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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
Liberal democracies have struggled recently with protecting freedom of speech and assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is an old, general problem in new, specific guise. In Australia, the Supreme Court of New South Wales has been exercising a statutory jurisdiction to ‘authorise’ or ‘prohibit’ proposed public assemblies for 40 years. This article offers the first sustained analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence. After describing the operation of the statutory permit scheme and systematising the case law, this article critiques the Court’s jurisprudence from the perspective of free speech and freedom of assembly. It then argues that there is a puzzle at the heart of the legislative scheme: the conferral of a wide discretion the exercise of which produces a narrow legal order. This puzzle suggests that the legal effect of an authorising or prohibiting order does not exhaust its broader social significance.
I am grateful, with the standard disclaimer, to Simon Bronitt, Ben Chen, Andrew Edgar, Peter Gerangelos, Bradley Gooding, Alexandra Grey, Emily Hammond, Carolyn McKay, Simon Rice, Rayner Thwaites, Anne Twomey, Kevin Walton, the two anonymous referees, and participants in three events hosted by Sydney Law School: The Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence Seminar in November 2020, the ECA Workshop in May 2021, and the ECA Symposium in Law and Justice in July 2021.
1. Balancing may or may not be an appropriate methodology, but authorities do describe the regulatory task as striking a balance: Commissioner of Police v Allen (1984) 14 A Crim R 244, 251 (‘Allen’). See also Simon Bronitt and George Williams, ‘Political Freedom as an Outlaw: Republican Theory and Political Protest’ (1996) 18(2) Adelaide Law Review 289, 294–5; Tim Legrand and Simon Bronitt, ‘Policing the G20 Protests: “Too Much Order With Too Little Law” Revisited’ (2015) 22(1) Queensland Review 3, 11.
2. Public Assemblies Act 1979 (NSW).
3. Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) pt 4. The Public Assemblies Act 1979 (NSW) met with some criticism: Robin Handley, ‘“Serious Affront” and the NSW Public Assemblies Legislation’ (1986) 10(5) Criminal Law Journal 287. But in 1988 the government regarded the permit scheme as having ‘operated successfully for the past nine years’: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 31 May 1988, 807 (John Dowd, Attorney-General); New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 2 June 1988, 1339 (Ted Pickering, Minister for Police and Emergency Services). In 1991, the Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission agreed that the permit system in New South Wales worked well: Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, Review of Public Assembly Law (Report, February 1991) 52 [5.52], 54 [5.65], 65 [6.73], 74 [7.33], 95 [8.27] (‘Review of Public Assembly Law’). For a more recent sanguine view, see Roger Douglas, Dealing with Demonstrations: The Law of Public Protest and its Enforcement (Federation Press, 2004) 68. For some critical perspectives, see Daniel Meyerowitz-Katz and Benjamin Brady, ‘Protest Prohibited: Commissioner of Police v Keep Sydney Open’ (March 2017) LSJ: Law Society of NSW Journal 90; Human Rights Law Centre, Say it Loud: Protecting Protest in Australia (Report, December 2018) 15.
4. Allen (n 1) 251.
5. Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 4A.
6. For example, the legal category of ‘offensive language’ under s 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) can and should be given content by binding precedent, even if little is currently available: Julia Quilter and Luke McNamara, ‘Time to Define “The Cornerstone of Public Order Legislation”: The Elements of Offensive Conduct and Language under the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW)’ (2013) 36(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 534, 546; cf Handley (n 3) 290 n 16. When exercising the permit-scheme discretion, however, Bellew J pushed aside prior decisions because they can offer only ‘limited assistance … the facts and circumstances of cases necessarily differ’: Commissioner of Police v Holcombe [2020] NSWSC 1428, [38] (‘Holcombe’).
7. Commissioner of Police v Bassi [2020] NSWSC 710 (‘Bassi’); Commissioner of Police v Supple [2020] NSWSC 727 (‘Supple’); Commissioner of Police v Kumar [2020] NSWSC 804 (‘Kumar’); Commissioner of Police v Gray [2020] NSWSC 867 (‘Gray’); Commissioner of Police v Gibson [2020] NSWSC 953 (‘Gibson’); Holcombe (n 6); Commissioner of Police v Thomson [2020] NSWSC 1424 (‘Thomson’). Bassi and Gibson were appealed, but the Court of Appeal did not review the primary judge’s exercise of discretion: Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186; Gibson v Commissioner of Police (2020) 102 NSWLR 900.
8. Ian Freckelton, ‘COVID-19: Criminal Law, Public Assemblies and Human Rights Litigation’ (2020) 27(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 790, 797. See also Greg Martin, ‘Protest, Policing and Law During COVID-19: On the Legality of Mass Gatherings in a Health Crisis’ (2021) 46(4) Alternative Law Journal 275, 279–80.
9. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 April 1979, 4677.
10. See generally Dan Meagher, ‘Is There A Common Law “Right” to Freedom of Speech?’ (2019) 43(1) Melbourne University Law Review 269.
11. Eg International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 19(2).
12. The index cases are Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
13. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, rev ed, 2005) 334–56.
14. Illegitimate force, even if it expresses an important political message, cannot claim the protection of free speech; it is ‘too disruptive of the democratic process to be permitted by the rules of order of political debate’: Ibid 336.
15. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982) 7–8.
16. For an Australia-wide treatment, see Douglas (n 3). See also Roger A Brown, ‘“And Hast Thou Slain the Jabberwock?” The Law Relating to Demonstrations in the ACT’ (1974-1975) 6(1) Federal Law Review 107; Robin Handley, ‘The Right of Peaceful Assembly in the ACT’ (Occasional Paper No 8, Human Rights Commission, February 1985); Review of Public Assembly Law (n 3).
17. Peaceful Assembly Act 1992 (Qld). This legislation has been suspended during prominent events: Legrand and Bronitt (n 1) 3–6, 7. For an overview of permit systems in Australia, see Douglas (n 3) 58–69.
18. A-G (Qld) v Sri [2020] QSC 246.
19. See, eg, R (Jones) v Commissioner of Police [2020] 1 WLR 519; Leigh v Commissioner of Police [2021] EWHC 661 (Admin); DPP v Ziegler [2021] 3 WLR 179; Givens v Newsom, 459 F Supp 3d 1302 (ED Cal, 2020), affd 830 F App 560 (9th Cir, 2020).
20. Vicki Sentas and Michael Grewcock, ‘Criminal Law as Police Power: Serious Crime, Unsafe Protest and Risks to Public Safety’ (2018) 7(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 75, 84.
21. Bronitt and Williams (n 1) 307, 314, 323–5.
22. Importantly, the public-order offences discussed here do not exhaust the substantive offences that can be deployed against protesters. See, eg, Roads and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2022 (NSW); Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW); Sentas and Grewcock (n 20) 81–2; Murray Lee, ‘Policing the Pedal Rebels: A Case Study of Environmental Activism Under COVID-19’ (2021) 10(2) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 156.
23. Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) ss 4, 4A.
24. Ibid s 6.
25. Ibid s 8.
26. Ibid s 8A.
27. Public Health Act 2010 (NSW) ss 10, 117.
28. Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No 2) 2021 (NSW) cls 3.13, 4.14.
29. ‘Timber Workers’ Strike’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 4 February 1929) 11; ‘Riotous Demonstration in City Streets’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 28 March 1929) 15; New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 1929, 384–7 (Tom Bavin, Premier), 376 (Jack Lang).
30. From 1990 to 1999, there were only 14 court appearances for s 545C: David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot’s Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South Wales (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2001) 1026. From 2010 to 2020, there was only one finalised charge under s 545C: Email from NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research Information Service to Jeffrey Gordon, 31 August 2021.
31. Young J left the question open in Black v Corkery (1988) 33 A Crim R 134, 138 (appeal allowed on other grounds in Corkery v Black [1989] NSWCA 49).
32. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) sch 3 cl 3, originally enacted as Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988 (NSW) sch 1 cl 2.
33. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) sch 1 tbl 1 cl 10.
34. Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 11A.
35. Jane Sanders and Edward Elliot, ‘Affray: What Is It, and What Is It Not?’ (2012) 36(6) Criminal Law Journal 368.
36. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 197. See also Luke McNamara and Julia Quilter, ‘Criminalising Protest Through the Expansion of Police “Move-On” Powers: A Case Study from Australia’ (2019) 58 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 22.
37. LEPRA s 199.
38. Ibid s 200(2). Before 2016, police were generally prohibited from directing protesters to move on: McNamara and Quilter (n 36).
39. NSW Police, ‘153 Arrested; 573 PINs to be Issued Over Unauthorised Protest Activity Across NSW’ (Latest News, 31 August 2021), archived at <https://perma.cc/3G3W-W5AC?type=image>.
40. See generally Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2017) 901–2.
41. LEPRA ss 99(1)(a), (b). Leading authorities on reasonable suspicion include R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; Hyder v Commonwealth (2012) 217 A Crim R 571. Enumerated reasons are listed in LEPRA s 99(1)(b).
42. Public Health Act s 10; Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No 2) 2021 (NSW) cls 3.13, 4.14.
43. Poidevin v Samaan (2013) 85 NSWLR 758, 763 [18] (Leeming JA); Binsaris v Northern Territory (2020) 94 ALJR 664, 670–1 [28] (Gageler J) (‘Binsaris’); Forbutt v Blake (1981) 51 FLR 465 (‘Forbutt’).
44. New South Wales v Bouffler (2017) 95 NSWLR 521, 553–4 [164] (‘Bouffler’); R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2007] 2 AC 105, 124 [28] (‘Laporte’). Although a centuries-old idea, breach of the peace remains bedevilled by indeterminacy. Glanville Williams wrote in 1954 that breach of the peace ‘seems clearer than it is and there is a surprising lack of authoritative definition of what one would suppose to be a fundamental concept in criminal law’: Glanville Williams, ‘Arrest for Breach of the Peace’ [1954] Criminal Law Review 578, 578. Since the 1990s, courts in the United Kingdom have hewed closely to a conception of breach of the peace rooted in ‘violence or threatened violence’: Laporte [2007] 2 AC 105, 123 [27]. But in New South Wales, breach of the peace is a ‘multifaceted’ notion that ‘includes a wide range of actions and threatened actions that interfere with the ordinary operation of civil society’: Bouffler (2017) 95 NSWLR 521, 553–4 [159]–[164]. It is even an open question whether that description of breach of the peace is ambiguous: Fletcher v New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 31, [2] (Beazley P), [11] (Basten JA), [32] (Payne JA). See also Bronitt and Williams (n 1) 315–23; Bronitt and McSherry (n 40) 879–85, 889–92.
45. NSW Police, ‘Six Arrested During Unauthorised Public Assembly – Sydney CBD’ (Latest News, 28 July 2020), archived at <https://perma.cc/L8T4-TJ47?type=image>. See also Louise Boon-Kuo et al, ‘Policing Biosecurity: Police Enforcement of Special Measures in New South Wales and Victoria during the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (2021) 33(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 76.
46. For offensive conduct, offensive language and obstructing traffic, see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ch 7 pt 3; Criminal Procedure Regulation 2017 (NSW) sch 4. For failing to comply with a move-on direction, see LEPRA ss 199, 235; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) r 53. For participating in an outdoor public gathering of more than two people, see Public Health Act s 10; Public Health Regulation 2012 (NSW) sch 4 pt 1 item (c)(ii); Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No 2) 2021 (NSW) cls 3.13, 4.14.
47. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 334; Fines Act 1996 (NSW) s 20.
48. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 339. There is no equivalent provision in the Fines Act 1996 (NSW).
49. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ch 3 pt 2 div 1, ch 4 pt 2 div 1.
50. Binsaris (n 43) 670–1 [28]–[29], 672–3 [39]–[40] (Gageler J); Poidevin v Samaan (n 43) 766–7 [33]–[34] (Leeming JA). A ‘leading case’ is Humphries v Connor (1864) 17 ICLR 1: Williams (n 44) 590. The power endorsed by Humphries v Connor ‘continues to be part of the common law of Australia’, at least for those plaintiffs who are witting or unwitting provocateurs: Poidevin v Samaan (n 43) 764 [20] (Leeming JA); Binsaris (n 43) 673 [40] (Gageler J).
51. See, eg, Ball v McIntyre (1966) 9 FLR 237 (‘Ball’), which has been affectionately referred to as one of our ‘old friends’: Burns v Seagrave [2000] NSWSC 77, [12] (Simpson J). In Ball at 241, Kerr J, the future Governor-General, held that a charge of offensive behaviour ‘is not available to ensure punishment of those who differ from the majority’.
52. (1882) 15 Cox CC 138.
53. Ibid 145 (Field J), 148 (Cave J).
54. Ibid 147.
55. In Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218, 222, Lord Hewart CJ described Beatty v Gillbanks as a ‘somewhat unsatisfactory case’.
56. In Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) 163 JP 789, Sedley LJ said that he did not understand why Lord Hewart CJ thought Beatty v Gillbanks ‘somewhat unsatisfactory’, and that Duncan v Jones represented ‘[t]he old order’. See also Forbutt (n 43) 475.
57. New South Wales v Robinson (2019) 266 CLR 619, 655 [62]–[63], 671–2 [109]–[111] (Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
58. Ibid 665 [93].
59. (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182.
60. Ibid 188.
61. Public Assemblies Act 1979 (NSW).
62. Brown et al (n 30) 1028; Summary Offences Act 1970 (NSW) pt 2 div 6.
63. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 April 1979, 4677.
64. Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 23.
65. Ibid s 23(f).
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid s 25.
68. Ibid s 26.
69. Ibid s 24.
70. Ibid s 6; Allen (n 1) 246.
71. Allen (n 1) 246–7.
72. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 545C; New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 April 1979, 4932; Commissioner of Police v Gabriel (2004) 141 A Crim R 566, 567 [2] (‘Gabriel’).
73. Allen (n 1) 246.
74. Ibid.
75. Commissioner of Police v Rintoul [2003] NSWSC 662, [24] (‘Rintoul’).
76. Ibid.
77. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 April 1979, 4677.
78. Gray (n 7) [50]–[57]. This point was assumed, but not decided, in Kumar (n 7) [30].
79. If this construction was wrong, Adamson J would have held that participation in an authorised public assembly is a ‘reasonable excuse’ under s 10 of the Public Health Act. Gray (n 7) [57].
80. Gray (n 7) [50].
81. Ibid [51].
82. Ibid [53].
83. Ibid [56].
84. Ibid [50].
85. Allen (n 1) 246.
86. Gray (n 7) [50].
87. Ibid.
88. LEPRA s 200(4).
89. Gray (n 7) [22].
90. LEPRA s 200(3). Section 200(2) does not refer in terms to authorised public assemblies. Presumably an authorised public assembly will count as an apparently genuine demonstration or protest, a procession, or an organised assembly.
91. McNamara and Quilter (n 36); Sentas and Grewcock (n 20) 84.
92. Sydney Public Reserves (Public Safety) Act 2017 (NSW) s 11; Roads Regulation 2018 (NSW) rr 48(2), 61(2).
93. Commissioner of Police v Bainbridge (2007) 175 A Crim R 226, 229 [15], [17] (‘Bainbridge’). See also Handley (n 3) 291–2; Douglas (n 3) 63–4.
94. Allen (n 1) 245.
95. Gabriel (n 72) 567 [1].
96. Commissioner of Police v Langosch [2012] NSWSC 499, [19] (‘Langosch’); Commissioner of Police v Folkes [2015] NSWSC 1887, [11] (‘Folkes’); Gray (n 7) [43].
97. Allen (n 1) 245.
98. Commissioner of Police v Ridgewell [2014] NSWSC 1138, [4] (‘Ridgewell’); Rintoul (n 75) [23]–[24]; Gabriel (n 72) 568 [4].
99. Gabriel (n 72) 568 [5].
100. Allen (n 1) 250–3; Rintoul (n 75) [5]–[7], [21]–[24]; Gabriel (n 72) 567–8 [4]; Bainbridge (n 93) 229 [16]; Commissioner of Police v Keep Sydney Open Ltd [2017] NSWSC 5, [9] (‘Keep Sydney Open’); Supple (n 7) [6]–[7]; Kumar (n 7) [24]–[26].
101. Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186, 191 [17] (observation (vi)).
102. Rintoul (n 75) [6], [23].
103. Gabriel (n 72) 571 [15].
104. Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186, 187–8 [7].
105. See, eg, Review of Public Assembly Law (n 3) 54 [5.62]; David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot’s Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South Wales (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 568; Bronitt and McSherry (n 40) 934. Obtaining accurate yearly data on the total number (and outcome) of permits sought across New South Wales is difficult. A request to New South Wales Police under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) was considered too broad and likely to require a substantial and unreasonable diversion of resources.
106. It is unclear how many applications settle before hearing. See, eg, Christopher Harris, ‘Short March to Town Hall, but Long Road to Justice’, CityHub (online, 18 February 2016) <https://cityhubsydney.com.au/?p=113897>.
107. Bainbridge (n 93) 229 [16].
108. Kumar (n 7) [4].
109. Allen (n 1) 245.
110. Ibid 252, 255.
111. Rintoul (n 75) [5].
112. Commissioner of Police v Vranjkovic (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Lee J, 28 November 1980) 6–7 (‘Vranjkovic’); Commissioner of Police v Willis (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Lee J, 22 April 1983) 8, 10–11 (‘Willis’); Allen (n 1) 245, 251–2, 255; Rintoul (n 75) [5], [22]; Gabriel (n 72) [1]; Bainbridge (n 93) 229 [15], [17], 233 [33]; Commissioner of Police v Jackson [2015] NSWSC 96, [67], [90] (‘Jackson’); Keep Sydney Open (n 100) [9].
113. Gray (n 7) [59].
114. Allen (n 1) 252.
115. Bassi (n 7) [31]. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from Fagan J’s refusal to authorise the assembly, but the appeal involved some ‘very narrow’ notice issues, not the ‘difficult weighing exercise’ that the statute requires: Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186, 187–8 [7]. Indeed, in a subsequent case, Lonergan J went so far as to say that the Court of Appeal ‘accepted and approved’ Fagan J’s ‘approach to the judicial task’ at first instance in Bassi: Kumar (n 7) [26].
116. Bassi (n 7) [31].
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order (No 3) 2020 (NSW) cl 10(3)(a), sch 2 item 7.
120. Michael Pelly, ‘A “Different Style” of Justice Post-Pandemic’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 19 June 2020) 33.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. The pandemic certainly posed challenges for open justice. Courts were rightly anxious to protect open justice as much as possible: Michael Legg, ‘The COVID-19 Pandemic, the Courts and Online Hearings: Maintaining Open Justice, Procedural Fairness and Impartiality’ (2021) 49(2) Federal Law Review 161, 166–9.
124. ‘Black Cyclist’s Death Sparks Sydney Riot’, The Guardian (London, 16 February 2004) 12; Nicole Watson, ‘Policing of Indigenous People in Australia: Justice is Still Elusive’ (2007) 6(25) Indigenous Law Bulletin 10; Raul Bassi, ‘TJ Hickey: 14 Years and Still No Justice’, Green Left (Sydney, 13 February 2018) 8.
125. Jackson (n 112) [86]–[87].
126. See, eg, City of Melbourne v Barry (1922) 31 CLR 174, 208–9; Watson v Trenerry (1998) 122 NTR 1, 8; R v Roberts [2019] 1 WLR 2577, 2589 [37].
127. Jackson (n 112) [86].
128. Ibid [87].
129. Ibid.
130. Vranjkovic (n 112) 5–6.
131. Willis (n 112) 1; Allen (n 1) 247–8.
132. Malcolm Brown, ‘24,000 on the March: Anzac Spirit Lives On’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 26 April 1983) 3; Greg Roberts, ‘Old Soldiers Parade, but it’s a Day of Protest for Some’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 26 April 1984) 3.
133. Willis (n 112) 10–11.
134. Allen (n 1) 250.
135. Rintoul (n 75) [7], [23]; Langosch (n 96) [22]; Ridgewell (n 98) [6]; Jackson (n 112) [18]; Commissioner of Police v Da Costa-Reidel [2019] NSWSC 198, [21] (‘Da Costa-Reidel’).
136. Vranjkovic (n 112) 5–6.
137. Jackson (n 112) [71].
138. Ibid [23], [27], [63].
139. Ibid [50], [60].
140. Ibid.
141. On the day of the 2014 march, Detective Superintendent Luke Freudenstein said: ‘We had 200 people there. We make an arrest, there’s going to be disruption, there’s going to be a bit of a brawl. And that’s OK, but there’s further disruption to the traffic.’ ‘Thomas “TJ” Hickey Rally in Redfern, Sydney, Could Be Last After Brawls Lead to Traffic Disruption: Police’, ABC News (online, 14 February 2014) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-14/police-warn-tj-hickey-rally-could-be-last/5260536>.
142. Jackson (n 112) [93]. Especially after Prior v Mole (2017) 261 CLR 265, it seems that courts will treat police evidence on the likelihood of violence as inherently more probative than organiser evidence.
143. Bainbridge (n 93).
144. Ibid 231 [24].
145. Ridgewell (n 98).
146. Ibid [18].
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid [15], [18].
151. David E Pozen, ‘From the Heckler’s Veto to the Provocateur’s Privilege’ in David E Pozen (ed), The Perilous Public Square: Structural Threats to Free Expression Today (Columbia University Press, 2020) 62.
152. (1882) 15 Cox CC 138.
153. Bainbridge (n 93) 232 [27].
154. See, eg, Folkes (n 96) [55]–[56], [58].
155. Langosch (n 96) [31].
156. Bassi (n 7) [20].
157. Da Costa-Reidel (n 135).
158. Ibid [13].
159. Ibid [24].
160. Bainbridge (n 93) 233 [33].
161. Bassi (n 7) [20].
162. Bainbridge (n 93) 232 [28].
163. Ibid.
164. Langosch (n 96) [31], [34].
165. Plumb v Commissioner of Police (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Barr AJ, 28 May 2010) (‘Plumb’).
166. Ibid [5].
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid [16]–[17].
169. Ibid [18].
170. Gray (n 7) [59].
171. Ibid.
172. Holcombe (n 6) [65].
173. Ibid [66]–[67].
174. See, eg, Michael Hamilton, ‘The Meaning and Scope of “Assembly” in International Human Rights Law’ (2020) 69(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 521, 525–34, 552–6. I am grateful to Rayner Thwaites for pressing the distinction between the freedoms of expression and assembly.
175. Willis (n 112) 3, 4, 8, 11.
176. Allen (n 1) 252.
177. Gabriel (n 72) 568 [7].
178. Allen (n 1) 254.
179. Ibid 251.
180. Ibid 252.
181. Ibid.
182. Willis (n 112) 3.
183. Allen (n 1) 249.
184. Willis (n 112) 12.
185. Ibid 4.
186. Allen (n 1) 252.
187. Ibid 253.
188. Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J dissenting).
189. Rintoul (n 75) [23].
190. Gabriel (n 72) 571 [15].
191. Ibid.
192. (2000) 3 HKCFAR 339.
193. Ibid 352–4 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead NPJ, Li CJ agreeing at 345, Bokhary PJ agreeing at 346, Ribeiro PJ agreeing at 346, Sir Denys Roberts NPJ agreeing at 346).
194. Public Health Act s 10.
195. Ministry of Health (NSW), ‘NSW Public Health Alert – COVID-19 Case’ (Media Release, 16 June 2021); Ministry of Health (NSW), ‘COVID-19 Weekly Surveillance in NSW: Epidemiological Week 24, Ending 19 June 2021’ (Report, 28 June 2021) 7.
196. Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No 2) Amendment (No 7) Order 2021 sch 1 item 20.
197. Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186, 191 [19].
198. Bassi (n 7) [27].
199. Ibid [33].
200. Kumar (n 7) [2].
201. Supple (n 7) [39].
202. Kumar (n 7) [3].
203. Gibson (n 7) [82], [84]; Holcombe (n 6) [57].
204. Gray (n 7); Thomson (n 7). An appeal was successful in Bassi but on narrow notice grounds: Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186.
205. Gray (n 7) [63], [66], [69].
206. Thomson (n 7) [79], [85], [86], [90]–[92].
207. In Jackson, a police officer who testified for the Commissioner was an expert in crowd control but not a third party. Jackson (n 112) [79]. See also Martin (n 8) 5–6.
208. Ridgewell (n 98) [4].
209. Allen (n 1) 250, cited by Rintoul (n 75) [7], [23]; Langosch (n 96) [22]; Ridgewell (n 98) [6]; Jackson (n 112) [18]; Da Costa-Reidel (n 135) [21].
210. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 April 1979, 4677.
211. See, eg, Rintoul (n 75) [24].
212. See, eg, Allen (n 1) 250.
213. Bassi (n 7) [31]; Kumar (n 7) [57]. It is not entirely clear whether Walton J also agreed. Supple (n 7) [42].
214. Rintoul (n 75) [23].
215. Holcombe (n 6) [38].
216. City of Melbourne v Barry (1922) 31 CLR 174, 198.
217. Allen (n 1) 245. See also Handley (n 3) 291.
218. Kevin Nguyen, ‘Enormous Crowds March in Sydney Black Lives Matter Protest After Last-Ditch win in Court of Appeal’, ABC News (online, 6 June 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-06/arrests-at-sydney-black-lives-matter-protests/12329066>.
219. For an early example, see ‘Croatian March Banned, but Expected to Proceed’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 29 November 1980) 11. For a more recent example, see Elizabeth Colman and Patricia Karvelas, ‘Court Allows Protest Rally at Ruddock’s Home’, The Australian (Sydney, 19 July 2003) 6.
220. For a particularly noisy signal, witness the Bassi appeal. The Court of Appeal was at pains to emphasise that its decision emphatically ‘did not … turn on a difficult weighing exercise’ but instead on ‘very narrow’ notice issues: Bassi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2020) 283 A Crim R 186, 187–8 [7]. Yet the public and the media (among others) wrongly viewed the appellate decision as a substantive validation of the protest. I am grateful to Anne Twomey for pressing this point.
221. Folkes (n 96) [57]; Handley (n 3) 291; Douglas (n 3) 116.
222. Jackson (n 112) [96].
223. Meredith Burgmann, ‘The Women Against Rape in War Collective’s Protests Against ANZAC Day in Sydney, 1983 and 1984’ (2014) 6 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal 116, 119.
224. Matthew Odlum, ‘168 Arrested as Women Defy “No March” Order’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 26 April 1983) 3.
225. Connolly v Willis [1984] 1 NSWLR 373, 375; Chris Ronalds, ‘Anzac Day and the Aftermath’ (1983) 8 Legal Service Bulletin 133, 133; Douglas (n 3) 63 n 114.
226. Offences in Public Places Act 1979 (NSW) s 5, later amended by Offences in Public Places (Amendment) Act 1983 (NSW) sch 1 item 1; Ronalds (n 225) 133; Kate Harrison, ‘“What Did You Do in the War, Mummy?”: Supreme Court Order’ (1983) 8 Legal Service Bulletin 132, 133.
227. Connolly v Willis (n 225).
228. Burgmann (n 223) 120.
229. Karen Cooke, Report on the Sydney Women Against Rape March, The Age (Melbourne, 26 April 1984) 4.
230. Rosalind Reines, ‘Sydney Anti-Rape March Peaceful’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 26 April 1984) 3.
231. The description in this paragraph is based on: Angela Cuming and Andrew West, ‘Disorder at the House’, The Sun Herald (Sydney, 20 July 2003) 20; Joe Hildebrand, ‘Violence as Police Barricade Marchers from Ruddock’s Home’, AAP General News (Sydney, 19 July 2003), Factiva Accession No AAP0000020030720dz7j0000c.
232. NSW Police, ‘Police Operations Conclude Following Protests Across NSW’ (Latest News, 6 June 2020), archived at <https://perma.cc/MSG3-2A6U?type=image>.
233. Ibid.
234. Laura Chung, ‘Black Lives Matter Protest Over Before It Began’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 29 July 2020) 6.
235. Ibid; NSW Police, ‘Six Arrested During Unauthorised Public Assembly – Sydney CBD’ (Latest News, 28 July 2020), archived at <https://perma.cc/L8T4-TJ47?type=image>.