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Romania: Perils of a “Perfect Euro-Model” of Judicial Council

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Bianca Selejan-Gut̗an

Abstract

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The last three decades have brought important changes to the Romanian judicial system, especially concerning the struggle for independence and autonomy within the separation of powers equation. The internal and external context – i.e. the transition to democracy, after 1989, and the intention to join the European Union – determined an orientation towards the “Euro-Model” of judicial self-government. This has not come without difficulties and perils, both from the inside and from the outside. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Romanian system of judicial self-government in the context of these perils and emphasizes the link between the attempts to reinforce judicial independence and the anti-corruption fight, required by the supervision mechanism under which Romania has been placed at the moment of the EU accession. The increase in the number and intensity of such perils in the recent period has coincided with an increase in the number of high-level political corruption cases that have resulted in convictions. The article also discusses recent changes in the laws of the judiciary, which still are, partially, under parliamentary scrutiny, but which have raised serious concerns at the European level, as regards the progress made by Romania in achieving the objectives included in the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 7: Special issue — Judicial Self-Government in Europe , 01 December 2018 , pp. 1707 - 1740
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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