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How to Sharpen a Dull Sword – The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Christoph Ritzer ,
Marc Ruttloff  and
Karin Linhart

Extract

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The Treaty Establishing a European Constitution seems to have failed. The problems continue to exist: a centralizing tendency is inherent in the European Union like in supposedly every federal or supra-national system. This is why, for years, there has been a growing demand for a barrier against the subtle loss of competence for the Member States and their sub-national units, which also potentially threatens the acceptance of the Union's legal acts and therefore the progress of European integration overall.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 7 , Issue 9 , 01 September 2006 , pp. 733 - 760
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Compare Craig, Paul, Competence: Clarity, Containment and Consideration, 29 European Law Review 324 (2004); Bermann, George A., Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Columbia Law Review 344 (1998); Konow, Gerhard, Zum Subsidiaritätsprinzip des Vertrages von Maastricht, 46 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 405 (1993).Google Scholar

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17 This principle is as well known as the “principle of attributed competences” or by the term “enumerated powers.” Compare von Bogdandy & Bast, supra note 2, at 340.Google Scholar

18 Compare Merten, Detlef, Die Subsidiarität Europas 77, 78 (1993); Calliess, Christian, Art. 5, in Kommentar des Vertrages über die Europäische Union und des Vertrages zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft - EUV/EGV margin note 6 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 2nd ed. 2002).Google Scholar

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23 The Commission takes the view in its “Communication […] to the Council and the European Parliament concerning the principle of subsidiarity” that the notion of exclusive competences needs to be interpreted in a broad way. For that reason it encompasses not only the areas expressly mentioned as exclusive, but also the areas of the four fundamental freedoms, the general rules on competition, the common organization of agricultural markets, and the essential elements of transport policy. Art. 71 lit. a and b EC, (reprinted in Merten, supra note 18, at 112.). Art. 71 sec. 1 lit. a and b presumably referring to ECJ, decision of 22 May 1985, Case 13/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1513 (European Parliament/Council).Google Scholar

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29 Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und an das Europäische Parlament betr. das Subsidiaritätsprinzip (reprinted in Merten, supra note 18, at 112. Compare No. 4 and No. 5 of the Protocol of Subsidiarity, supra note 12.Google Scholar

30 Compare Conclusions of the Council of Edinburgh of 12 Dezember 1992 (published in German Calliess, supra note 15, at 391); Interinstitutional Agreement on Procedures for Implementing the Principle of Subsidiarity 1993/XX, 1993 O.J. (C 329/132) (EC) (republished in German in 20 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 602 (1993)).Google Scholar

31 According to No. 1 of the Protocol in exercising the powers conferred on it, each institution shall ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is complied with.Google Scholar

32 Any proposed Community legislation has to state the reasons on which it is based, also having considered the financial or administrative burden falling upon the Community, national governments, local authorities, economic operators and citizens. See No. 4 and No. 9 of the Protocol; Art. 253 EC.Google Scholar

33 The Commission submits an annual report to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and to the Economic and Social Committee on the application of Art. 5 EC (No. 9 of the Protocol). The Council takes this report into account in its report on the progress achieved by the Union that it is required to submit to the Parliament in accordance with Art. 4 EU. It considers the consistency of each proposal of the Commission as well as amendments that the Council itself, or the Parliament, envisage making with respect to the principle of subsidiarity (Nos. 10 et seq. of the Protocol).Google Scholar

34 See, e.g., Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health, para. 99, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0154:EN:HTML.Google Scholar

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52 Case C-11/95, Commission v. Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. I-4115.Google Scholar

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61 Case C-84/94, Directive Concerning Working Time, 1996 E.C.R. I-5755.Google Scholar

62 Id. at para. 46.Google Scholar

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68 Case C-84/94, Directive Concerning Working Time, 1996 E.C.R. I-5755, para. 47.Google Scholar

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70 Case C-376/98, Ban on Advertising of Tobacco Products, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419.Google Scholar

71 AG Fennelly, Advocate General's Opinion of 15 June 2000, Case C-376/98, C-74/99, ECR 2000, I-8419, para. 131 et seq. (ban on advertising of tobacco products).Google Scholar

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81 A less effective instrument seems to be the rigorous disapproval by one Member State within the Council, even more since decisions are often taken by qualified majority. It seems much more promising to bring forward potential concerns in a constructive way. See Rompe, Sibylle, Der Subsidiaritätsbericht der Bundesregierung für 1999, Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung (ZG) 275 (2000). Compare the reports on subsidiarity of the German Government of 1999 and 2000: 12 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 111 (2001) and 13 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 3 (2002). Compare, further, remarks, according to which attention is paid to the compliance with the principle of subsidiarity by the Member States and the Regions and its compliance is demanded, challenges, however, are explicitly reserved to problematic constellations. Compare the reports on subsidiarity of the German Länder, the Upper House (Bundesrat) and the Government, e.g. Bundestagsdrucksachen BT-DRs.14/4017, BR-DRs.508/00 bzw. BT-DRs.12/7132, 13, No. 43; BT-DRs.13/10109, 14, Nr. 11; BR-DRs.215/99, 18, No. 31: 12 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 111 (2001); 13 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 3 (2002).Google Scholar

82 Compare the report of the Chairman of the Group on Subsidiarity of the European Convent of September 23, 2003, CONV 286/02, 2.Google Scholar

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89 Motivated by two members of the Convent, the Prime Minister of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Erwin Teufel, and the British Member of the European Parliament, Duff. Comp. CONV 724/03, 62. This, however, does not constitute a substantive change, since so far the test following the not-sufficient-criteria has taken into account every national level of the Member States.Google Scholar

90 The words “and therefore” would have been replaced by the words “but rather”, which would have underlined the cumulative relation between the two criteria as parts of a two-fold test. See Stewing, Clemens, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip als Kompetenzverteilungsregel im Europäischen Recht, 107 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (DVBl) 1518 (1992); Clemens Stewing, Subsidiarität und der Föderalismus in der Europäischen Union 108 (1992). Following this, there should not be a presumption in favour of the smallest unit. Rather the Community should feel encouraged to further expand its competences.Google Scholar

91 BullEC 12–1992, 1 (13 et seq.) No. I.15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

92 OJ 1993 C 329/135; 20 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 603 (1993).Google Scholar

93 One basis for the distribution of the subjects was a report set up by a working group of the European Parliament which referred to the “current division of competences” according to current Community Law. Therefore part of the exclusive competence of the Community was considered primarily competences that have already been declared exclusive by the case law of the European Court of Justice. See European Parliament, Committee for Constitutional Issues, Allain Lamassoure (reporter): Report on the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States (2001/2024[INI]), 20 et seq. at http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/other/oth150601_en.pdf.Google Scholar

94 The internal market according to Art. I-14 sec. 2 lit. a) of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe would be part of the shared competence, which would have expressly rendered the principle of subsidiarity applicable also for measures on the basis of harmonization of the internal market.Google Scholar

95 Even though it was sporadically demanded to keep the list of competences contained in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe by any means, a “fast” reform seems difficult, since this part reaches out to all other areas of Primary Law.Google Scholar

96 Art. 2 SubsProt.Google Scholar

97 The Commission, however, within its consultations shall “where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension of the action envisaged”, Art. 2 SubsProt.Google Scholar

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99 Art. 5 SubsProt.Google Scholar

100 Comp. also No. 4 of the previous Subs. Prot.Google Scholar

101 Generally, on the role of the national parliaments, see Maurer, Andreas, Parlamentarische Demokratie in der Europäischen Union. Der Beitrag der nationalen Parlamente und des Europäischen Parlaments (2002).Google Scholar

102 Report of the Chairman of the Group on Subsidiarity of the European Convent of September 23, 2003, CONV 286/02, 5.Google Scholar

103 An exertion of influence already takes place in the existing system (see the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union [COSAC], n. 132).Google Scholar

104 Art. 4 Subs. Prot.Google Scholar

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108 As to questions concerning the space of freedom, security and justice a quorum of a quarter of votes is sufficient.Google Scholar

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112 Like this Art. 8 Subs. Prot. (emphasis added).Google Scholar

113 See Art. 8 Subs. Prot.Google Scholar

114 Compare one of the members of the Convent, Wuermeling, Joachim, Kalamität Kompetenz: Zur Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeiten in dem Verfassungsentwurf des EU-Konvents, 39 Europarecht 216, 225 (2004).Google Scholar

115 Id.Google Scholar

116 Zuleeg, , supra note 27, at margin number 37.Google Scholar

117 Möschel, Wernhard, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und europäisches Kartellrecht, 48 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 281 (1995).Google Scholar

118 As to the differences between the principle of subsidiarity in the broad and in the narrow sense, see Calliess, supra note 18, at. 5, margin note 3.Google Scholar

119 See Schilling, Theodor, A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, 14 Yearbook of European Law (Yb.Eu.Law) 203 (1994).Google Scholar

120 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking rights seriously (1977), 24.Google Scholar

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122 Schilling, , supra note 119, at 213. (referring to Ronald Dworkin, supra note 120).Google Scholar

123 Dworkin, , supra note 120, at 24.Google Scholar

124 Schilling, , supra note 119, at 215.Google Scholar

125 “A pervading principle.” Id. at 217.Google Scholar

126 Ludwigs, , supra note 121, at 136.Google Scholar

127 Mager, , supra note 106, at 480; Wuermeling, , supra note 114; Lais, supra note 110, at 214.Google Scholar

128 The fact that the national members of parliament are much closer to their citizens could possibly lead to a higher acceptance of and trust in the European decision making process, which could at the end also lead to a decrease in the often regretted democratic deficit of the European Community. Mager, supra note 106 (citing Niklas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (1969)).Google Scholar

129 Sommermann, Karl-Peter, Verfassungsperspektiven für die Demokratie in der erweiterten Europäischen Union: Gefahr der Entdemokratisierung oder Fortentwicklung im Rahmen europäischer Supranationalität, 56 Die öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 1009, 1013 (2003).Google Scholar

130 Similarly Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast & Dietrich Westphal, Die vertikale Kompetenzordnung im Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrages, 3 Integration 414, 420 (2003); Oppermann, Thomas, Eine Verfassung für die Europäische Union – Der Entwurf des Europäischen Konvents, 118 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (DVBl) 1165, 1171 (2003); Ruffert, supra note 110, at 182.Google Scholar

131 At the end the success of the new provisions will be measured by the case law of the European Court of Justice. Epping, Volker, Die Verfassung Europas?, 58 Juristenzeitung (JZ) 821, 827 (2003); Knöll, Ralf & Bauer, Michael W., Der Konvent zur Zukunft der EU – eine Zwischenbilanz aus Sicht der deutschen Länder, 22 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 446, 447 (2003).Google Scholar

132 “Conférence des Organes spécialisés en Affaires communautaires”: COSAC is a co-operation between committees of the national parliaments dealing with European affairs as well as representatives from the European Parliament. This organization was created in May 1989 in Madrid, where the speakers of the Parliaments of the EU Member states agreed on strengthening the role of the national parliaments in relation to the community process. See http://www.cosac.org.Google Scholar

133 As to the current situation in national parliaments, see Maurer, Andreas & Kietz, Daniela, Die neuen Rechte der nationalen Parlamente: Umsetzungsprobleme und Empfehlungen, discussion paper, March 2004, (http://www.swp-berlin.org), 11 et seq.Google Scholar

134 Compare Mauer, Andreas & Becker, Peter, Die Europafähigkeit der nationalen Parlamente: Herausforderungen des EU-Verfassungsvertrags für den deutschen Parlamentarismus, SWP-Studie 2004/S 23, 2004, (http://www.swp-berlin.org), 18.Google Scholar

135 Compare Marcus ter Steeg, Eine neue Kompetenzordnung für die EU – Die Reformüberlegungen des Konvents zur Zukunft Europas, 14 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 325, 328 (2003); Danwitz, Thomas von, Grundfragen einer Verfassungsbindung der Europäischen Union, 58 Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1125, 1131 (2003).Google Scholar