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Sliding Towards Supranationalism? The Constitutional Status of EU Framework Decisions after Pupino

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Carl Lebeck

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The constitutional structure of the EU comprises two different components, one supranational (the European Community - EC) and one intergovernmental (the European Union). The EC is referred to as the first pillar, while the European Union in turn consists of two parts referred to as the second and third pillars respectively: the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the second, and the Police & Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (the so called “area of Freedom, Security and Justice” - PJCC). The role of the common European institutions was from the outset more limited not just when it - which is logical - comes to legislation, but also when it comes to consultation and preparation of legislation. However, the ECJ retained jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of so called framework decisions in order to create a basis for uniform implementation in national law of such decisions. This was particularly true in relation to the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Whereas the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was granted jurisdiction in PJCC, the other community institutions, notably the European Commission, were given roles to supervise the implementation of framework decisions - but their role in enforcing uniformity was limited compared to the role of the community institutions in EC-law.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 8 , Issue 5 , 01 May 2007 , pp. 501 - 531
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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