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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
Very little is known for certain about John Pupper of Goch. He appears to have been a priest of the archdiocese of Utrecht, who founded a convent in Malines in 1459 and who had previously been a rector in Sluis. He may have studied in Cologne, though that is subject to some doubt, or even in Paris, though that remains to be proven. His importance for history lies not in his founding of the Augustinian convent of Thabor but in his composition of four theological treatises, which attacked scholastic theology and monastic theory in the name of the doctrine of Christian liberty.
page 191 note 1 The most recent and reliable biographical material is found in Post, R. R., Johann Pupper von Goch, NAK, N.S. 47 (1965/1966), 71–97Google Scholar; The Modern Devotion, SMRT III (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 469–92Google Scholar.
page 191 note 2 WA 10/II, 330.5.
page 192 note 1 Ullmann, Carl, Reformers before the Reformation, I, trans, by Menzies, Robert (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1874), 32Google Scholar.
page 192 note 2 AlbrechtRitschl found Ullmann's understanding of Luther's theology to be equally deficient. Cf. Ritschl, A., Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, 4th ed., I, Die Geschichte der Lehre (Bonn, 1903), 129–33Google Scholar.
page 192 note 3 Clemen, Otto, Johann Pupper von Goch, Leipziger Studien aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, II.3 (Leipzig, 1896), 187Google Scholar.
page 193 note 4 Clemen, 189.
page 193 note 5 Clemen, 226.
page 193 note 6 Clemen, 208: “Dogmatisch steht Goch … in der Schriftlehre auf der Schwelle zur Reformation, sofern er innerhalb einer Gruppe von Theologen am Ausgang des Mittelalters, welche die in der Reformation zu einem vorläufigen Abschluss gelangte Reduktion der Traditionsmasse beginnen — damit beginnen, dass sie die Tradition auf das kirchliche Altertum beschränken —, sich dem Standpunkt der Reformatoren am meisten nähert.”
page 193 note 7 Clemen, 190.
page 193 note 8 Post, R. R., The Modern Devotion, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, III (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 470–73, 486Google Scholar.
page 193 note 9 Post, Modern Devotion, 483.
page 194 note 10 Post, Modern Devotion, 482.
page 194 note 11 Post, R. R., Johann Pupper van Goch, NAK, N.S. 47 (1965/1966), 71–97Google Scholar. See page 83: “Von wem das Lehramt ausgehen muss, kommt allerdings nicht klar zum Ausdruck.”
page 194 note 12 Abramowski, Luise, Die Lehre von Gesetz und Evangelium bei Johann Pupper von Goch im Rahmen seines nominalistischen Augustinismus, ZThK 64 (1967), 83–98Google Scholar.
page 194 note 13 Abramowski, 84.
page 194 note 14 Abramowski, 84–85.
page 194 note 15 On this question see Oberman, H. A., The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 166–68Google Scholar. Cf. Vignaux, Paul, Luther, commentateur des Sentences (Paris, 1935), 45–86Google Scholar.
page 195 note 16 Abramowski, 86–88.
page 195 note 17 Abramowski, 89.
page 195 note 18 For example, his stress on mysticism as conformity of will (Dial. X.132), on the simplicity of God (De lib. chr. II.40.165; III.6.199), and on the bonitas of God (De lib. chr. III.7.200) all show nominalist influences. There is also some agreement between JeanGerson and Goch on the status of evangelical counsels. On this question see Abramowski, Luise, Johann Gerson, De consiliis evangelicis et statu perfectionis, in Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation, Festschrift für Ernst Bizer, ed. Abramowski, et al. (Neukirchen, 1969), 63–78Google Scholar.
page 195 note 19 Goch's works include the following: De quatuor erroribus circa legem evangelicam exortis et de votis et religionibus factitiis dialogus [Abbreviated: Dial.], ed. Walch, C.G.F., Monimenta medii aevi, Vol.I.4 (Göttingen, 1760), 74–239Google Scholar; De scholasticorum scriptis et religiosorum votis epistola apologetica [Abbreviated: Epist. Apol.], ed. Walch, C.G.F., Monimenta medii aevi, Vol. II.1 (Göttingen, 1761), 1–24Google Scholar; De libertate Christiana [Abbreviated: De lib. chr.], ed. Pijper, F., Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica, Vol. VI (Hague, 1910), 1–263Google Scholar; Fragmenta [Abbreviated: Frag.], ed. Pijper, F., Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica, Vol. VI (Hague, 1910), 267–347Google Scholar.
page 195 note 20 On this question see H. A. Oberman, Harvest, 30–89.
page 196 note 21 De lib. chr. III.6.199: “Ecce tu iratus es Dicitur deus iratus non in se, cum sit ex natura immobilis et immutabilis, sed in actibus suis quos exercet circa homines. Nam misericordia et iustitia sunt Una natura in deo, sed sunt diversi effectus in creatura.” Cf. De lib. chr. II.40.165, where Goch speaks of the “naturae suae simplicissimam unitatem.” LeifGrane explains the nominalist doctrine of the simplicity of God as follows: “Spricht man von Gottes Wissen, Intellekt, Willen, Allmacht oder Prädestination, sind keine selbständigen Eigenschaften gemeint. Allein die Objekte für Gottes Wirken machen diese Begriffe zu Nicht-Synonymen. Sie repräsentieren in sich selber nichts anderes als Gottes Wesen, mit dem sie in jeder Weise identisch sind.” Grane, Leif, Contra Gabrielem, Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio Contra Scholasticam Theologiam 1517 (Gyldendal, 1962), 69Google Scholar.
page 196 note 22 De lib. chr. III.7.200: “Omne igitur opus bonum, est intantum bonum inquantum est a deo volitum, eo quod voluntas divina est regula et mensura omnis boni.” Cf. De lib. chr. III.12.215; Epist. Apol. 23; Frag. 306–09.
page 196 note 23 De lib. chr. 1.14.65: “Tanta est enim certitudo catholicae veritatis in scripturis sanctis, quod per nullam potentiam, etiam divinam, aliter se potest habere: alias enim deus negaret seipsum.”
page 196 note 24 De lib. chr. III.10.210: “Tertium hie notandum est, quod quamvis secundum potentiam dei absolutam, non sit ei impossibile, dare puro homini potestatem illam, quae posset omnem implere iustitiam, tamen sanctae litterae, id est scriptura canonica, de nullo tradunt hoc factum fuisse, aut futurum esse, praeter Christum iesum….”. Cf. Frag. 301: “Certam vero fiduciam habere non possumus, nisi in fidelitate et veritate dei quae mentiri non potest.” See also De lib. chr. II.8.107: “Hoc divinae voluntatis consilium inevitabiliter sequutum est quod ab eo est decretum. Moriendi ergo necessitatem homo incurrit per peccatum, quia deus et si aliquando suam mutat sententiam, nunquam tamen mutat suae concilium voluntatis.”
page 197 note 25 De lib. chr. I.18.72: “Si quid autem veri est in scriptis philosophorum, hoc est in primis principijs per se notis, ex apprehensione terminorum.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.14.66: “Certitudo naturalis, quae est certitudo primorum principiorum, habet evidentiam rationalem … Consistit vero haec evidentiae … in primis principijs per se notis, cognitis scilicet ex sola apprehensione terminorum. Ut quodlibet est vel non est. Et omne totum est maius sua parte. In hac evidentia consistit certitudo.” It is therefore not quite correct to say with Post that Goch “… rejects unconditionally the writings of the pagan philosophers.” Modern Devotion, 475.
page 197 note 26 De lib. chr. I.14.66: “Certitudo moralis sive civilis, quae est certitudo conscientiae circa agibilia, non autem scientiae circa credibilia, non habet evidentiam omnino certam, sed tantum habet evidentiam probabilis coniecturae, magis ad unam partem, quam ad aliam declinantis.”
page 197 note 27 De lib. chr. I.9.57: “Quia in agilibus non est ecdesiae tanta certitudo revelata, sicut in credilibus: sed magis sunt futuro examini reservata.”
page 197 note 28 Goch makes it clear that the most dangerous metaphysical error is the doctrine of double truth, which he rejects categorically. Cf. De lib. chr. I.17.71; I.19.72.
page 197 note 29 Epist. Apol. 6: “Aristoteles, cum suis complicibus tenebris infidelitatis involutus, de lumine veritatis nihil habuit, quamvis naturali lumine rationis de coelo et mundo multa disputavit. Lumen enim veritatis non est, quod intellectum ad cognitionem eorum quae facta sunt erigit, sed quod ad Dei cognitionem et amorem perducit. Ob hoc enim creaturae in esse productae sunt, non ut in se existerent, sed ut conditorem suum ubique et in omnibus admirabilem et amabilem ostenderent et hominem ad ejus cognitionem et amorem elevarent.” Cf. De lib. chr. II.40.166.
page 198 note 30 Epist. Apol. 8: “Eum non cognovit; eum inquam, qui est splendor lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis. Huius ergo lucis quia Aristoteles notitiam non habuit, planum est, quod lucem veritatis non cognovit.”
page 198 note 31 De lib. chr. I.21.78–79.
page 198 note 32 Epist. Apol. 6–7. “Philosophi autem in cognitione et contemplatione rerum summam felicitatem constituentes, ad amorem illius qui omnia fecit non pervenerunt. Propter quod scientia tumidi cognitionis, et sapientia veri boni vacui, ad cognitionem summae veritatis pervenire non potuerunt.”
page 198 note 33 De lib. chr. I.20.76: “Quia ex praemissis evidenter ostenditur, quod doctrina philosophorum in exercitiis Theologicis, non solum prodest, sed detrimentum aeternae salutis operatur.” Cf. Epist. Apol. 5–8.
page 198 note 34 The motif of laus dei so prominent in the writings of Staupitz also appears in Goch. Knowledge of the true purpose of God in nature leads naturally to the praise of God. Epist. Apol. 7; De lib. chr. I.1.41–2. Abramowski has called for a comparison of Staupitz and Goch as a step toward the clarification of the shape of late medieval Augustinianism. Abramowski, Gesetz und Evangelium, 84.
page 198 note 35 De lib. chr. I.14.65: “Prima est evidentia clara, et intuitiva, quam habituri sumus in patria, quando sublato enigmate, videbimus ipsam veritatem sicuti est.” De lib. chr. III.10.209: “Primum est plena dei cognitio qua illustratus homo nihil eorum eum lateret, quae ad iustitiam pertinent perfectam, qualis est cognitio intuitiva sanctorum in patria….” In citing the basis for Christian certitude, Goch also stresses the certitude which the prophets had from revelation, even though it was not the certitude of intuitive knowledge, and the certitude which all believers possess, since faith enables them to see as in a glass darkly. De lib. chr. I.14.65. But the more nominalistic grounds of intuitive knowledge and covenantal fidelity provide greater certitude and the strongest foundation for Christian confidence.
page 199 note 36 M De lib. chr. I.15.68: “Christus autem, non solum viator fuit, ut loqueretur nobis more prophetico, sed et fuit comprehensor loquens ex cognitione intuitiva, sicut de eo scriptum est. Erat enim docens sicut potestatem habens, hoc est, erat docens ex lumine proprio, non ex lumine revelato.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.15.67; III.10. 210; III.12.222.
page 199 note 37 De lib. chr. I.14.65. For text see supra, footnote 23. Cf. De lib. chr. II.8.107; III.10.210; Frag. 301.
page 199 note 38 Epist. Apol. 10–11: “Antiquorum patrum scripta tantum habent autoritatis, quantum canonicae veritati sunt conformia. Haec fideli sunt amplectenda, quia canonica veritate student approbare quae dicunt.”
page 199 note 39 Epist. Apol. ii; De lib. chr. I.16.69.
page 199 note 40 Epist. Apol. 13.
page 200 note 41 De lib. chr. I.1.43: “Caetera scripta omnia tantam habent auctoritatem quantam cum scriptura canonica conformitatem.” Cf. Epist. Apol. 10, 13; Dial. I.78–79.
page 200 note 42 Dial. I.77–78: “Ideoque oportebit me aliquando non solum praecedentium patrum vestigia sequi, sed vel medium inter dissidentes reperiri, vel probabilioribus rationibus eorum dictis contradicere et contraire.”
page 200 note 43 For the most recent treatments of WesselGansfort's understanding of Scripture and tradition see H. A. Oberman, Harvest, 408–12; Forerunners of the Reformation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 53–65Google Scholar, 99–120; R. R. Post, The Modern Devotion, 476–92. Post is in basic agreement with Oberman's exposition.
page 200 note 44 De lib. chr. I.1.43: “Supernaturalis scriptura est, qua intellectus illustratur cognitione summi veri, et voluntas imbuitur in amore summi boni. Haec est scriptura canonica, et determinatio universalis ecclesiae, cui fides credentium tanquam firmae petrae contra ventos tentationum et aquas tribulationum immobiliter innititur….“
page 200 note 45 De lib. chr. I.9.57: “Nam ecclesiae auctoritas est maxima auctoritas, quia ut dicit Augustinus Si non crederem ecclesiae, non crederem evangelio.” What Augustine really says is “… ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas.” Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti liber unus, 5, CSEL 25.197.22. Cf. van den Brink, J. N. Bakhuizen, Traditio in de Reformatie en het Katholicisme in de zestiende Eeuw, Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterk., n.s. 15.2 (Amsterdam, 1952), 10ffGoogle Scholar. For the view of Gregory of Rimini see I Sent, d.i q.i art.2 fol. 3 F.
page 201 note 46 De lib. chr. I.1.43–44: “Est etiam notandum Quod scriptura Canonica quadruplicem habet sensum scilicet Literalem Allegoricum Tropologicum et Anagogicum iuxta versum, Littera gesta docet, quid credas Allegoria, Tropologia quid agas, quid speres Anagogia.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.1.44–45.
page 201 note 47 De lib. chr. I.1.44: “Sensus litteralis est ille, qui a deo intenditur, et per voces in littera contentas significatur. Et sic sensus historicus non solum est sensus litteralis, verumetiam sensus propheticus et apostolicus per voces in littera contentas significatus.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.2.45; I.3.46; I.5.50.
page 201 note 48 Cf. Ebelinc, Gerhard, Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik, ZThK 48 (1951), 172–230Google Scholar; Hermeneutik, in RGC 3, III, cols. 242–62; Der hermeneutische Ort der Gotteslehre bei Lombardus, Petrus und von Aquin, Thomas, ZThK 61 (1964), 283–326Google Scholar; Werbeck, Wilfrid, Jacobus Perez von Valencia, Untersuchungen zu seinem Psalmenkommentar (Tübingen, 1959)Google Scholar; Smalley, Beryl, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Spicq, P. C., Esquisse d'une histoire de l'Exégèse Latine au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1944)Google Scholar; Preus, James Samuel, From Shadow to Promise, Old Testament Interpretation from Augustine to the Young Luther (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
page 202 note 49 De lib. chr. I.3.46: “Et in talibus, sensus litteralis principaliter intellectus ab auctore deo, non est ille qui per significationem vocum primarie intelligitur, sed potius ille qui ulterius per significationem rerum per voces significatarum habetur.”
page 202 note 50 De lib. chr. I.5.50: “Ideo ille sensus litteralis est verus, et videtur alijs praeferendus, qui litterae magis est conformis: sive in loco suo, sive in alio loco planiori.”
page 202 note 51 De lib. chr. I.8.56: “Secunda consideratio est quod ille sensus litteralis videtur caeteris praeferendus, qui traditur a catholicis doctoribus catholice viventibus, et in suis expositionibus magis sacrae scripturae innitentibus, quam rationi naturali.”
page 202 note 52 De lib. chr. I.10.57: “Quod ille sensus videtur alijs praeferendus, cuius sententia magis innititur rectae rationi. Quia deus qui est prima veritas, a qua omnis scriptura derivatur, est rationabilior quam quicunque homo, et rationabiliter in omnibus scripturis.” Dial. I.78: “Sola enim veritas est, quae ubique se efficacem et invictam exhibet, et quae omnibus earn dicentibus autoritatem praebet. Unde fit, ut quanto probabilius verum sit, quod ab aliquo dicitur, tanto maior autoritas illi dicto tribuatur. Iustum enim est, ut probabiliori veritati semper faveatur, licet a quocumque dicatur.”
page 202 note 53 De lib. chr. I.5.50: “Ille vero sensus qui in suo loco secundum apparentiam litterae conformis, alteri litterae planiori repugnare invenitur, est omnino repellendus: nisi sit ab ecclesia determinatus.” De lib. chr. I.9.57: “Quod ille sensus videtur alijs praeferendus, qui determinationi ecclesiae magis est conformis. Et ideo quantumcunque aliquis sensus est litterae conformis, non est pro vero sensus tenendus, si determinationi ecclesiae obviare manifeste reperitur.”
page 203 note 54 “Sensus Scripturae litteralis judicandus est prout ecclesia Spiritu Sancto inspirata et gubernata determinavit, et non ad cujuslibet arbitrium et interpretationem. Unde Augustinus contra epistolam fundamenti: Evangelio non crederem, etc…. Sensus logicalis verus in assertione theologica, non excusat asserentem quin talem assertionem debeat revocare si falsa sit in sensu theologico litterali, aut si sit scandalosa vel piarum aurium offensiva, aut aliter male sonans.” Gerson, Jean, De Sensu Litterali Sacrae Scripturae, Oeuvres Complètes, III: L'Oeuvre Magistrate, ed. Glorieux, P. (Paris, 1962), 335Google Scholar. Gerson is one of the few modern doctors whom Goch cites. On Goch's possible relationship to the University of Paris and his accurate knowledge of French theological disputes, see R. R. Post, Johann Pupper van Goch, 76–77; Modern Devotion, 473–74. The most helpful discussions of Gerson's hermeneutic are: H. A. Oberman, Harvest, 385–87; J. S. Preus, From Shadow to Promise, 79–85; Meyjes, G. H. M. Posthumus, Jean Gerson, zijn Kerkpolitiek en Ecclesiologie (Hague, 1963), 262–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
page 203 note 55 J. S. Preus, citing Oberman's much used distinction between traditions I, II, and III, argues that Gerson is a representative of tradition III and that Oberman's own later dating of this tradition should be revised. From Shadow to Promise, 81–82, footnote 23. Goch's agreement with Gerson lends weight to Preus's argument. If the Church is led by the Spirit to embrace in a certain instance the less probable grammatical meaning as the true literal sense, then the tradition of the Church which supported the more grammatical meaning is shown to be in error and the reasons of the doctors who embraced that view to be spurious. The absoluteness of the freedom of the Spirit-guided magisterium can give the contemporary Church independence of its tradition and of its theological advisers. Clearly, Goch does not expect that the Spirit will be working at cross purposes with himself, but the dangers for the Church in a freedom inadequately grounded in Scripture and tradition are only too obvious.
page 204 note 56 Epist. Apol. ii; De lib. chr. I.4.49; I.8.56; Dial. I.77–78.
page 204 note 57 H. A. Oberman, Harvest, 390.
page 205 note 1 Augustinianism and Pelagianism are terms in the history of Christian thought with a life of their own. They are frequently used to mean, not strict agreement with the original teaching of these theologians, so much as the embodiment of a tendency which in special cases may go beyond the original teaching. In one sense it is possible to say that Thomas is more Augustinian than Luther on the question of merit, if the standard is fidelity to the original teaching of Augustine. But one can also hold without absurdity that Luther is more Augustinian than Thomas, if the frame of reference is the more perfect embodiment of a tendency. To complicate the problem still further, historians must always bear in mind the context and intention of theological affirmations. Original formulations do not always mean the same thing in changed historical circumstances. Indeed, it may be necessary to formulate views in a more extreme way — or even in a totally different way — in order to say the same thing. Goch faced in the 15th century a revived semi-Pelagianism. Thomas in the 13th century did not. (On this problem see McSorley, Harry J., C.S.P., Luther: Right or Wrong? [New York, 1969], 167Google Scholar.) The fact of the difference of context between Thomas and Goch has not been taken sufficiently into account by historians, who for the most part have been content merely to compare the formulations of these theologians against the standard of the teaching of Augustine.
page 206 note 2 Abramowski, Luise, Die Lehre von Gesetz und Evangelium bei Johann Pupper von Goch im Rahmen seines nominalistischen Augustinismus, ZThK 64 (1967), 90Google Scholar. “Gegen die Gnaden- und Verdienstlehre des Sentenzenkommentars kann ein strikter Augustinist tatsächlich Einwände erheben. Dass Goch zwischen den beiden Werken des Thomas nicht unterscheidet, kann mann ihm nicht übelnehmen; es werden heute noch ältere Ausgaben der Summe gebraucht in denen sie aus dem Sentenzenkommentar erklart wird.”
page 206 note 3 De lib. chr. III.1.183: “Haec et hijs similia quae sunt a canonica veritate aliena, multipliciter reperies in scriptis modernorum doctorum super librum sententiarum, maxime in diversis scriptis doctoris sancti Thomae de aquino, primo scripto dist. vij. secundo scripto .dist. xxvij. tertio scripto .dist. xviij. et in prima secundae.” Goch's, works include the following: De quatuor erroribus circa legem evangelicam exortis et de votis et religionibus factitiis dialogus [Abbreviated: Dial.], ed. Walch, C.G.F., Monimenta medii aevi, Vol. I.4. (Göttingen, 1760), 74–239Google Scholar; De scholasticorum scriptis et religiosorum votis epistola apologetica [Abbreviated: Epist. Apol.], ed. Walch, C.G.F., Monimenta medii aevi, Vol. II.i (Göttingen, 1761), 1–24Google Scholar; De libertate Christiana [Abbreviated: De lib. chr.], ed. Pijper, F., Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica, Vol. VI (Hague, 1910), 1–263Google Scholar; Fragmenta [Abbreviated: Frag.], ed. Pijper, F., Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica, Vol. VI (Hague, 1910), 267–347Google Scholar.
page 206 note 4 Post, R. R., van Goch, Johann Pupper, NAK, N.S. 47 (1965/1966), 89Google Scholar: “Das Qualifizieren der Lehre Thomas' als Pelagianismus ist eine Ansichtssache, über die sich streiten lässt. Tatsache ist, dass auch für Thomas alles von Gott abhäangig ist — die Erwählung, die Gnadenzuteilung, die Belohnung.”
page 207 note 5 OttoClemen was the first to draw attention to Goch's accuracy in quoting from a letter of Stephen of Paris in connection with his discussion of the debate between Peter van denBeeken and Henry of Someren at the University of Louvain. Clemen, Otto, Johann Pupper von Goch, Leipziger Studien aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, Vol. II.3 (Leipzig, 1896), 27–29Google Scholar. Cf. Post, R. R., The Modern Devotion, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, III (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 473–74Google Scholar.
page 207 note 6 Lortz, Joseph argues his case, above all, in his Die Reformation in Deutschland, 2 vols., 4th ed. (Freiburg, 1962)Google Scholar. Harry J. McSorley, C.S.P., summarizes very well the position of the Lortz school, when he writes: “… had Luther carefully studied Thomas' teaching on the evangelical law (S. Theol., I–II, q. 106, aa. 1 and 2), and the necessity of grace (I–II, q. 109, aa. 1–10), as well as Thomas' doctrine on faith and works, grace, predestination and man's bondage to sin as set forth above all in his commentaries on the Pauline epistles, there is every reason to suspect that he would not only have accepted this doctrine, but would actually have cited it, along with the teaching of Paul and Augustine, against the errors he found in some of the late Scholastics concerning the unaided powers of man's fallen nature in respect to justification.” Luther: Right or Wrong?, 140. Goch, however, who has read prima secundae (see supra, footnote 3), not only does not quote Thomas' teaching on grace as a model of Augustinianism, but even rejects it as Pelagian. There is no prima facie evidence for believing that Luther, whose mentor was the radically Augustinian Staupitz and who writes with approval of Goch's theology when he finally reads it, would have reacted more favorably to Thomas than these other late medieval Augustinians. Certainly, the burden of proof is on the Lortz school to show that they are not merely engaging in the kind of als/ob theology which they so readily deplore in Ockham. For Luther's judgment of Goch, cf. Frag. 283–84.
page 208 note 7 The rector of the University of Wittenberg in an address on November 16, 1507, called Carlstadt a ” … virum latine, grece, et hebraice, vehementer eruditum, magnum Philosophum, maiorem theologum, maximum Thomistam, quod facile ostendunt monumenta sua, que in laudem Gymnasii nostri, de intentionibus et formalitatibus Thomisticis edidit.” Quoted by Krtechbaum, Friedel, Grundzüge der Theologie Karlstadts, Theologische Forschung 43 (Hamburg, 1967), 10Google Scholar. For the relation of Carlstadt, to Staupitz, and the change in his theological orientation see Ernst Kähler, Karlstadt und Augustin (Halle, 1952), 2*–8Google Scholar*; Oberman, H. A., Wittenbergs Zweifrontenkrieg gegen Prierias und Eck, ZKG 80 (1969), 331–58Google Scholar, esp. 349ff.; and my Misericordia Dei, The Theology of Johannes von Staupitz in its Late Medieval Setting, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought IV (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 171–81Google Scholar. Popular introductions to Carlstadt are found in Rupp, Gordon, Patterns of Reformation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969)Google Scholar and my Reformers in the Wings (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971)Google Scholar.
page 208 note 8 The points of agreement between Goch and Staupitz make a long list: (I) the simplicity of God, De lib. chr. II.40.165; III.6.199. Cf. Staupitz, Hiob (1497–8) 11.84.36ff. (2) the bonitas dei, De lib. chr. III.7.200. Cf. Hiob 15.134.37–38. (3) predestination ante praevisa merita, Frag. 200; De lib. chr. III.2.185. Cf. Staupitz, Libellus (1517) 52. (4) predestination first to glory then to grace, De lib. chr. II.29.140. Cf. Libellus 22. (5) rejection of gratia creata, De lib. chr. I.22.80, 83; II.23.127. Cf. Staupitz, Lieb gottes (1518) Kn. 98–99. (6) dialectic of the potentia dei absoluta and the potentia dei ordinata, De lib. chr. I.14.65; III.10.210. Cf. Hiob 23.186.27–32. (7) rejection of the idea that Mary merited the right to become the theotokos by a meritum de congruo, Dei lib. chr. I.23.86. Cf. Staupitz, Hs: b II 11, St. Peter (1523), Sermo 17, fol. 154 b–155a. (8) the doctrine of acceptation, Frag. 306–07. Cf. Hiob 22.186.32–187.3. (9) rejection of merita de condigno in a state of grace, Frag. 309. Cf. Libellus 51. (10) definition of mysticism as conformity of will rather than intellectual union with God, Dial. X.132. Cf. Hiob 3.16.14–18. (11) denial of certitude of final salvation, De lib. chr. I.9.57; III.12.215. There is a close parallel on the question of virtue apart from grace. While Staupitz denies outright that there is bonitas without charitas (Libellus 19, 33, 42), Goch takes a somewhat more complex position, (a) Though there is a certain sense in which man may do good (bonum facere), he does not do good well (bonum bene facere) unless from a love of justice, which arises only from grace. De lib. chr. IV.5.238. (b) Without charitas these good acts are falsa virtus, even peccatum, though they may be regarded by men as good and meritorious. De lib. chr. II.37. 157–58; II.41.167; III.3.188–89. (c) Acts which spring from charitas and are directed to God as their end may be good ex genere but are still not meritorious. Dignitas depends on the divine will alone and not on inherent bonitas. De lib. chr. III.14.191; III.5.195. There are differences, however, as well as agreements between these two theologians. (1) While Staupitz differs with ThomasAquinas, his epistemology owes much to the Thomists. The same cannot be said for Goch, who is epistemologically a nominalist. De lib. chr. I.18.72; 14.65; III.10.209. Cf. Hiob 11.87.20–26. (2) Whereas Staupitz redefines gratia gratum faciens as the grace which makes God pleasing to man, Goch retains the traditional definition of it as the grace which makes man pleasing to God. De lib. chr. I.23.85; II.23.128. Cf. Libellus 40, 86, 131, 152. (3) Although Staupitz in his later writings defines prima gratia as predestination, Goch identifies it with gratia increata. De lib. chr. II.23. 128. Cf. Libellus 21. (4) While Goch lays great stress on the authority of the Church, Staupitz tends to view it as nothing more than a function of the gratia predestinationis. De lib. chr. I.9.57. Cf. Hiob 11.95.5–8; Libellus 22, 26, 33. (5) Whereas Staupitz is willing to view men as cooperatores with God, Goch rejects the notion of cooperatio. Men voluntarily consent to their justification, but do not cooperate. Frag. 302; De lib. chr. I.22.80. Cf. Hiob 27.214.32–37. For the full titles of the treatises of Staupitz and a discussion of their contents, see my Misericordia Dei.
page 209 note 9 De lib. chr. III.2.184–85: “Primus error huius opinionis est, quod dicit, quod naturalis voluntas hominis cooperatur gratiae dei ad hominis iustificationem, et ad meritum aeternae beatitudinis. Dicit enim sic in secundo scripto .dist. xxviij. Liberum arbitrium et si non est causa sufficiens, est tamen causa efficiens meriti. Et iterum prima secundae q. xxi. licet homo moveatur a deo ut instrumentum, tamen per hoc non excluditur, quin possit etiam seipsum movere per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo per suum actum meretur vel demeretur apud deum.” Note that Goch cites both the young and the mature ThomasAquinas.
page 209 note 10 De lib. chr. III.3.187: “Secundus error huius opinionis est, quod dicit meritum esse actum, cui ex debito iustitiae debetur praemium.”
page 209 note 11 De lib. chr. III.4.190–91: “Tertius error opinionis est, quod meritum habeat etiam aliquam efficatiam a genere boni operis. Et ideo dicit secunda secundae .q. lxxxviij quod magis est meritorium facere aliquod opus bonum cum voto quam sine voto, et ad hoc adducit tres rationes, quarum prima est de eo de quo hie loquimur scilicet quod unum genus boni operis sit melius et nobilius quam aliud, et ergo etiam raagis meritorium.”
page 210 note 12 De lib. chr. III.6.196: “Quartus error huius opinionis est, quod dicit. Quod actus charitate informatus est actus proportionatus beatitudini aeternae secundum debitum iustitiae. Dicit enim tertio scripto sen. dist. xviij. Quod actus proportionatus ad vitam aeternam, est actus charitate informatus, ex quo aliquis meretur vitam aeternam ex condigno, quia inter huiusmodi meritum et praemium invenitur aequalitas secundum rectam aestimationem, et huiusmodi meritum innititur divinae iustitiae, haec ille. Hunc errorem destruit canonica veritas in multis locis.”
page 210 note 13 Of the 11 points of agreement between Goch and Staupitz cited in footnote 8, Thomas differs over 9, agreeing only with points 3 and 11.
page 210 note 14 For Biel's teaching on justification, see Oberman, H. A., The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 131–248Google Scholar. Cf. ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II q.:114 a.2. On this point Thomas and Goch make common cause against Biel. See De lib. chr. II.24.132; III.2.186.
page 210 note 15 De lib. chr. I.22.82; II.29.140. God does not predestine men to grace and then predestine them through their cooperation with grace to arrive at glory. Rather God predestines the elect to aeterna beatitudo and then brings that decree of election to fruition in time by predestining them to receive vocation, justification, and glorification. For a very similar understanding of predestination, see my discussion of Staupitz, Misericordia Dei, 75–92.
page 210 note 16 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II q.100 a.12 ad 3. For a brief treatment which stresses Thomas' Augustinianism, see H. J. McSorley, C.S.P., Luther: Right or Wrong?, 165–66. This point is also forcefully made by Goch, De lib, chr. III.3.188–89.
page 211 note 17 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II q.114 a.i and a.4.
page 211 note 18 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II q.114 a.1 ad 3.
page 211 note 19 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II q.114 a.3. Goch is familiar with the Thomist distinction between merita digni, congrui and condigni (De lib. chr. III.1.182–83; Frag. 298), and with the Thomist objection to the idea of PeterLombard that charitas or gratia gratum faciens is the Spiritus Sanctus or gratia increata (De lib. chr. 1.22.80; 23.84). If Goch differs with Thomas on these questions, it is not because of his ignorance of Thomas' position in the Summa Theologiae.
page 211 note 20 Frag. 309: “Omne meritum consistit simpliciter et absolute in acceptatione divina: et non potest mensurari ex operatione humana quantumcunque virtuosa: sed solum ex divina acceptatione.” Cf. Frag. 307; De lib. chr. III.4.191; 5.195.
page 212 note 21 De lib. chr. 1.22.83: “Ex praemissis scripturarum testimonijs satis evidenter ostenditur, quod ad operandum opera meritoria, homo non indigeat forma, per quam agat, quae sit principium actionis meritoriae, cum spiritus sanctus haec omnia operetur, per specialem assistentiam in homine. Et ergo non oportet ponere charitatem creatam.” Cf. De lib. chr. 1.23.85; 24.89; 24.90; II.23.128.
page 212 note 22 Frag. 307: “Et ideo bonum omne quod facimus non habet rationem meriti a quacunque aestimatione hominum; sed ab acceptatione divina. Quia sicut bonum nostrum non est bonum: nisi quia est a deo volitum. ideo bonum nostrum non est meritorium: nisi quia est a deo acceptum.”
page 212 note 23 von Amsdorf, Nikolaus, Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Lerche, Otto (Gütersloh, 1938), 128–29Google Scholar.
page 212 note 24 De lib. chr. II.37.157–58: “Nam sine charitate falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus, sicuti sunt mores religiosorum, quia qui fidem et charitatem non habet, omnis actio peccatum est.” Cf. Frag. 308: “Per opera de se indigna et deo premianti inacceptabilia. Homo nihil meretur: cum meritum consistat in acceptatione dei premiantis. Sed opera virtutum ex suo genere quantumcunque magna et qualitercunque facta, de se sunt deo indigna et inacceptabilia. Patet per Esaiam. Omnes iustitiae nostrae quasi pannus menstruate.” See also De lib. chr. 11.41.167; Frag. 315.
page 212 note 25 De lib. chr. III.3.189: “Sed proprius actus qui procedit ex arbitrio voluntatis, non est actus fidei per charitatem operantis, quia a seinvicem distinguuntur. Ergo talis actus proprius est peccatum. Si peccatum, non potest sibi deum constituere debitorem praemij beatitudinis aeternae.”
page 212 note 26 Frag. 302: “Ad dictum Augustini cum dicit. Qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te: die quod intelligitur hoc modo. Qui creavit te sine te, non cooperante sed et non volente, quia voluntatem nondum habebas, nondum existens. Non iustificabit te sine te volente. Non autem cooperante.” Cf. De lib. chr. II.7.102 ; Dial. VIII.121; Epist. Apol. 19–20.
page 212 note 27 Frag. 300: “Quare autem dicit apostolus, Iustificati gratis. Nisi ut ostendat legentibus quod per solam divinam operationem sine aliqua nostra cooperatione credentes ad vitam aeternam raparati sumus. Nam et si voluntas humana, gratia informata se ad actus virtutum movere videatur, ac per hoc iuxta quorundam falsam opinionem deo cooperari dicatur ad suam iustificationem.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.22.83; III.2.185.
page 213 note 28 For the Mariology of Staupitz, see my Misericordia Dei, 145–51.
page 213 note 29 De lib. chr. I.23.86: “Denique beatissima dei genetrix virgo maria, quae spiritus sancti singularissima operatione filium dei concepit, licet ipsa ad hunc conceptum nihil fuerit cooperata, nisi fidei integritate….”
page 213 note 30 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae III q.2 a.11 ad 3.
page 213 note 31 De lib. chr. I.23.86: “Unde virgini gloriosae propria merita ut mater dei fieri mereretur? Quod si quis contendere velit magna in ea merita praecessisse. Quod si ita est, quare plena gratia, et non plena meritis ab angelo salutatur?”
page 213 note 32 De lib. chr. II.23.127: “Sicut ergo in prima distinctione huius opusculi, per diversa et multa scripturarum testimonia ostendimus, nullam formam creatam ponendam esse in anima, sive charitatem sive gratiam, per quam operaretur homo opera meritoria, sed quod spiritus sanctus tertia in trinitate persona, spirituali sua assistentia cum consensu humanae voluntatis opera meritoria in homine operatur, ipso tamen in sua immobilitate permanente.” Cf. I.22.80.
page 213 note 33 Frag. 314: “Sicut enim alia opera gratiae gratis datae: ut sunt suscitare mortuos, mundare leprosos, et similia nullus fidelium dicit esse hominum opera sed dei, quamvis per homines tanquam per instrumenta fieri videantur. Sic utique nullus fidelium ambigere debet opera gratiae gratum facientis ut conversionem peccatoris, iustificationem impij et similia (Quae procul dubio sunt prioribus illis longe maiora) opera esse dei quamvis etiam per homines fieri videantur.”
page 213 note 34 De lib. chr. III.2.185: “Si deus est qui iustificat, planum est hominem in sui iustificatione non cooperari, nisi voluntate consentiendo deo in se operanti, ne quis existimet hominem invite posse iustificari.” De lib. chr. I.22.80; IV.2.187. R. R. Post correctly observes that the “… Mitwirkung des begnadeten Willens hat bei Thomas einige Bedeutung. Es wird mehr gefordert als nur die Zustimmung zur Gnade. Sodann spricht Thomas nicht von der acceptatio durch Gott als Bedingung für die Belohnung.” Johann Pupper van Goch, 89. Goch has reduced the role of the human will to a mere consentire.
page 213 note 35 Frag. 299: “… quid iam gloriari poterimus de operibus nostris: cum Christus in nobis manens ipse facit opera?” Frag. 310–11: “Sicut actus humani nihil habent bonitatis supernaturalis inquantum humani sunt, et ut ab homine facti: sed inquantum divini sunt facti a deo in Christo Iesu, per cuius spiritum naturalis voluntas humana movetur ad supernaturalem conformitatem divinae voluntatis.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.22.83. In the strict sense (ex condigno) Christ is the only one who can merit, since he alone is free (De lib. chr. III.8.201), he alone can place God under obligation ex debito institute (III. 10.208–09), his work always deserves God's acceptation (III.12.215), and he alone has the perfection of justice which is worthy of the divine reward (III.13.223). Staupitz adopts a remarkably similar position in his Libellus (1517) 40, 42, 51. See my Misericordia Dei, 114–22.
page 214 note 36 Frag. 308: “Per qualecunque opus virtutis etiam ex suo genere maximum et excellentissimo gradu procedens nullus meretur aeternum praemium. Sed hoc praemium solummodo percipitur ex electione divinae voluntatis, quamvis quaedam opera virtutum requirat deus a praemiando.” Goch condemns the error of those who hold “… quod proprius actus voluntatis qui in se consideratus est actus naturae, potest deum constituere sibi debitorem praemij retributionis aeternae…. Sed actus naturae nullomodo potest mereri aeternam beatitudinem, quae est quid supernaturale. patet, quia haec fuit haeresis pelagiana ab ecclesia condemnata, sed hoc solum potest gratia spiritus sancti, sicut superius diffuse declaratum est.” De lib. chr. III.3.189. If one were to attach a label to the merits of the Christian man performed in a state of grace, one could say that they are merita de congruo, not in the Thomistic sense as merits which arise from the human will, but in the nominalistic sense as merits ex abundantia divinae bonitatis et misericordiae. De lib. chr. III.6.200. Goch does not call them merita de congruo in this non-Thomistic understanding of the term, but the designation can appropriately be applied by the historian. For the similar position of Staupitz and Wyclif, see my Misericordia Dei, 120–21.
page 214 note 37 De lib. chr. III. 12.215: “Patet prima pars, quia meritum non consistit in operatione hominis, sed in divina acceptatione. Sed deo nihil est acceptum, nisi quod est ab ipso volitum, eo quod divina voluntas est regula et tnensura omnis boni.” Cf. Frag. 306: “Meritum aeternae beatitudinis non potest aestimari secundum genus virtuosi operis: neque secundum conditionem operantis quamvis etiam excellentissimo gradu charitatis ad ipsum opus moveatur. Sed solum debet aestimari secundum acceptationen divinae voluntatis.”
page 214 note 38 Frag. 306: “Prima pars patet: Quia aestimatio rerum fieri debet secundum proportionem unius ad aeternum. Sed genus virtuosi operis sicut est actus voluntatis imparatus, neque qualiscunque conditio operantis quae attenditur exactu voluntatis elicito: possunt praemio aeternae beatitudinis proportionari: quia omnis actus humanae voluntatis in se etiam cum gratia movente est infinitae [Waarschijlijk moet hier “finitae” staan] activitatis, et praemium in se est infinitae retributionis. Et finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio.” Cf. Frag. 308, 309; De chr. III.13.224; Dial. V.97.
page 215 note 39 De lib. chr. III.7.200: “Ubi sciendum, quod actus hominis non potest esse meritorius apud deum inquantum est ab homine factus, sed inquantum est a deo tanquam meritorius acceptus, tum, quia homo est debitor omnium quae potest facere, tum, quia universae iustitiae hominis sunt coram deo quasi pannus menstruate….” There is, of course, another sense in which Goch could accept the term meritum congruo (supra, footnote 36).
page 215 note 40 R. R. Post believes that Goch's understanding of acceptatio is saved from being merely arbitrary by Goch's adherence to the doctrine of the simplicity God: “Dies ist augenscheinlich die Theorie Ockhams, die uns sehr willkürlich scheint, aber nicht als solche bezeichnet werden darf, weil Gott bei der acceptatio nach seinem Wesen, das gut, barmherzig und gerecht ist, handelt.” Post, Johann Pupper van Goch, 88. Much the same position on this question is taken by Grane, Leip, Contra Gabrielem, Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio contra Scholasticam Theologiam 1517 (Gyldendal, 1962), 11Google Scholar. Equally important is the nominalist idea of the covenantal fidelity of God to his decisions de potentia ordinata. See De lib. chr. I.14.65; II.8.107; III.10.210; Frag. 301. With view of Spiritus or even Christus inhabitans and Deus acceptans, Goch stresses God gives both merit and reward (Frag. 314; De lib. chr. I.23.85–86), that good works, though meritorious and therefore necessary to salvation (Dial. 89–90), are nothing more than signa uniformis vitae nostrae cum Christo (Frag. 303) and in no sense causes of the reward which God gives to his elect at the end of time (Frag. 304). Reward is based on acceptation of those works which are merely temporal fruition of the eternal predestination of God (Frag. 300). Man's only function in this process is the consentire to grace.
page 215 note 41 De lib. chr. I.23.85–86: “Satis igitur ostensum est, quod nemo timere debeat opera salutis, quae spiritus sanctus speciali sua assistentia in homine, et per hominem operatur, homini non esse meritoria, eo quod homo ea non operetur, cum adhoc a spiritu sancto in homine operantur et operata homini donantur, ut tali eius specialis doni beneficio dignus aeterna beatitudine habeatur, ad quod alias idoneus esse non potest.” Cf. De lib. chr. I.22.80; III.2.185; IV.2.187.
page 215 note 42 De lib. chr. III.1.182; III.3.188.
page 215 note 43 De lib. chr. III.5.193; Dial. XVII.181.
page 215 note 44 De lib. chr. III.6.198.
page 216 note 45 Vignaux, Paul, Luther, commentateur des Sentences (Paris, 1935), 52ffGoogle Scholar.
page 216 note 46 See, for example, H. A. Oberman, Harvest, 209–11.
page 216 note 47 OnGregory see Würsdörfer, J., Erkennen und Wissen nach Gregor von Rimini in BB, vol. XX, pt. 1 (Münster i.W., 1917)Google Scholar ; Vignaux, Paul, Justification et prédestination au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1934)Google Scholar; Schüler, Martin, Prädestination, Sünde und Freiheit bei Gregor von Rimini (Stuttgart, 1934)Google Scholar ; Leff, Gordon, Gregory of Rimini, Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought (Manchester, 1961)Google Scholar.
page 216 note 48 De lib. chr. III.1.184: “Doctores vero moderni et si gratiam dei ad meritum necessariam asserunt, in hoc tamen desipiunt, quod soli gratiae dei meritum non tribuunt, sed humanam voluntatem et gratiam dei simul meritum causare affirmant. Propter quem tamen errorem a catholica fide eliminandum apostolus Paulus pene omnes suas scripsit epistolas, maxime earn quae est ad Romanos.” Cf. De lib. chr. II.3.190: “Attende lector et compara verba Pauli apostoli et Thomae de aquino. Apostolus dicit hominem, ex operibus iustitiae quae facit salvum non fieri, sed per misericordiam dei. Ut iustificatus gratia ipsius, heres sit vitae aeternae per spem divinae bonitatis et misericordiae. Thomas de aquino dicit hominem se movere posse per liberum arbitrium et per suum actum mereri vitam aeternam apud deum. Ita ut ille actus sit talis, ut ei ex debito iustitiae praemium debeatur. Vel ergo falsum est quod dicit apostolus, vel falsum est quod dicit Thomas de aquino, quia utraque dicta sunt sibi invicem contraria. Sed falsum esse quod dicit apostolus est hnpossibile. Ergo falsum est quod dicit Thomas de aquino.”
page 217 note 1 Goch's works include the following: De quatuor erroribus circa legem evangelicam exortis de votis et religionibus factitiis dialogus [Abbreviated: Dial.], ed. Walch, C.G.F., Monimenta medii aevi, Vol. 1.4 (Göttingen, 1760), 74–239Google Scholar; De scholasticorum scriptis et religiosorum votis epistola apologetica [Abbreviated: Epist. Apol.], ed. Walch, C.G.F., Monimenta medii aevi, Vol. II.i (Göttingen, 1761), 1–24Google Scholar; De libertate Christiana [Abbreviated: De lib. chr.], ed. Pijper, F., Bibliotheca Reformatories Neerlandica, Vol. VI (Hague, 1910), 1–263Google Scholar; Fragmenta [Abbreviated: Frag.], ed. Pijper, F., Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica, Vol. VI (Hague, 1910), 267–347Google Scholar.
page 217 note 2 Clemen, Otto, Johann Pupper von Goch. Leipziger Studien aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, II.3 (Leipzig, 1896), 186–87Google Scholar.
page 217 note 3 Post, R. R., The Modern Devotion. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, III (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 470–73, 486Google Scholar.
page 217 note 4 Clemen, 208.
page 218 note 5 Abramowski, Luise, Johann Gerson, De consiliis evangelicis et statu perfectionis, in Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation, Festschrift für Ernst Bizer, ed. Abramowski, Luise et al. (Neukirchen, 1969), 63–78Google Scholar.
page 218 note 6 Abramowski, 77–78.
page 218 note 7 Abramowski demonstrates the duality of Gerson's relationship to Thomas in his De consiliis: “… einerseits ist Thomas auctoritas, dann wird er mit genauen Stellenangaben herangezogen, andererseits est er Gegner, was aber nie ausdrücklich gesagt wird.” Abramowski, 65.
page 218 note 8 To the extent that Goch stresses perfection as conformity of will to the will of God rather than as the cultivation of ecstatic experiences, one can see a certain democratizing tendency at work in his own thought. Nevertheless, the center of gravity, as we shall see, lies for him elsewhere.
page 219 note 9 This point has been forcefully made by Lohse, Bernhard, Mönchtum und Reformation, Luthers Auseinandersetzung mil dent Mönchsideal des Mittelalters (Göttingen, 1963), 153–56Google Scholar, 373–74.
page 219 note 10 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.186 a.i ad 3. Cf. q.184 a.5 ad 2; q.184 a.4 concl.
page 219 note 11 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.184 a.4
page 220 note 12 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II q.108 a.4.
page 220 note 13 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.184 a.5.
page 220 note 14 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.184 a.7.
page 220 note 15 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.184 a.6 ad 2.
page 220 note 16 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.184 a.6 concl.
page 220 note 17 Theoretically Thomas appears to give preeminence to bishops, when he concludes: “Potior et perfectior est status perfectionis in praelatis et episcopis, quam in religiosis.” (Summa Theologiae II–II q.184 a.7 concl.) Over against this theoretical preeminence of the bishops must be set the practical advantages of the monk: viz., second baptism and greater meritoriousness of his works. Furthermore, since only a few secular priests become bishops while all monks are by reason of their vows in a state of perfection, the overall impact of this argument is to stress the advantages of the mendicant orders over against the secular priesthood. Nevertheless, Thomas does recognize the preeminent place of bishops. On this question see BernhardLohse, Mönchtum und Reformation, 156–57.
page 221 note 18 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.189 a.2.
page 221 note 19 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.88 a.6.
page 221 note 20 ThomasAquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II q.189 a.3 ad 3.
page 221 note 21 This position is represented, for example, by Luther's superior at Erfurt, John of Paltz. Cf. BernhardLohse, Mönchtum und Reformation, 167–69.
page 222 note 22 Gerson, Jean, De consiliis evangelicis et statu perfections, Oeuvres Complètes, III: L'Oeuvre Magistrale, ed. Glorieux, P. (Paris, 1962), 10–11Google Scholar. The treatise covers pp. 10–26.
page 2 note 23 Gerson, 14.
page 222 note 24 Gerson, 20–21.
page 222 note 25 Oberman, H. A., The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 336Google Scholar.
page 222 note 26 Gerson, 20–21.
page 222 note 27 Gerson, 21.
page 222 note 28 Gerson, 22.
page 222 note 29 Gerson, 25.
page 222 note 30 Gerson, 23–24.
page 222 note 31 Gerson, 25.
page 223 note 32 Gerson holds that the status episcoporum is the status perfectissimus in the ecclesia militans. Gerson, 22. For Goch it is the priesthood as such.
page 223 note 33 Dial. X.138: “Hoc est igitur scire Iesum Christum et hunc cruciflxum, ex intimo cordis affectu sentire, quod summa perfectio animae consistat in totali humanae voluntatis sub divino beneplacito resignatione, ut, sicut Christus libera voluntatis suae facultate per mortem crucis se totum obtulit Deo patri, sic et Christi servus sine aliqua exceptione se totum redigat in obsequium Dei.” Cf. Dial. X.132: “… planum est, in actu voluntatis esse summam supernaturalem animae perfectionem.” See also Dial. XVIII.186; XIX.196; Frag. 296. According to Dial. XII.158: “Ideo quanto humana voluntas divinae voluntati sit conformior, tanto est anima Deo propinquior et perfectior.”
page 223 note 34 Dial. X.132: “Quod autem doceri desideras de summa animae supernaturali perfectione, an consistat in actu intellectus, ut iste Doctor determinat, an in actu voluntatis, ut nos iam declaravimus, scire debes, quod tres sunt summi et ultimi actus animae beatae, sc. tenere Deum per memoriam, videre et cognoscere per intellectum, et frui Deo per voluntatem. Quorum duo primi scilicet tenere et videre subserviunt tertio, qui est frui, in quo consummatur tota ipsius animae beatitudo et felicitas, ut dicit Augustinus 1. de trinitate.” Cf. Dial. X.135.
page 223 note 35 Dial. XIX.191–92: “Et ideo nihil proprii habere, ut religiosi communiter faciunt, non est summa perfectio christianae religionis. Nee etiam nihil vel proprio vel communiter habere, ut faciunt fratres minores, non est summa perfectio christianae religionis: Sed nihil velle habere, et effectum voluntatis liberum et absolutum ab omni creatura, quae est bonum particulare reservare, et in Deo habere resolutum, quod est bonum universale, et summa perfectio christianae religionis.”
page 224 note 36 Dial. XXII.234–35: “Ubi notandum: quod quando duplex est proprietas, scilicet proprietas iuris et amoris. Proprietas iuris potest stare cum summa perfectione evangelica, proprietas amoris est omnibus christianis per praeceptum charitatis simpliciter illicita et interdicta etc.”
page 224 note 37 Dial. XIX.190.
page 224 note 38 De lib. chr. IV.10.247: “Dicendum ergo, quod sentire quod lex evangelica addit concilia supra praecepta, est falsum et erroneum. Quia concilia sic sunt de lege evangelica sicut praecepta, et ad evangelicae legis summam perfectionem omnibus indifferenter necessaria.” Though Goch singles out Thomas for comment, he admits that this view is taught by “… pene omnes moderni doctores maxime ordinum mendicantium.” De lib. chr. IV.10.247.
page 224 note 39 De lib. chr. IV.11.251: “Sed est solummodo una perfectio unius legis evangelicae, quae est perfectio charitatis consummatae, quam nemo in hac vita habuit vel habiturus est, praeter illum unum hominem qui sic est homo ut sit etiam natura deus eo quod est una realiter cum ea charitate quam habent sancti in patria, propter quod in retributione iustorum non debet ipsa perfectio exigi a filijs regni cum rigore iustitiae, sed cum dilectione pietatis et misericordiae, diversimode tamen secundum variam distributionem gratiarum in praesenti.”
page 224 note 40 Dial. XIX.194–95. ThomasAquinas regards martyrdom as the actus moximae perfectionis (Summa Theologiae II–II q.124 a.3 and q.184 a.5 ad 3). John of Paltz, however, places the monk and the martyr on the same level. Cf. BernhardLohse, Mönchtum und Reformation, 168.
page 225 note 41 Dial. XIX.192: “In omni statu christianae religionis potest summum aeternae beatitudinis praemium mereri, quamvis in omni statu christianae religionis non possit summus actus evangelicae perfectionis exerceri.”
page 225 note 42 De lib. chr. IV.1.226: “Est igitur primo notandum, quod votum non habet originem a novo testamento….”
page 225 note 43 Cf., e.g., De lib. chr. 1.6.53; Epist. Apol. 15.
page 225 note 44 De lib. chr. I.7.55: “Quod ergo scriptura actuum de fidelibus ex Iudaismo congregatis obscure posuit, de modo ad religionem Christianam fideles assumendi, hoc scriptura apostolorum in epistolis suis plane determinat, ostendens quod non sub voto obligante, sed sub Evangelica libertate omnes ad religionem Christianam sunt assumpti.”
page 226 note 45 Dial. XVII.181: “Dicere ergo, quod votum sit causa productiva meriti, et quod faciat actum virtutis meritorium, non est aliud dicere, quam quod exteriore actu voluntatis absque auxilio gratiae potest aeterna beatitudo mereri. Quia votum, in quantum dicit obligationem, declaravimus stare non posse cum libertate voluntatis, et per consequens, nee etiam cum gratia, quae est causa liberrima. Haec fuit insania Pelagii haeretici, dicentis, quod voluntas facultate naturali sufficeret ad aeternam beatitudinem promerendam absque auxilio gratiae, a qua error Thomistarum non solum in hoc loco, sed etiam in multis aliis non multum degenerare videtur.” Cf. De lib. chr. III.4.190–91; 5.193.
page 226 note 46 De lib. chr. IV.3.229: “Tres possunt adduci rationes, quare in institutione et promulgatione evangelicae legis non decuit mentionem fieri de voto obligante. Prima ratio est, quia lex evangelica, est lex perfectae libertatis: cum perfecta autem libertate nulla omnino potest stare necessitas obligationis, et ideo nullam decuit de obligatione fieri mentionem.” Cf. Dial. XVII.181; De lib. chr. IV.3.229; 4.231–32; 6.238.
page 226 note 47 Epist. Apol. 19: “Quamquam ergo per mille vota ad bonum se quis obligaverit, ex ipsa obligatione nihil meretur, nisi ipsum bonum, ad quod se obligavit, per libertatem spiritus operatur.” Cf. Dial. XVIII.183: “Votum religionis, in quantum dicit necessariam obligationem, et est quid positivum ab Ecclesia, non est bonum meritorium, nee alicuius boni supernaturalis per se effectivum.”
page 226 note 48 Frag. 309: “Omne meritum consistit simpliciter et absolute in acceptatione divina: et non potest mensurari ex operatione humana quantumcunque virtuosa: sed solum ex divina acceptatione.” Cf. Frag. 307; De lib. chr. I.22.83; 23.85; 24. 89; 24.90; II.23.128; III.4.191; 5.195.
page 226 note 49 Dial. XVIII.184: “Votum religionis, in quantum dicit liberam voluntatis oblationem ad evangelicam observationem, et est actus voluntatis charitate informatae, est bonum meritorium et alicuius supernaturalis boni effectivum.”
page 227 note 50 Dial. XVII.178: “Quia ergo votum religionis inter alia est quaedam positiva constitutio Ecclesiae….” Cf. Dial. XVIII.183.
page 227 note 51 Dial. XIV.164–65: “Et ideo quamvis votum non firmet voluntatem in bonum per obligationem, nee sit idoneum ad tam excellens bonum, potest tamen esse occasio alicuius boni … Sic etiam votum religionis ab Ecclesia ordinatur, non quia est magnum bonum in se; sed quia multis infirmis et negligentibus potest esse melioris boni occasio.” Cf. Dial. XII.159.
page 227 note 52 Dial. XV.167: “Votum igitur religionis propter infirmos et instabiles Ecclesia ordinavit, qui ad perfectam legis evangelicae observantiam sub communi institutione christianae religionis aliter indud non poterant … Cum igitur haec ita se habeant, valde est a veritate alienum, quod quidam religiosorum ad tam superstitiosam elationem religiones extollunt, quod in suam contumeliam status eas perfectionis dicere non erubescant.” Goch lists the profession of vows (Dial. VII.109) as one of the four errors concerning evangelical law. The others are Iegalism (Dial. III.83), sola fide (Dial. IV. 84), and Pelagianism (Dial. V.91). On this problem see Abramowski, Luise, Die Lehre von Gesetz und Evangelium bei Johann Pupper von Goch im Rahmen seines nominalistischen Augustinismus, ZThK 64 (1967), 83–98Google Scholar.
page 228 note 53 Dial. XX.211: “Professio vero religionis obligat religiosum ad exercitium actuum praesentialium, qui consistit in mortificatione corporis peccati … Sed religiosus est in statu poenitentiae….”
page 228 note 54 De lib. chr. IV.1.228: “Concedunt omnes etiam ipsi Thomistae, quod differant votum et propositum, nam et ipsi distinctionem faciunt inter ilia duo. Quod si fideles ad Christianam religionem non admittebantur nisi per votum, sicut Thomistae dogmatizant, quare Barnabas non hortabatur eos permanere in voto cordis, sicut in proposito cordis eos permanere hortabatur. Nam propositum continetur in voto quia requiritur ad votum, sed votum non continetur in proposito, sicut nec maius continetur in minori.”
page 228 note 55 Dial. XII.153: “Alia est ratio promissionis et professionis fidei in baptismo, quam obligationis voti in religioso. Quia promissio fidei de necessitate salutis in baptizato requiritur, sicut observantia mandatorum necessario exigitur.”
page 228 note 56 Dial. XVIII.185: “Christiana religio potest absque voto religionis per libertatem spiritus secundum omnem suam perfectionem, perfectissime observari.” Cf. Dial. XIX.189.
page 228 note 57 Dial. XX.205: “Ordo sacerdotalis est summus ordo in Ecclesia militante. Quia ipsius est consecrare corpus Christi et sanguinem, in quo est plenitudo omnium gratiarum.” Cf. Dial. XX.206: “Et sic Episcopatus non dicit ordinem supra sacerdotium.” See also Dial. XX.199: “Vita sacerdotalis, secundum eminentiam status sacerdotalis et dignitatem ordinis regulata, est vere et simpliciter Apostolica et summa perfectio religionis christianae.”
page 229 note 58 Dial. XX.201: “Ergo status sacerdotalis est in ecclesia militante status summae perfectionis, propter cuius excellentiam et dignitatem alicui competit in Ecclesia locus summae dignitatis. Sed sacerdotium est talis status, quia propter dignitatem et excellentiam sacerdotii competit sacerdotibus esse duces Ecclesiae catholicae, et per sacramentorum consecrationem et dispensationem ecclesiastici populi instrumentales sanctificatores.”
page 229 note 59 Dial. XX.209–10: “Respondetur, quod hoc verum est, quantum ad Ecclesiae consuetudinem vel constitutionem, sed non quantum ad primariam sacramentorum institutionem et divinam ordinationem. Verum tamen soli Episcopi sunt successores Apostolorum quoad plenam autoritatem iurisdictionis ad populi subiecti gubernationem: ratione cuius dicuntur praelati, quia Episcopatus dicit autoritatem iurisdictionis, non ordinis. Sicut ergo centurio baro est miles inter milites, et Abbas monachus inter monachos, sic Episcopus est sacerdos inter sacerdotes….”
page 229 note 60 See supra, footnote 57.
page 229 note 61 See supra, footnote 58.
page 229 note 62 See supra, footnote 59.
page 229 note 63 Dial. XX.212: “Unde liquet, quod sacerdotes secundum consilia evangelica sub Episcopo communem vitam gerere et sacerdotaliter vivere fuit ab exordio christianae religionis vere vita Apostolica et Christi vitae simillima, tam quoad summum actum exteriorem, quam ad interiorem affectum.”
page 230 note 64 On the question raised by Clemen whether in his monastic theology Goch is a forerunner of Luther, one can do no better than quote the judgment of Abramowski concerning Gerson, Johann Gerson, 75–76, footnote 63: “Luther bekämpft nicht den engen Begriff von status perfectionis, wie Thomas ihn bietet, sondern die gängige Unterscheidung von geistlichem und weltlichem status. Mit der Bestimmung des Christenstandes vom königlichen Priestertum aller her hebt er nicht nur den status als innerchristlichen Unterscheidungsbegriff auf, sondern schwemmt auch noch den ordo fort.”