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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
BEFORE THE ISRAELI GENERAL ELECTION OF 1988, IT HAD BEEN confidently forecast that the major determinant of the outcome would be the year-long Palestinian uprising in the Administered Territories — the so-called intifada — and the future of the peace process. It was widely believed that the traumatic events in the West Bank and Gaza would displace from the attention of the electorate the more pressing issues, both domestic and foreign, which had been virtually frozen owing to the inability of the critically-divided ‘national unity government’ to agree on any positive course of action.
The research for this article was conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London.
2 See Capitanchik, David B., The Israeli General Election 1984, Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report No. 9, 09 1984.Google Scholar
3 The top third of the list, where candidates have a realistic chance of being elected.
4 The National Unity Government in which Labour leader, Shimon Peres, and Likud leader, Yitzhak Shamir, rotated in office as prime minister, was established after the inconclusive elections of 1984. During its first two years in office under the leadership of Mr Peres, it succeeded in extricating Israeli forces from Lebanon and in dramatically reducing the annual rate of inflation.
5 See Capitanchik, David B., A Guide to the Israeli General Election, 1988, Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report No. 7, 10 1988.Google Scholar
6 Gross, N.D., ‘Orthodox hold key to new Government’, Jerusalem Post, 12 11 1988.Google Scholar Boaz, Shapira, ‘Election ‘88: The Secular Voter also leans to the Right’, Haaretz, 12 11 1988.Google Scholar Levy, Amnon, ‘The Religious Parties appeal to the Secular Voter, a Wild Success’, Hadashot, 3 11 1988.Google Scholar
7 Frankel, Glen, ‘Strictly Speaking, this Rabbi has Power’, International Herald Tribune, 24 11 1988.Google Scholar
8 ‘Their Just Desserts’, Jerusalem Post, 22 December 1988.
9 See Toledano, Shmuel, ‘The Meaning of the Arau Vote’, Haaretz 3 11 1988.Google Scholar
10 ‘Any two parties may agree in advance of the election to pool their surplus votes. This means that the party with the larger surplus remaining after its vote has been divided by the quota will also receive the surplus votes of the second party. This can mean an extra seat.
11 ‘The Government‘s Guidelines’, Jerusalem Post, 22 December 1988.
12 Kavanagh, Dennis, Political Science and Political Behaviour, London, George Allen & Unwin, 198, p. 79.Google Scholar
13 ‘No Cause for Celebration’, Jerusalem Post, 21 December 1988.