Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T09:46:18.809Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Role of COVID-19 Soft Law Measures in Italy: Much Ado about Nothing?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2021

Flaminia APERIO BELLA ,
Cristiana LAURI  and
Giorgio CAPRA
Flaminia APERIO BELLA
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor in Administrative Law, Roma Tre University, Italy; email: flaminia.aperio.bella@gmail.com.
Cristiana LAURI
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Administrative Law, University of Macerata, Italy.
Giorgio CAPRA
Affiliation:
PhD candidate, Roma Tre University, Italy.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article considers the role of non-binding legal instruments adopted in Italy against the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the early months of 2020. To verify whether the use of such instruments restricted fundamental and human rights beyond constitutional and legal limits, the article first gives an overview of hard law measures adopted in Italy against the coronavirus. It then focuses on soft law measures, the use of which became significant only in Phase II of Italy's response to COVID-19 and argues that non-binding legal instruments provided the public with instructions on gradually returning to normal life. This contribution contains case studies on the soft law measures adopted in relation to private economic enterprise and freedom of worship. Italian soft law deployed during the COVID-19 epidemic was borne out of coordination between the state and the Regions and as the result of (even informal) dialogue with the relevant stakeholders. Despite some criticism of the soft law measures used, their role in restricting constitutionally granted rights was marginal, because only hard law measures adopted nationally and locally limited personal rights and freedoms in order to contain the pandemic.

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 12 , Special Issue 1: Special Issue on COVID-19 and Soft Law , March 2021 , pp. 93 - 110
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The present work is the product of a joint reflection by the authors. However, Sections I and II should be attributed to Flaminia Aperio Bella, Section III to Cristiana Lauri, and Section IV to Giorgio Capra. Section V should be attributed to the three authors.

References

1 Phase I of the Coronavirus emergency is the period starting from the first lockdown (23 February 2020) until the beginning of May when several activities were allowed to restart. Since then, Italy has been in Phase II. Some scholars ground the distinction between Phases I and II on the dichotomy “emergency versus risk”. From this point of view, as the risk suppression measures started to bear fruit, Member States progressively lifted some of the restrictions and introduced new risk management measures: see A Alemanno, “The European response to COVID-19: From regulatory emulation to regulatory coordination?” 11 (2020) EJRR 307–16. However, this article uses the notion Phase I as used by the Italian government. To this end, and also due to the temporal proximity with the events observed, this article analyses official documents as well as newspaper articles.

2 See in particular Decree-Law No 6 of 23 February 2020, which, after conferring on competent authorities the powers to issue – in case of specific signs of the pandemic spreading – emergency orders adequate and proportionate to the evolving emergency situation (Art 1(1)), and listing some types of those orders (Art 1(2)), conferred on the same authorities the power to adopt further measures as to prevent the spread of the pandemic “even beyond the occurrence of conditions described by Article 1(i)”.

3 The legal framework for the use of emergency orders is composite: pursuant to Art 32 of Law No 833 of 23 December 1978 (the basic law on the national healthcare system), emergency powers are shared among three levels of government: (i) the Minister of Health; (ii) presidents of Regions; and (iii) mayors. Further emergency powers are attributed to mayors by Art 50(4–5) of Legislative Decree No 267 of 18 August 2000, and by Art 117 of Legislative Decree No 112 of 31 March 1998. These provisions reflect the traditional role of the chief of the municipality as a local health authority, particularly in case of emergencies. There also exists legislation on civil protection (disaster relief), recently consolidated in the Code of Civil Protection of 2 January 2018. According to the Code the legal tool for dealing with a state of national emergency is the ordinanze di protezione civile referred to in Art 25. These acts are adopted by the Head of the Department for Civil Protection (the PM or his/her delegate) after seeking an agreement (intesa) with the affected Regions, and their aim is to provide support to the population and to restore basic services and infrastructures. The ordinanze can derogate from the laws in force but must respect the general principles of the legal system (Art 25(1)). See M Massa, “A General and Constitutional Outline of Italy’s Efforts Against COVID-19 – With the Best Face On, in Coronavirus and the Law in Europe” <www.intersentiaonline.com/publication/coronavirus-and-the-law-in-europe/v-544bf2be-8004-f72f-8088-dea754a9a0da/29#H0> (accessed 30 September 2020).

4 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 31 January 2020 adopted pursuant to Legislative Decree No 1/2018 (Civil Protection Code) <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/02/01/20A00737/sg>.

5 The text of the Decree-Law No 6/2020 is available at <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/02/23/20G00020/sg>. It was converted into law, with amendments, by Law No 13 of 5 March 2020 <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/03/09/20G00028/sg>.

6 An English translation of the Italian Constitution is available at: <www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg18/file/repository/relazioni/libreria/novita/XVII/COST_INGLESE.pdf>. For a general introduction to Italian constitutional law, see V Onida et al, Constitutional Law in Italy (Wolters Kluwer 2013).

7 See, in particular, DPCM of 9 March 2020 establishing the national lockdown <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2020/03/09/62/sg/pdf>.

8 See Massa, supra, note 3. The peculiar legal nature of the DPCMs issued during the pandemic has been analysed in the literature. See EC Raffiotta, “Sulla legittimità dei provvedimenti del governo a contrasto dell’emergenza virale da coronavirus” (2020) 2 BioLaw Journal <www.biodiritto.org/content/download>, or M Luciani, “Il sistema delle fonti del diritto alla prova dell’emergenza” (2020) 2 Rivista AIC <www.rivistaaic.it/it/rivista/ultimi-contributi-pubblicati>. See also the judgment No 8615 of Lazio TAR, Rome, Section I-quater, 22 June 2020, in which the court refused the legal nature of general administrative acts of DPCMs, linking them, because of their “peculiar atypicality”, to the ordinanze <www.giustizia-amministrativa.it>.

9 The use of Decree-Laws to manage the pandemic made government the key player. Some newspapers and scholars spoke of the “absence” of Parliament; see C Melzi D’Eril and GE Vigevani, “Il Parlamento non sia assente durante la pandemia”, Il Sole 24 Ore (Milan, 15 March 2020) 6; A Lucarelli, “Costituzione, fonti del diritto ed emergenza sanitaria” (2020) 2 Rivista AIC <www.rivistaaic.it/it/rivista/ultimi-contributi-pubblicati/alberto-lucarelli/costituzione-fonti-del-diritto-ed-emergenza-sanitaria>; S Curreri, “Il Parlamento nell’emergenza” (2020) 3 Osservatorio AIC <www.osservatorioaic.it/it/osservatorio/ultimi-contributi-pubblicati/salvatore-curreri/il-parlamento-nell-emergenza>.

10 See judgment 115/2011 of the Constitutional Court <www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2011&numero=115> according to which the primary source can hand powers over to administrative authorities, but basic political decisions regarding individual rights and liberties have to be made in the form of legislative norms, which have to supply the administrative act with sufficient guidance. Among scholars who affirmed the inconsistency of Decree-Law No 6 with the rule of law, see A Lucarelli as well as Curreri, supra, note 9, and G Delledonne and C Padula, “Italy: The Impact of the Pandemic Crisis on the Relations between the State and the Regions” in E Hondius et al (eds), Coronavirus and the Law in Europe <www.intersentiaonline.com/bundle/coronavirus-and-the>.

11 In particular, with the DPCM of 8 March 2020, the Government imposed a lockdown in Lombardy and 14 other provinces of northern Italy introducing several legal prohibitions, such as the ban on people travelling to and from places in the red zones. With the subsequent national lockdown, the Government imposed a travel ban in the entire country and prevented all forms of social gathering in public places or places open to the public across the country. Furthermore, pursuant to DPCM of 11 March, retail businesses and personal services were suspended. See D Vese, “Managing the Pandemic. The Italian Strategy for Fighting Covid-19 and the Challenge of Sharing Administrative Powers” (2020) EJRR.

12 See M Simoncini, “The Need for Clear Competences in Times of Crisis. Clashes in the Coordination of Emergency Powers in Italy” (2020) Verfassungsblog <verfassungsblog.de/the-need-for-clear-competences-in-times-of-crisis/>.

13 For example, G Zagrebelsky, “Chi dice Costituzione violata non sa di cosa sta parlando”, Il Fatto Quotidiano (Rome, 1 May 2020) 6; G Azzariti, “Le misure sono costituzionali a patto che siano a tempo determinato”, La Repubblica (Rome, 8 March 2020); Luciani and Raffiotta, supra, note 8; B Caravita, “L’Italia ai tempi del coronavirus: rileggendo la Costituzione italiana” (2020) 5 Federalismi <www.federalismi.it/nv14/editoriale.cfm?eid=548>.

14 The mentioned “conversion” set aside the debate about the risk of “marginalising” Parliament.

15 See “Summary of the report on the work of the constitutional court in 2019”, available in English <www.cortecostituzionale.it>. See also L Giacomelli and E Lamarque “The Italian Constitutional Court and the Pandemic: A National and Comparative Perspective” in Hondius et al (eds), supra, note 10.

16 President Cartabia underlined that the Constitution does not provide for special rules in case of emergency, and this was a conscious choice. Some scholars suggested, on the contrary, a constitutional reform: see A Vedaschi and C Graziani, “Coronavirus Emergency and Public Law Issues: An Update on the Italian Situation” (2020) Verfassungsblog <verfassungsblog.de/coronavirus-emergency-and-public-law-issues-an-update-on-the-italian-situation/>.

17 Decree-Law No 19/2020 <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/03/25/20G00035/sg>, converted, with amendments, by Law No 35 of 22 May 2020 <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/05/23/20G00057/sg>. For an in-depth analysis, see Massa, supra, note 3.

18 Zagrebelsky, supra, note 13; Massa, supra, note 3.

19 Decree-Laws No 6/2020 and No 19/2020 stipulate that prior to the adoption of DPCMs the advice of the President of the Conference of the Regions, or of the presidents of the Regions themselves, for measures affecting only their territories is needed. For a detailed analysis, see F Cintioli, “Sul regime del lockdown in Italia” (2020) Federalismi <www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?Artid=41781>. Contra Delledonne and Padula, supra, note 10.

20 See the report of President Cartabia, supra, note 16, and the public statements by the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, on 5 March 2020 about the Coronavirus emergency <www.quirinale.it/elementi/45537>.

21 Administrative rulings about the pandemic are collected in the dedicated section of the official website: <www.giustizia-amministrativa.it/covid19-focus>. For a comment on the inconsistency among emergency orders adopted centrally and locally, see A D’Aloia, “L’art 120 Cost, la libertà di circolazione e l’insostenibile ipotesi delle ordinanze regionali di chiusura dei ‘propri confini’” (2020) Dirittifondamentali <dirittifondamentali.it/2020/04/18/lart-120-cost-la-liberta-di-circolazione-e-linsostenibile-ipotesi-delle-ordinanze-regionali-di-chiusura-dei-propri-confini/>.

22 Among Italian literature see, in general, E Mostacci, La soft law nel sistema delle fonti: uno studio comparato (Cedam, Padua 2008); A Somma (ed), Soft law e hard law nelle società post-moderne (Giappichelli, Turin 2009); M Ramajoli, “Soft law e diritto amministrativo” (2017) Dir Amm, 147–67. The notion of “soft law” is generally contrasted, in the literature, with that of “hard law” and its characteristics are inferred by their difference from those of enforceable norms, capable of prescribing legally binding commitments in clear and precise terms, ie hard law norms.

23 Posters and recordings of the webinars are available in the webpage of the Italian Association of Administrative Law Professors <https://www.aipda.it/>.

24 C Mancuso, “La giustizia di fronte all’emergenza: il rinnovato ruolo del soft law” (2020) Judicium <www.judicium.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Carolina-Mancuso.pdf>. See Massa, supra, note 3 who highlights how the use of “guidelines” started from Phase II, and M Dani and AJ Menéndez, “Soft-conditionality through soft-law: le insidie nascoste del Pandemic Crisis Support” (2020) laCostituzione.info <www.lacostituzione.info/index.php/2020/05/10/soft-conditionality-through-soft-law-le-insidie-nascoste-del-pandemic-crisis-support/> arguing that soft law force relies on a hard institutional commitment.

25 V Ottaviano, “Sulla nozione di ordinamento amministrativo e di alcune sue applicazioni” (1958) Riv trim dir pubbl 825.

26 N Bobbio, Il positivismo giuridico (Giappichelli, Turin 1997).

27 See eg MP Chiti, “A Rigid Constitution for a Flexible Administration: New Forms of Governance” (2004) ERPL 186–87; MA Sandulli, “Principio di legalità e effettività della tutela: spunti di riflessione alla luce del magistero scientifico di Aldo M Sandulli” (2015) Dir e soc, 649–70; MR Ferrarese La governance tra politica e diritto (Il Mulino, Bologna 2010) 36.

28 See Council of State, Section V, 2 March 2018, No 1299; Lombardia TAR, Milan, Section I, 29 January 2018, No 250; Lazio TAR, Rome, Section II ter, 17 June 2019, No 7836.

29 Council of State, Section V, 22 October 2018, No 6026.

30 Lazio TAR, Rome, Section I, 18 June 2019, No 7934; see also Council of State, Section V, 22 October 2018, No 6026, Lazio TAR, Rome, Section I, 15 July 2019, No 9308.

31 See <www.inail.it/cs/internet/comunicazione/pubblicazioni/catalogo-generale/pubbl-doc-tecn-ipotesi-rimod-parrucchieri-trattamenti-estetici.html>.

32 See, for example, Annex 17 – Guidelines for the reopening of Economic and Productive Activities of the Conference of Regions and Autonomous Provinces to DPCM of 17 May 2020 or Annex 1 – Guidelines for the reopening of Economic, Productive and Recreational Activities of the Conference of Regions and Autonomous Provinces to DPCM of 14 July 2020 <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/07/14/20A03814/sg>.

33 See <www.ordineavvocatiroma.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/PROT_5010-COA-ROMA.pdf>. For more examples, see <www.ordineavvocatiroma.it/emergenza-coronavirus/>.

34 According to Art 83 (7f) and (7h), of Legislative Decree No 18 of 17 March 2020, of 9 April 2020.

35 See the CSM resolution of 5 March, replaced with that of 26 March and further integrated on 1 April, which prepared guidelines containing more precise indications and recommendations to the heads of offices for the management of the two phases of the emergency. All the documents are available at <www.csm.it/web/csm-internet/-/emergenza-covid-19>.

36 Mancuso, supra, note 24. See also the CSM resolution of 4 November, which seeks to fill the gaps contained in the Decree-Law of 28 October 2020 No 137, This Decree-Law offers no suitable instruments to counterbalance the risk of groupings and contagion caused by the choice to carry out activities <www.csm.it/documents/21768/5144806/Emergenza+Covid+-+Linee+Guida+agli+Uffici+Giudiziari+%28Delibera+del+4+novembre+2020%29/53d9e4e3-8ce0-4ee5-fb3f-366bafd68641>.

37 Annexed to DPCM of 26 April 2020 and available at <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaArticolo?art.progressivo=0&art.idArticolo=1&art.versione=1&art.codiceRedazionale=20A02352&art.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2020-04-27&art.idGruppo=0&art.idSottoArticolo1=10&art.idSottoArticolo=1&art.flagTipoArticolo=6>.

38 The Technical-Scientific Committee is a public body created within the Department of Civil Protection. It is composed of experts and qualified representatives of the agencies and administrations of the state that support the head of department in activities aimed at overcoming the epidemiological emergency by Covid-19 <www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_1_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=notizie&p=dalministero&id=4544>.

39 See <www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/archivioNormativaNuovoCoronavirus.jsp>.

40 See L Rosenbaum, “Facing Covid-19 in Italy – Ethics, Logistics, and Therapeutics on the Epidemic’s Front Line” (18 March 2020) 382(20) New England Journal of Medicine 1873–75.

41 See <www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_2944_allegato.pdf>.

42 The Bruno Kessler Foundation is the research organisation of the Autonomous Province of Trento that operates in the field of scientific technology and human sciences.

43 See <www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioNotizieNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=notizie&p=dalministero&id=5036>.

44 See <www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_1_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=notizie&p=dalministero&id=503>.

45 See <www.governo.it/it/faq-iorestoacasa>.

46 See “‘Phase II’ – Frequently asked questions about the measures taken by the Government” <www.governo.it/it/faq-fasedue>.

47 See <www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/archivioFaqNuovoCoronavirus.jsp>.

48 For example, following the DPCM 3 November 2020, by specifying the division of “yellow”, “orange” and “red” areas on the national territory according to the contagion assessment, or what is meant by “condition of need”, which allows displacement between Regions despite the high contagion assessment, see <www.governo.it/it/articolo/domande-frequenti-sulle-misure-adottate-dal-governo/15638?gclid=Cj0KCQiAzZL-BRDnARIsAPCJs73fQi-VEqrf980wwcox1FEOVmJcJtBIyKA7JefuN_YHPWa4_bcDTiYaAu_ZEALw_wcB#zone>.

49 For example, for visits to minors whose parents are divorced, see <www.governo.it/it/articolo/domande-frequenti-sulle-misure-adottate-dal-governo/15638?gclid=Cj0KCQiAzZL-BRDnARIsAPCJs73fQi-VEqrf980wwcox1FEOVmJcJtBIyKA7JefuN_YHPWa4_bcDTiYaAu_ZEALw_wcB#zone>.

50 G Morbidelli, “Linee guida dell’ANAC: comandi o consigli?” (2016) Dir amm 273.

51 S Sotgiu, “Faq nuova fonte di diritto? Il governo faccia chiarezza. Parla Guzzetta” (April 2020) <formiche.net/2020/04/guzzetta-faq-restrizioni/> accessed August 2020. See also A Monti, “Linee guida, fonti del diritto e (ir)responsabilità”, arguing that the use of FAQ leads to the erosion of the boundaries separating the powers of the state, in particular between the executive and the courts interpreting the laws <formiche.net/2020/05/linee-guida-irresponsabilita/>.

52 For example, DPCM 26 April 2020, Art 1(1a) allows travel only to meet “relatives” (literally: congiunti). The word congiunti differs from the lexicon used by family law in the Italian civil code and laws. As a result, the government has resolved the confusion, providing through the FAQ an interpretation listing the subjects that can be considered congiunti and in particular highlighting that the meaning of the term can be indirectly derived, systematically, from the rules on kinship and affinity as well as from the jurisprudence on civil liability: <www.governo.it/it/faq-fasedue>.

53 Monti, supra, note 51, argues that this underlies the political choice of transferring risk and responsibility from institutions to private entities, including the weaker ones, without any protection mechanism.

54 They are referred to, for example, in the DPCM of 17 May 2020.

55 Mancuso, supra, note 24.

56 For example, in July 2020 a public tender was launched for the purchase of single-seater school desks, considered more respectful of the distancing measures recommended. The delay in the delivery of the new furniture, together with other issues related to the recruitment of teachers, has delayed the start of the school in some Regions <www.repubblica.it/scuola/2020/09/09/news/i_presidi_del_lazio_non_possiamo_aprire_e_l_anp_molte_scuole_non_riapriranno_nel_paese_-266699946/>.

57 Annex 17 to DPCM of 17 May 2020.

58 Sotgiu, supra, note 51.

59 See <www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/05/17/20A02717/sg>.

60 See Annex Nos 13 and 14 of the DCPM of 17 May 2020.

61 See Annex No 10 of the DPCM of 17 May 2020.

62 See Annex No 1, para 5 of the DCPM of 17 May 2020.

63 P de Marco, “Date a Cesare. Stato e Chiesa in pandemia” (2020) OLIR <www.olir.it/focus/pietro-de-marco-date-a-cesare-stato-e-chiesa-in-pandemia/>.

64 See Annex No 17 to the DPCM of 17 May 2020.

65 Available at <www.regioni.it/comunicato-stampa/2020/05/22/covind-19-e-fase-di-riapertura-conferenza-delle-regioni-approva-integrazione-delle-linee-guida-613161/>.

66 See <bur.regione.veneto.it/BurvServices/pubblica/DettaglioOrdinanzaPGR.aspx?id=420370>.

67 See <www.regione.campania.it/assets/documents/ordinanza-n-48-del-17-maggio-2020.pdf>.

68 See <www.regione.lazio.it/rl/coronavirus/wp-content/uploads/sites/72/BUR_16_05_2020_Z00041.pdf>.

69 “Coronavirus: in tutta Italia le proteste di chi vuole riaprire” ANSA (Rome, 30 April 2020) <www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2020/04/29/a-milano-la-protesta-dei-commercianti>.

70 The Italian Agency of Statistics analysed a sample of 90,000 firms and pointed out a high standard of attention to health precautions, even beyond imposed rules: see Istat “Situazioni e prospettive delle imprese nell’emergenza sanitaria COVID-19” <www.istat.it/it/files//2020/06/Imprese-durante-Covid-19.pdf>.

71 See eg <www.contecaqs.it/consulenza-sicurezza-azienda/la-certificazione-del-protocollo-sicurezza-anticontagio-da-covid-19-ai-fini-dellottenimento-del-marchio-anticovid/>, and <www.acsq.it/certificazioni/covid-free-certification.html>.