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On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Armin von Bogdandy  and
Ingo Venzke

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While the introductory contribution addressed the questions and definitions of our research into judicial lawmaking, this concluding chapter discusses strategies regarding the justification of international judicial lawmaking that our introduction sought to capture and that the volume set out to present. How can one square such lawmaking with the principle of democracy? A first response could be to negate the phenomenon. If there were no such thing as judicial lawmaking, there would evidently be no need for its justification. This response, though unconvincing, merits attention all the same because, according to the traditional and still widespread view of international dispute settlement, international decisions flow from the consent of the state parties to the dispute, both from the consensual basis of the applicable law and from consent-based jurisdiction. If state parties are democratic, then the presence of their consent should solve any legitimate question as long as the courts only fulfill their task of dispute settlement properly. This explains the emphasis that traditional schools of thought place on the cognitive paradigm and on the principle that judges are limited to applying the law to the dispute at hand.

Type
V. Strategies in Response: Concluding Considerations and Outlook
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 5: Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers , 01 May 2011 , pp. 1341 - 1370
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

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123 Lindblom (note 121).Google Scholar

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125 See ICJ Practice Direction XII (2004).Google Scholar

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128 Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para. 106. The EC-Asbestos Case was also of great importance, see especially WTO Appellate Body Communication, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/9, 8 November 2000; and Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council Held on 22 November 2000, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/60, 23 January 2001.Google Scholar

129 See Delaney & Magraw (note 117).Google Scholar

130 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Recommendation on Non-disputing Party Participation, 7 October 2004.Google Scholar

131 OECD, Transparency and Third Party Participation (note 110).Google Scholar

132 Art. 37(2) Arbitration Rules. Cf. Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, 22 October 2004.Google Scholar

133 See Benvenisti & Downs (note 44) (sharpening the understanding of how powerful states and sectoral interests strategically use international judicial institutions).Google Scholar

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