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The Principle of Democracy: Watered Down by the Federal Constitutional Court
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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For historic reasons, the parliamentary legislator of North-Rhine-Westphalia assigned important public responsibilities concerning water supply and distribution in the areas of the rivers Lippe and Emscher to the public-law bodies Lippeverband and Emschergenossenschaft. By law the compulsory members of theses bodies are the Land (federal state) North-Rhine-Westphalia, the municipalities situated in the respective territories, as well as private companies involved with water distribution or usage as well as companies profiting from the bodies’ work or making it more difficult. In 1990 the organizational structure of the two bodies was reformed and participation rights of the respective work forces were introduced. They were granted the right to name representatives to the bodies’ supervisory boards (councils) and the boards of directors, but not for the most powerful organs, the assemblies of the bodies’ members.
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- Copyright © 2003 by German Law Journal GbR
References
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24 Expressly conceded in Para. 172 of the decision.Google Scholar
25 Para. 168 of the decision.Google Scholar
26 It has to be noted that the representatives of the working forces in the bodies organs are not directly elected by their fellows. A proposal of candidates has to be made by the regular workers representation body (existing in every branch of the public administration) consisting twice as many candidates as posts are to be staffed. Finally, the representatives of the working forces are elected by the assembly of members.Google Scholar
27 In Para. 184 of the decision the court says that this organisational modification of the self-administrating bodies is still within the framework of the constitution.Google Scholar
28 See Hendler at p. 302 et seq., supra note 14.Google Scholar
29 Similarly Emde, supra note 14.Google Scholar
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41 ”The dignity of man is inviolable.“.Google Scholar
42 ”Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.“.Google Scholar
43 See only Ossenbuehl at p. 15 et seq., 26 et seq., supra note 6.Google Scholar
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