sambanis, ‘What is civil war?’, available at: {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0022002704269355/suppl_file/Sambanis_Data.zip} accessed 13 December 2016.

109 Available at: {http://data.worldbank.org/country/Georgia} accessed 27 September 2016.

110 Cited in Thomas Greene, ‘Internal displacement in the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia’, in Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (eds), The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 284.

111 Fatos Tarifa, ‘The human dimension of de-communization in post-communist societies’, Helsinki Monitor, 5:2 (1994), p. 62.

112 Julie Gonce, ‘Anne-Marie Autissier: “Albania was the North Korea of its time”’, Cafebabel (2009), available at: {http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/society/article/anne-marie-autissier-albania-was-the-north-korea-of-its-time.html} accessed 26 May 2016.

113 Bernd J. Fischer, ‘Enver Hoxha and the Stalinist dictatorship in Albania’, in Bernd J. Fischer (ed.), Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe (London: Purdue University Press, and C. Hurst & Co., 2007), p. 263.

114 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Albania: A Country Study, ed. Raymond Zickel and Walter Iwaskiw (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 227–8. Also, according to a former government minister now writer, Albania was the only European state in which the communist party controlled all newspapers. Interview with the author, Tirana.

115 Helga Turku, Isolationist States in an Interdependent World (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), p. 88; Julian Birch, ‘The Albanian political experience’, Government and Opposition, 6:3 (1971), p. 366.

116 Interviews with a former ambassador, and two former government ministers now economists, Tirana.

117 Turku, Isolationist States in an Interdependent World, p. 85.

118 Russell King and Nicola Mai, Out Of Albania: From Crisis Migration to Social Inclusion in Italy (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008/11), p. 35.

119 Interviews with a local journalist, and a former ambassador, Tirana.

120 Interview with a local journalist, Tirana.

121 Nigel Hawkes, ‘In the Stalinist deep freeze’, The Globe and Mail (5 January 1990).

122 Tony Smith, ‘Communists’ win leaves Albania more polarized, violence possible’, The Associated Press (1 April 1991).

123 Artan Fuga, Les mots dans la communication politique en Albanie (Paris: Harmattan, 2003), pp. 138–41.

124 United States, Department of State, ‘Acting Secretary Kimmitt Meets with Albanian Democratic Leaders Berisha and Pashko’ (State 094948, March 1991). Supplied to the author following a Freedom of Information request.

125 Gramoz Pashko, ‘Obstacles to economic reform in Albania’, Europe-Asia Studies, 45:5 (1993), p. 907.

126 Instituti I Statistikes, ‘Statistika nr. 1: Njoftime, analiza e te dhena statistikore periodike’ (Tirana: Government of Albania, 1993), p. 16.

127 Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 75.

128 Brenda Fowler, ‘Albania searches for a stable future’, The New York Times (16 February 1992).

129 Helena Smith, ‘Feuding Albania destroys itself’, The Guardian (24 September 1991).

130 Interview with a former government minister now economist, Tirana.

131 Interview with an Albanian academic specialising in national defence, Tirana.

132 Interview with a senior figure from the Ministry of Defence from the period of transition, Tirana.

133 Based on an interview with a former ambassador, Tirana.

134 Elez Biberaj, ‘Albania’, in Sabrina Ramet (ed.), Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society since 1939 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 271.

135 Reuters, ‘Official in Albania sees anarchy as rioting and looting continue’, The New York Times (1 March 1992).

136 Louis Zanga, ‘A crisis of confidence’, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2:16 (1991), pp. 1–4.

137 The author was given such an explanation in interviews with diverse actors, Tirana.

138 The author was given related explanations in an interview with a local university professor, and in written communication with a former government minister, now economist, Tirana.

139 Interview with a local expert in international affairs, Tirana.

140 Interview with a local journalist, Tirana.

141 Interviews with a member of parliament, and with an early figure in the Democratic Party, Tirana.

142 See reports in Ian Traynor, ‘Albanian tanks on streets as the protests continue’, The Guardian (22 February 1991); Mark Frankland, ‘Riot deaths deepen crisis in Albania’, The Observer (24 February 1991); David Binder, ‘Albania’s hard-liners and democracy backers battle for control’, The New York Times (24 February 1991).

143 Fuga, Les mots dans la communication politique en Albanie, pp. 138–9; Liam McDowall, ‘President empowers army to stop food riots’, The Associated Press (7 December 1991); AFP, ‘Food riots in Albania leave two dead’, Agence France Press (7 December 1991).

144 Mary Battiata, ‘Albania’s post-communist anarchy; crime, looting spread in Balkan land once ruled by terror’, The Washington Post (21 March 1992).

145 Anthony Clunies Ross and Petar Sudar, Albania’s Economy in Transition and Turmoil, 1990–97 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 61; Liam McDowall, ‘New prime minister installed as 32 die in Albanian food riot’, The Guardian (11 December 1991).

146 Ian Traynor, ‘Coup rumours sweep Tirana as four reported killed in clashes’, The Guardian (23 February 1991); Tony Smith, ‘Shkodra and Tirana tense after post-election violence’, The Associated Press (3 April 1991); United States, Department of State, ‘Albanian Post-Electoral Unrest’ (State 107860, April 1991).

147 See Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 7.

148 Sarah Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chs 3, 4.

149 Adam C. Seitz, ‘Ties that bind and divide: the “Arab Spring” and Yemeni civil-military relations’, in Helen Lackner (ed.), Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition (London: Saqi Books and SOAS, 2014); International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?’, Middle East Report No. 139 (Sanaa/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), pp. 2–12.

150 Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen’s Economy: Oil, Imports and Elites’, Middle East and North Africa Programme Paper 2011/02 (London: Chatham House, October 2011), p. 2.

151 In 2010, oil production in Yemen was only around 280,000 barrels per day. Sarah Philips, ‘What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building’, Middle East Program, No. 107 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), p. 2.

152 April Longley Alley, ‘The rules of the game: Unpacking patronage politics in Yemen’, The Middle East Journal, 64:3 (2010), pp. 385–409.

153 Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment, ch. 4; Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006–7).

154 Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 172.

155 See Weir, A Tribal Order; Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

156 National Democratic Institute, ‘Yemen: Tribal Conflict Management Program’, Research Report (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2007), pp. 17–18; Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen, pp. 124–8.

157 See Najwa Adra, ‘Tribal Mediation in Yemen and its Implications to Development’, AAS Working Papers in Social Anthropology 19 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2011); Daniel Corstange, ‘Tribes and the Rule of Law in Yemen’, Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association (Washington, DC, 2008); Derek Miller, ‘Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls: Small Arms in Yemen’, Occasional Paper No. 9 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2003).

158 For example, a 2006 report found that 90 per cent of conflicts were prevented or resolved through the application of customary law. Nadwa al-Dawsari, Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).

159 Interview with a Yemeni tribal governance expert, via telephone.

160 See April Longley Alley, ‘Yemen changes everything … and nothing’, Journal of Democracy, 24:4 (2013), pp. 74–85.

161 Bernard Haykel, ‘The State of Yemen’s Oil and Gas Resources’, Policy Brief (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2013), p. 1.

162 Available at: {http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=YE} accessed 20 January 2017.

163 Ali Saeed, ‘Economists: Government must collect taxes, better manage oil revenues’, Yemen Times (5 November 2013).

164 International Crisis Group, ‘The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa’, Middle East Report No. 154 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014), p. 18.

165 Dimitis Soudias and Mareike Transfeld, Mapping Popular Perceptions: Local Security, Insecurity and Police Work in Yemen (Sanaa: Yemen Polling Center, 2014), pp. 17, 39.

166 International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown’, Middle East Report No. 145 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013).

167 International Crisis Group, ‘The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa’.

168 Intenational Crisis Group, ‘Yemen’s Military-Security Reform’, p. I.

169 Soudias and Transfeld, Mapping Popular Perceptions, p. 45.

170 In 2001, there were almost 5.6 million small arms in the hands of Yemeni tribesmen. Miller, ‘Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls’, p. 28.

171 See Sheila Carapico, ‘Yemen between revolution and counter-terrorism’, in Helen Lackner (ed.), Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition (London: Saqi Books and SOAS, 2014); Ahmed al-Haj and Lee Keath, ‘Rocket wounds Yemen president, escalating fight’, Associated Press Online (4 June 2011); Alley, ‘Yemen changes everything … and nothing’.

172 April Longley Alley, ‘Assessing (in)security after the Arab Spring: the case of Yemen’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 46:4 (2013), pp. 721–6.

173 International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition’, Middle East Report No. 125 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012).

174 Alley, ‘Assessing (in)security after the Arab Spring’, p. 722. Also, interview with a former foreign diplomat, London.

175 See treatments in Soudias and Transfeld, Mapping Popular Perceptions.

176 See, for example, Khaled Fattah, ‘Yemen: a social intifada in a republic of Sheikhs’, Middle East Policy, 18:3 (2011), pp. 79–85; Samia Nakhoul and Mohammed Ghobari, ‘Yemen on brink of civil war as clashes spread’, Reuters (27 May 2011); J. Dana Stuster, ‘In Yemen, both leadership and opposition face possible collapse’, The Atlantic (6 June 2011).

177 Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari, ‘Waiting for Change: The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen’, Peaceworks Report No. 85 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013); al-Dawsari, Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen, pp. 1–7.

178 Yemen Post Staff, ‘Tribal mediation ceases battles between army, militants in Yemen’, Yemen Post (30 January 2013); AFP, ‘Al-Qaeda fighters agree to pull out of Yemen’s Rada “without resistance”’, Alarabiya.net English (25 January 2012).

179 Gaston and al-Dawsari, ‘Waiting for Change’, p. 13.

180 BBC Online, ‘Yemen: Hashid tribal fighters in ceasefire with Saleh’, BBC News Online (28 May 2011).

181 Interviews with a Yemeni expert in tribal governance, via telephone, and with a former foreign diplomat, London.

182 Available at: {http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/678} accessed 12 December 2016.

183 Available at: {https://acd.iiss.org/en/statistics/selectreporttype} accessed 27 September 2016.

184 Available at: {http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=YE} accessed 27 September 2016.

185 Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail.

186 Alice Ackermann, ‘The prevention of armed conflicts as an emerging norm in international conflict management: the OSCE and the UN as norm leaders’, Peace and Conflict Studies, 10:1 (2003), p. 10.

187 Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, ‘The collapse of North Korea: Military missions and requirements’, International Security, 36:2 (2011), pp. 84–119.

188 See, for example, Jarat Chopra, ‘Building state failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, 33:5 (2002), pp. 979–1000.

189 Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, International Security, 22:2 (1997), pp. 5–53.