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Erasing the Vision Splendid? Unpacking the Formative Responses of the Federal Courts to the Fast Track Processing Regime and the ‘Limited Review’ of the Immigration Assessment Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Joel Townsend Open the ORCID record for Joel Townsend [Opens in a new window]  and
Hollie Kerwin
Joel Townsend*
Affiliation:
Economic and Social Rights, Victoria Legal Aid, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Hollie Kerwin*
Affiliation:
Human Rights Law Centre, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
*
The author may be contact at joel.townsend@vla.vic.gov.au
The author may be contacted at hollie.kerwin@vla.vic.gov.au.
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Abstract

The establishment of the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘IAA’) and the Fast Track Processing Regime for certain asylum seekers has posed new and important questions for Australian administrative law, especially in respect of the place, scope and effect of merits review. This article considers the early and formative jurisprudence of the federal courts in relation to ‘Fast Track decisions’ made by the IAA. It concludes that the Fast Track process represents a novel development in Australian public law: a partial review process which is not sufficient to correct the errors of the decision-maker at first instance but which appeared for a time capable of immunising elements of the decision from appeal or direct judicial review. It is, in its intention and current operation, more than a ‘targeted tinkering’ with the mechanics of merits review and of migration law in Australia. It deserves attention as it commences its journey through superior courts and as the regime settles into the Australian administrative law landscape.

Type
Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 185 - 209
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

Both authors practise principally in administrative and constitutional law, including previously in relation to decisions made by the Immigration Assessment Authority under Part 7AA of the Migration Act. The authors thank Maria O’Sullivan, Kerry Ford, Maya Narayan and Douglas McDonald-Norman for their generous reviews of earlier drafts of this article.

References

1. As recently as 2010, Stephen Gageler (then Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth) described migration law as being in a phase of only ‘targeted tinkering’ after a decade of more radical reform and challenge: Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 17(2) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 93.

2. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473FA (‘Migration Act’).

3. Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) review of migration decisions under pts 5 and 7 of the Migration Act apply, respectively, to most non-protection visa applications and protection visa applications (to which pt 7AA does not apply).

4. In most cases, this will be a boat arrival: Migration Act (n 2) s 5 (definition of ‘fast track applicant’).

5. Migration Act (n 2) s 473CA.

6. Ibid s 473CB.

7. See BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 448, 472 [87] (Charlesworth J) (‘BMB16’); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431, 442 [32].

8. See AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) FCR 503, 509–10 [17]–[18]. The question of the nature of the IAA’s review task may soon be explored in DVO16: see DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCATrans 51.

9. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 September 2014, 10545 (Scott Morrison, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection) (‘Second Reading Speech’).

10. See, eg, Klaus Neumann, Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History (Black Inc, 2015); Klaus Neumann, ‘“Queue Jumpers” and “Boat People”: The Way We Talk About Refugees Began in 1977’, The Guardian (online, 5 June 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/05/queue-jumpers-and-boat-people-the-way-we-talk-about-refugees-began-in-1977>; Adrienne Millbank, ‘Kind or Cruel: Labour’s Boat People Policies’ (2009) 17(4) People and Place 8.

11. Second Reading Speech (n 9) 10547. No empirical data were provided as to the ‘gaming’ of the system by any unmeritorious protection visa applicants.

12. Refugee Council of Australia, Recent Changes in Australian Refugee Policy <www.refugeecouncil.org.au/recent-changes-australian-refugee-policy/7/>: ‘From August 2012 until 2015, the government suspended refugee status determination (RSD) for people who arrived by boat after 13 August 2012’.

13. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 9.

14. See, eg, Mary Anne Kenny and Nicholas Procter, ‘Fast-Track Processing Risks Fairness for Efficiency’, The Conversation (online, 8 December 2014) <http://theconversation.com/fast-track-asylum-processing-risks-fairness-for-efficiency-35146>.

15. Emily McDonald and Maria O’Sullivan, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Refugees: Procedural Fairness in the Australian Fast-Track Regime’ (2018) 41(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1003.

16. See, eg, Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510, 577 [190] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

17. See, Robinson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] UKSC 11, 2 [2] (Lord Lloyd-Jones for the Court), citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Onibiyo [1996] QB 768, 781–2.

18. Cf Migration Act (n 2) ss 349, 415.

19. See ibid s 473DB.

20. See Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252, 266 [37] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).

21. See Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217 (‘M174’); BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 93 ALJR 1091 (‘BVD17’).

22. See Migration Act (n 2) s 473DD.

23. Second Reading Speech (n 9).

24. Most recently, where an instrument authorised by the Minister for Home Affairs to extend the regime to a further cohort of maritime arrivals was disallowed by the Senate. See Migration (IMMI 18/019: Fast Track Applicant Class) Instrument 2018 (Cth) and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 13 November 2018, 8009–16 (Nick McKim).

25. See Linda Kirk, ‘Accelerated Asylum Procedures in the United Kingdom and Australia: “Fast Track” to Refoulement?’ in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness (Hart Publishing, 2017) 243; McDonald and O’Sullivan (n 15).

26. See, eg, Calla Walquist, ‘Fast-Track Assessment Fundamentally Unfair to Refugees, High Court Told’, The Guardian (online, 7 December 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/dec/07/fast-track-assessment-fundamentally-unfair-to-refugees-high-court-told>.

27. BMB16 (n 7) 473 [91].

28. Ibid.

29. There is no express or implied constitutional guarantee of merits review in Australia. See, in this respect, the interplay of the principles set out in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482–3 [5] (‘Plaintiff S157/2002’); A-G (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35–6 (Brennan J).

30. This is itself a consequence of parliamentary freedom to ‘create and define the jurisdiction’ of executive bodies, as described in Plaintiff S157/2002 (n 29). Classic features of the merits review are capable of abrogation by Parliament by ‘express words or necessary intendment’: see, eg, Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 101 [41] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See also Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; Te Puia v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 263 CLR 1, see especially Edelman J from 48 [106] (‘Graham’).

31. Quoted in K O Shatwell, ‘Some Reflections on the Problems of Law Reform’ (1957) 31 Australian Law Journal 325, 340, cited in Graham (n 30) 35 [71] (Edelman J).

32. Robin Creyke, ‘Tribunals and Merits Review’ in Matthew Groves (ed), Modern Administrative Law in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 394.

33. Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report (Parliamentary Paper No 144, August 1971) 6 [18] (‘Kerr Committee Report’).

34. Ibid 90 [300].

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid 9 [20].

37. John McMillan, ‘Merit Review and the AAT: A Concept Develops’ in John McMillan (ed), The AAT—Twenty Years Forward: Papers Presented at a Conference to Mark the Twentieth Anniversary of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1–2 July 1996 (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1998) 32.

38. Kerr Committee Report (n 33) 88 [295].

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid 89 [297].

41. Linda Pearson, ‘The Vision Splendid: Australian Tribunals in the 21st Century’ in Anthony J Connolly and Daniel Stewart (eds), Public Law in the Age of Statutes: Essays in Honour of Dennis Pearce (The Federation Press, 2015) 161, 174.

42. McMillan (n 37) 35–54.

43. (1978) 1 ALD 167 (‘Lawlor’). See also the Federal Court appeal from this decision: Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 338 (‘Lawlor’).

44. McMillan (n 37) 39.

45. Ibid 42.

46. (1979) 46 FLR 409 (‘Drake’).

47. Ibid 419.

48. As Allars notes, this formula—’correct or preferable’—was advanced as a compendious label for the product of the AAT’s ‘structured decision-making process’: Margaret Allars, ‘The Nature of Merits Review: A Bold Vision Realised in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (2013) 41(2) Federal Law Review 197, 200.

49. (1980) 44 FLR 41.

50. Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 [134] (Kiefel J) (‘Shi’).

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid 293 [16] (Kirby J).

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid quoting Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2005] AATA 851 [24].

55. Shi (n 50).

56. Ibid 296 [29] (Kirby J), 315–6 [101] (Hayne and Heydon JJ), 332 [157] (Kiefel J, dissenting on a question relating to the Tribunal’s caution power on review, but in agreement with the other members of the Court on the scope of matters to be taken into account on merits review), 319 [117] (Crennan J).

57. Ibid 295 [25] (Kirby J), 311–2 [92] (Hayne and Heydon JJ), 324 [132] (Kiefel J, Crennan J agreeing at 319 [117]).

58. Ibid 296–7 [30] (Kirby J), 326 [139] (Kiefel J).

59. See, eg, ibid 298 [35] (Kirby J), 327 [141] (Kiefel J).

60. See, eg, ibid 315 [100] (Hayne and Heydon JJ).

61. Including a protection visa—see s 412, but not, since the introduction of pt 7AA, where the person is subject to the ‘Fast Track system’; see also, in relation to other decisions under the Act, ss 306, 347 and 500.

62. See generally Alan Freckelton, Administrative Decision-Making in Australian Migration Law, ed Marianne Dickie (ANU Press, 2015) 38–42.

63. Migration Act (n 2) ss 117–8, as at 31 December 1989.

64. Ibid s 349(2)(c).

65. Notably, decisions made by the Minister personally to cancel or refuse a visa under s 501 would not be subject to merits review: see Migration Act (n 2) s 501(1).

66. Pearson (n 41) 177.

67. Ibid. Typically, legislation confers jurisdiction on a large tribunal of wide jurisdiction exercising its own standard powers of review: see, eg, Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (Cth) s 43 (‘AAT Act’); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 51; Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) s 63.

68. For example, s 39A of the AAT Act regarding full participation in a hearing regarding adverse security assessments under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth).

69. For example, decisions to prosecute are not subject to such review, but the examples are innumerable.

70. Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2019) 266 CLR 250, 259 [21] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ) (‘Frugtniet’).

71. Pearson (n 41) 177.

72. (2017) 254 FCR 534 (‘AMA16’).

73. BMB16 (n 7).

74. M174 (n 21).

75. BVD17 (n 21).

76. AMA16 (n 72).

77. Ibid 555–6 [90]. See also: at 556 [91]–[92].

78. Ibid 556 [92].

79. Ibid. Dowsett J ‘generally agreed’ with the reasons of Griffiths J without specifically addressing this question: at 536 [1]; Charlesworth J did not address this issue: at [98].

80. BMB16 (n 7).

81. Ibid 465 [62] (Charlesworth J).

82. Ibid 454 [21] (Besanko J).

83. Ibid.

84. See Migration Act (n 2) ss 473BA, 473FA.

85. BMB16 (n 7) 450–1 [5]–[6] (Dowsett J).

86. Ibid 464 [59] (Charlesworth J), quoting BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 203, 22 [99] (Judge Brown) (emphasis in original).

87. Ibid 454–7 [25]–[31] (Besanko J).

88. Ibid 451 [9] (Dowsett J).

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid 470 [80] (Charlesworth J).

91. Ibid 458 [38] (Besanko J).

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid 457 [36].

94. Ibid 455 [20]–[34].

95. Ibid 455 [26].

96. Ibid 459 [45] (Charlesworth J).

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid 468 [76].

99. Ibid 471 [83].

100. Ibid 472 [87].

101. Ibid 471 [85].

102. Ibid 453 [17] (Dowsett J).

103. Ibid 453 [16].

104. Ibid 453 [15].

105. Ibid 455 [26] (Besanko J).

106. M174 (n 21).

107. Ibid 237–328 [57]–[58] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ).

108. Ibid 238 [59].

109. Ibid 241 [68].

110. Ibid 238 [62].

111. Ibid 239 [64].

112. Ibid 239 [63].

113. Ibid 233 [42].

114. Ibid 234 [43].

115. Ibid 235 [47].

116. Ibid 242 [71] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ), 246 [90] (Gordon J), 249 [97] (Edelman J).

117. Ibid 226 [17] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ).

118. Ibid 242 [70]. The plaintiff relied on the High Court’s decision in Banks v Transport Regulation Board (Vic) (1968) 119 CLR 222 (which predated the decision in Brian Lawlor) to argue that because of the limited merits review provided, ‘the delegate’s decision was not “supplanted” by the decision of the Authority’: Plaintiff M174/2016, ‘Plaintiff’s Submissions’, Submission in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 23 June 2017, 20 [86] n 58 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/m174-2016/Plf-M174-2016_Plf.pdf>.

119. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 367 [76] (‘Li’).

120. Second Reading Speech (n 9) 10547.

121. See, eg, the description of the pt 7AA regime as a ‘cloistered and non-adversarial context’: CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 94 ALJR 140, 148 [25] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J) (‘CNY17’).

122. (1995) 184 CLR 163, 177.

123. (2010) 239 CLR 531, 574 [73] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

124. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, ‘Peripheral Vision? Judicial Review in Australia’ (2014) 78 AIAL Forum 1, 13.

125. Justice Mark Leeming, ‘The Riddle of Jurisdictional Error’ (2014) 38(2) Australian Bar Review 139, 150.

126. Frugtniet (n 70) 25 [21] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ).

127. (2017) 257 FCR 111 (‘BBS16’).

128. Ibid 137 [72].

129. Ibid [74].

130. (2017) 254 FCR 221 (‘BVZ16’).

131. (2017) 257 FCR 111 [112].

132. Ibid 226 [19].

133. Ibid 225 [11].

134. Ibid 227 [23].

135. Ibid 228 [26]–[27].

136. Ibid 230 [36].

137. Ibid 230 [34].

138. Ibid [37].

139. Ibid 232 [47].

140. (2017) 257 FCR 148 (‘CHF16’).

141. Ibid 149 [5].

142. Ibid 158 [44].

143. (2018) 264 FCR 249 (‘CQW17’).

144. Ibid 254[23].

145. Ibid 258 [39].

146. Ibid 260 [54].

147. See further, EEM17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2018) 265 FCR 527. The High Court has recently confirmed that ‘the Authority [must] assess…new information…first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a)’: AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 94 ALJR 1007, 1010 [11] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ).

148. [2018] FCA 474 (‘CSR16’).

149. Ibid 481 [35]–[36].

150. Ibid 482 [39].

151. Ibid 483 [42].

152. Note, though, that the decision in CSR16 has been distinguished. See CRM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 3312 [18] where Judge Street found that the use of the term ‘credible’ without elaboration could be interpreted as referring to a preliminary finding about credibility and not a final finding on truth. Note also, implicitly, DSC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1414. Additionally, in DLB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 230 [22] the Court accepted that the IAA could take into account the credibility of new information at the stage of applying the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, arguably robbing the CSR16 principle of much impact.

153. BBS16 (n 127) 144–5 [106], confirmed by the High Court in M174 (n 21) 230–1 [33] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ).

154. Li (n 119). Cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611.

155. See, eg, Leighton McDonald, ‘Rethinking Unreasonableness Review’ (2014) 25 Public Law Review 117; Michael Barker and Alice Nagel, ‘Legal Unreasonableness: Life after Li’ (2015) 79 AIAL Forum 1.

156. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541, 551 [11] (Kiefel CJ).

157. (2017) 253 FCR 475 (‘CRY16’).

158. Ibid 476–7 [5]–[6].

159. CRY16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1549 [9]–[11].

160. Ibid [8], [12]. See below regarding BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 35.

161. (2017) 321 FLR 306 (‘DZU16’).

162. Ibid 334 [122].

163. CRY16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (n 159) [13]–[16].

164. CRY16 (n 157) 494 [82].

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid 491 [67].

168. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2018] HCASL 102.

169. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 (2018) 253 FCR 526.

170. Ibid 556 [117].

171. Ibid 536 [19].

172. Ibid 540–1 [34]–[37].

173. Ibid 536–8 [22].

174. Ibid 549–50 [79].

175. Ibid 550 [81].

176. Ibid 549 [79].

177. Ibid 546 [65].

178. (2018) 267 FCR 69.

179. Ibid 73 [20].

180. Ibid 83 [53].

181. Ibid 87 [68].

182. Ibid 88 [71].

183. Ibid 88 [70].

184. (2018) 258 FCR 551.

185. Ibid 569 [70].

186. Ibid 569 [74]. See also CGL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1747. Rangiah J distinguished CRY16 on the basis that, unlike in that case, the IAA did not, in the matter before him, have to obtain further information in order to discharge its function of ‘reviewing’ the application: at [22].

187. Indeed, in CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641, Thawley J rejected an argument that it was unreasonable for the IAA not to consider exercising the s 473DC discretion—the ‘question of legal unreasonableness is to be approached through the lens of the specific statutory scheme and not through the lens of the principles of natural justice’—the scheme contemplating the affirmation of a decision by a delegate without a hearing by the IAA: at [45], [53].

188. (2019) 269 FCR 134.

189. Ibid 150 [45] (Griffiths and Steward JJ), 153 [57] (Mortimer J). Mortimer J expressly drew attention to the ‘established connection’ between the concepts of legal unreasonableness and procedural fairness: at 157 [79].

190. Indeed, this is what the plaintiff argued had occurred in M174. See Plaintiff M174/2016, ‘Plaintiff’s Submissions’, Submission in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 23 June 2017 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/m174-2016/Plf-M174-2016_Plf.pdf>.

191. M174 (n 21) 226 [18] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ).

192. Ibid 227 [21] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ), 245 [86] (Gordon J), 249 [97] (Edelman J). This was reaffirmed recently, with the Court finding that ‘the reasonableness condition [could] compel the authority to exercise its powers to get and consider new information by inviting a referred applicant to an interview in order to assess and consider his or her demeanour in the conduct of a review’: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 94 ALJR 928, 933 [4] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).

193. M174 (n 21) 229 [27], 235–6 [49] (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ).

194. Ibid 249–50 [98] (Edelman J).

195. BVD17 (n 21).

196. Ibid 1097 [19] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

197. Ibid 1097 [19]–[20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

198. (2019) 264 CLR 421 (‘SZMTA’).

199. Ibid 440 [27] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), 454 [78], 466–7 [117] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). The majority held that in the absence of a ‘practical injustice’, a breach of procedural justice by failing to disclose the existence of a certificate would not constitute a jurisdictional error: at 443 [38] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ). The minority found that practical injustice was not a component of jurisdictional error but was to be taken into account on the question of discretionary refusal of relief: at 454–5 [79] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).

200. Ibid 441–3 [32]–[37] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).

201. BVD17 (n 21) 1098 [31] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

202. Ibid 1099 [34].

203. Ibid 1104 [61] (Edelman J). See also 1099 [34], 1100 [40] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

204. Ibid 1097–8 [27] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

205. Ibid 1100 [40].

206. Ibid 1097–8 [27], 1100 [40].

207. Interestingly, other ‘categories’ of jurisdictional error have been employed by courts to correct apparent procedural unfairness. In relation to the exclusion of common law hearing rights, see the novel successful application of a bias argument in AMA16 (n 72) and more recently, FSG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 456. The recent High Court decision, CNY17 (n 121), is another successful review on that basis. The peculiarities of Fast Track Review, including the absence of a hearing right, and restrictions on the degree to which new information may be taken into account, were apparently important to the plurality in finding that a fair-minded observer would have, in that case, apprehended bias: at 158 [94] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).