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Can Criminal Prosecution be the Answer to massive Human Rights Violations?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Christoph J.M. Safferling

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Almost 60 years after the surviving Nazi-leaders were tried in the first ever international criminal tribunal for mass atrocities during World War II in Nuremberg, criminal responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is perceived of as somewhat normal. Even if it is not yet an everyday event that human rights abusers are tried on an international level, the reality of the possibility of such a trial is present in the minds of the attentive public. This change was achieved over the last ten years. The establishing of the Yugoslavia-tribunal in 1993 was the turning point. Since then a number of both national and international trials held against human rights criminals has given the topic high priority. Finally the International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded and after a comparatively short time actually established and put in a position to operate. Sierra Leone relies on criminal prosecution in order to rebuild its society after a distracted and bloody civil war and a trial against Saddam Hussein seems a necessity. Many expectations are connected to criminal law and the working of the ICC. The dream of a world-wide justice, i.e. to attribute “just desert” to the offenders and to do justice to the victims, seems to have become reality. At the same time the establishing of an international criminal court is understood as a signal that will deter future offenders from committing human rights atrocities. The paper of Alexandra Kemmerer gives proof of how optimistically the EU promotes the idea of international criminal justice.

Type
Special Issue
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 5 , Issue 12: Special issue - The Political Economy of Jurisdiction for Human Rights. Papers from the 2nd International German Law Journal Workshop, Duke University Law School, 29 Oct 2004 , 01 December 2004 , pp. 1469 - 1488
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by German Law Journal GbR 

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35 Cf. Article 32 § 2 Rome Statute; although the general rule is in accordance with the Anglo-American tradition ignorantia iuris not excusat, a mistake of law is notwithstanding accepted as an excuse, if it negates the mental element required by the prohibition. The English practice in this regard shows that a wide interpretation is possible; see e.g. House of Lords Brutus v. Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297, and R. v. Smith DR [1974] 1 All ER 632; Privy Council in the case Beckford v. R. [1987] 3 All ER 411; therefore I consider Kai Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrecht 817-819 (2002) to hold a too pessimistic view of the concept of mistake of law.Google Scholar

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50 Not much research has been done in this field. What effect does mass victimisation have on the persecuted group? What are the long term effects on children suffering from persecution and war? Are the feeling of resentment also transferred to the next generation? See Uwe Ewald/Constanze v. Oppeln, War – Victimization – Security: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia, in: 10 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 39 (2002); Christina Möller, Völkerstrafrecht und Internationaler Strafgerichtshof – kriminologische, straftheoretische und rechtspolitische Aspekte (2003); Christoph Safferling, Das Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen, in: 115 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 352 (2003).Google Scholar

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54 International criminal prosecution had to solve this conflict from the very beginning on. At the ICTY the question of anonymity of witnesses for the prosecution caused trouble and necessitated a whole set of decisions; see e.g. Christoph Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure 226-239, 283-288 (2003); and in greater detail as concerns the Rules and the position of the victim at the ICC, see Christoph Safferling, Das Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen, in: 115 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 352 (2003) with further references.Google Scholar

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60 The ongoing debate whether capital punishment has a substantial deterrent effect is of no general interest here, because in international criminal law, the death penalty is no option. It is however important to note that even for the most severe and ultimate penalty no conclusive empirical proof exist that it actually deters people from offending, cf. recently Lisa Stolzenberg&Stewart J D'Alessio, Capital punishment, execution publicity and murder in Houston, Texas, in: 94 J. Crim. Law&Criminology 351-379 (2004).Google Scholar

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66 This is every day practice in US courts, while it is fairly unknown and even considered unfair in other jurisdictions; e.g. the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) has always decided against accepting punitive damages for execution in Germany, see BGH, 45 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3096 (1992); Heribert Hirte, ‘Spielt das amerikanische Rechtssystem verrückt?', in: 55 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2002), 345.Google Scholar

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68 An introduction to human rights litigation is given by, Michael Swan, International Human Rights Tort Claims and the Experience of United States Courts: An Introduction to the US Case Law, Key Statutes and Doctrines, in: Torture as Tort 65-107 (Craig Scott ed 2001) and John Terry, Taking Filártiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside the United States Should Accept Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving Torture Committed Abroad, ibid. 109-133. A positive view concerning civil prosecution from a German perspective is given by Susanne Walther, Menschlichkeitsverbrechen vor amerikanischen Gerichten. Ein Übersetzungsversuch', in: 151 Gold Archiv 390-401 (2004); a short introduction is provided by Steven Ratner & Jason Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 240-248 (2nd ed., 2001).Google Scholar

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70 As to English law, see Smith/Hogan, Criminal Law 201-208 (10th ed., 2002); from a German and comparative perspective see Roland Hefendehl, Kriminalitätstheorien und empirisch nachweisbare Funktionen der Strafe: Argumente für oder wider die Etablierung einer Unternehmensstrafbarkeit?, in: 86 Monatsschrift Kriminologie 27-43 (2003).Google Scholar

71 Former high ranking politicians of the GDR have been held responsible for the killings at the Berlin Wall because they failed to take active steps to lift the order to prevent boarder trespassing with all means in the national security council and the party council; 48 BGHSt 77 upheld by the Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht, in 95 BVerfGE 96 and ECHR. Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Judgment of 22 March 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-II.Google Scholar

72 See The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed 1961).Google Scholar

73 See for a critical analysis, Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich', in: 39 Harvard Journal on Legislation 1-61 (2002), reprinted in NS-Forced Labor: Remembrance and Responsibility 333-392 (Peer Zumbansen ed 2002); see also Christoph Safferling, Zwangsarbeiterentschädigung und Grundgesetz, in: 34 Kritische Justiz 208-221 (2001).Google Scholar

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75 The ICTY entertains offices in Sarajevo and Zagreb as well as in Pristina (Kosovo) and Belgrade. The so called “outreach programme” which is financed by donations aims at making the work of the Tribunal known in the states which are affected by the trials the most. ICTY 10th Annual Report, UN Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829, §§ 278-287Google Scholar

76 Cf. Bothe, Michael, Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte und des humanitären Völkerrechts, in: Die Rechtsstellung des Menschen im Völkerrecht 115 at 128 (Thilo Marauhn ed 2003).Google Scholar

77 Cf. Zimmermann, Andreas, Role and Function of International Criminal Law in the International System After the Entry into Force of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in: 45 GYIL 35 at 49-54 (2002).Google Scholar

78 Jesus-Maria Silva Sanchez, Die Expansion des Strafrechts 14 et subs. (2003) for the development of national criminal law.Google Scholar

79 Akhavan, Payam, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? in: 95 AJIL 7 at 30 (2001).Google Scholar