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Judicial Self-Government and Judicial Independence: the Political Capture of the General Council of the Judiciary in Spain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Aida Torres Pérez

Abstract

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The General Council of the Judiciary is the main institution of judicial self-government in Spain. It was established to ensure the external independence of the judiciary, and in particular the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive branch of government. To what extent does the Judicial Council manage to fulfill its goal? First, the evolution of the Judicial Council will be presented in order to understand the principal reforms and reasons behind its creation. Next, the impact of the Judicial Council upon judicial independence, as well as accountability, transparency, and public confidence will be critically examined in order to assess its contribution to judicial legitimacy. In the end, it will be argued that the politicization of the Judicial Council has hindered it from protecting judicial independence from partisan interests, and has contributed to undermining public confidence in the judiciary.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 7: Special issue — Judicial Self-Government in Europe , 01 December 2018 , pp. 1769 - 1800
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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