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Law as Integrity and Law as Identity: Legal Reasoning, State Intervention, and Public Policies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Marcos Vinício Chein Feres

Extract

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Taking both ordinary regulations and constitutional principles in account, is state intervention in the market through public policies legitimate? The legitimate use of public policies, as far as state intervention is concerned, will be analyzed taking into consideration legal procedures and the necessary legal interpretation. Methodologically, the theoretical object of this research is to conciliate the idea of law as integrity, developed by Dworkin, with the idea of law as identity, complemented by Taylor's idea of identity and Bankowski's idea of living lawfully. In fact, the methodological approach consists of reconstructing a system of analytical concepts based on a moral reading of legal rules and constitutional principles rooted within contemporary legal theory. The final object is to figure out new means of interpreting legal economic regulations and finding new ground for the legitimate evaluation of public policies.

Type
Part A: Political Theory and Constitutional Reasoning
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 8: Special Issue - Constitutional Reasoning , 01 August 2013 , pp. 1147 - 1162
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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