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Wolsey's Foreign Policy: The Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Peter Gwyn
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Extract

On 2 August 1521 Wolsey arrived at Calais to preside over a conference the ostensible purpose of which was to put an end to fighting that had broken out earlier in the year, fighting which had increasingly involved French and imperial forces. When, nearly four months later, the conference broke up, the fighting still continued. Clearly Wolsey had been unsuccessful in bringing about peace, but he did not return to England empty-handed. On 24 November a treaty had been signed committing England to a declaration of war against France, at least by March 1523. This treaty, and especially the fact that its terms had to all intents and purposes been settled at Wolsey's meeting with the emperor at Bruges less than a fortnight after his arrival at Calais, has led many historians to suspect that Wolsey had never been very serious about his role as peacemaker. Not, however, all. In his biography of Henry VIII, J. J. Scarisbrick has argued most powerfully that at Calais Wolsey worked very hard to reconcile Francis I and the emperor, and, indeed he sees his activities there as crucial evidence that ‘Wolsey's policy was a peace policy and for about fifteen years he struggled to make it work’. The main purpose of this article will be to argue that, at least as far as the events of 1521 are concerned, this thesis cannot be sustained. Instead, it will be shown that Wolsey's main aim in 1521 was to bring about the alliance with the emperor.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 755 - 772
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

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References

1 Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII (London, 1968), p. 49Google Scholar, and, more generally, pp. 41–240. For other accounts of Wolsey's concern for peace see Mattingly, G., ‘An early non-aggression pact’, Journal of Modern History, X (1938), 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Russell, J. G., ‘The search for universal peace: the conferences at Calais and Bruges in 1521’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XLIV (1971), 162–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This last contains a good survey of the documentary evidence, and much useful information not provided here.

2 Wernham, R. B., Before the Armada: the growth of English foreign policy, 1485–1588 (London, 1966), pp. 89Google Scholar ff.

3 Elton, G. R., Reform and reformation, England 1509–1558 (London, 1977), p. 86Google Scholar.

4 Charles of Castile and Aragon, at the treaty of Noyon, 13 August 1516; the Swiss, at the treaty of Fribourg, 29 Nov. 1516; Maximilian, at the treaty of Cambrai, 11 Mar. 1517.

5 There were various ‘paper’ treaties with both Maximilian and Charles, confirmed 5 July 1517.

6 Francis I to digest Milan, Charles to establish himself in Spain.

7 Leo X called for ‘a Five Year truce’, and a crusade on 6 March 1518.

8 Letters and papers, Henry VIII, II, 4468–71 for documents relating to the treaties comprising what is usually referred to as the treaty of London; details can most conveniently be studied in Rymer, T., Foedera, etc. (London, 1712), XIII, 624 ffGoogle Scholar. The account of the events leading up to the treaty of London is inevitably much compressed, but see Mattingly, , ‘Early non-aggression pact’, pp. 1–30Google Scholar; also Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, pp. 67Google Scholar ff. One of the difficulties in writing about it is that the negotiations were kept unusually secret – see Thomas More's conversation with the Venetian ambassador, in Brown, Rawdon, Four years at the court of Henry VIII (London, 1854), II, 215Google Scholar.

9 Dumont, J., Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens, etc. (Amsterdam, 1726), IV, 224Google Scholar f.

10 Public Record Office, S.P. 1/22, fos. 142–3; Le Glay, M., Negotiations diplomatiques entre la France et l'Autriche (Paris, 1845), II, 473Google Scholar for imperial policy at this time; also Pollard, A. F., Wolsey (Fontana edn, 1965), pp. 118Google Scholar ff.

11 Elton, G. R., Reform and reformation, p. 84Google Scholar for such scepticism, otherwise Russell, J. G., The Field of Cloth of Gold (London, 1969)Google Scholar; also Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, pp. 74Google Scholar ff.

12 Monumenta Habsburgica, etc. (Vienna, 1853–1858), II, 121Google Scholar – referred to from now on as Mon. Habsb., the references are to pages. Also Cal. S.P. Venetian, II, 1259, 1298; III, 60, 184, this last as late as April 1521.

13 S.P. 1/21, fos. 247–57; 1/22, fos. 29–39; British Library, Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 6–9, 170–1 V.

14 S.P. 1/21, fos. 20–7.

15 British Library, Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fo. 239; the recall is S.P. 1/21, fos. 258–9.

16 S.P. 1/21, fos. 20–7. It should be said that a defensive alliance was in fact signed between Henry and the emperor at their meetings. This was not in direct contradiction to the treaty of London, but hardly suggests great faith in its effectiveness.

17 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, II, fos. 186–9 V, 195–6, 197, 201–9 V, 238–9; Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 195–214.

18 von Pastor, L., History of the popes (London, 1908)Google Scholar, VIII, ch. I.

19 ‘For remembryng the good amyte that is beywixte us and Fraunce, and our doughter honorably bestowed there, consideryng also that we be in peax with all cristen princes, what nede have we to care for ferther amities, aliaunces or intelligence with the Pope or the Emperor than we have all redy’, Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fo. 199 V.

20 Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 195–214.

21 Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 6–9, 170–170 V; Caligula E, III, fos. 124–7 for English efforts to thwart these moves.

22 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fos. 238–9; the quotation is fo. 238 V.

23 Mon. Habsb. II, 207, 212, 219; State Papers, Henry VIII, I, 17, 38; S.P. 1/23, fos. 17–21.

24 It is interesting that, at least according to Charles, serious discussions had taken place at Canterbury about what would be the imperial response if the French discontinued their payment of the annual pension, Mon. Habsb. II, 212.

25 Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 397–9; Caligula D, VIII, fos. 6–9.

26 Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 44, 48–9 V.

27 Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 41–3, 44, 48–9 V, 54–9, 63–7 V; S.P. 1/22, fos. 166–9, 191–2.

28 S.P., Henry VIII, VI, 72.

29 S.P., Henry VIII, I, 17 – also S.P., Henry VIII, I, 20; Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 65, 71–2; Mon. Habsb. II, 219.

30 He was quite good at changing them himself – especially in 1514.

31 Le Glay, II, 473 for Gattinara's assessment.

32 Gattinara's comments at the imperial council meeting in August show that he was aware of Wolsey's worries on this score, Mon. Habsb. II, 241. In November, they were used by Charles to bring pressure on him, Mon. Habsb. II, 456.

33 Neither of these two meetings is well documented, and it appears that much that was discussed was not committed to paper. In the negotiations in 1521 reference is usually made to ‘the treaty of Canterbury’. What has survived is a treaty made at Calais. Presumably the terms were discussed at Canterbury and actually signed at Calais, but a puzzle remains. For the Calais treaty see S.P. 1/20, fos. 165–70.

34 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fos. 248–9.

35 Giustinian, the Venetian ambassador's words in September 1518, Brown, R., Henry VIII, II, 219Google Scholar.

36 S.P. 1/22, fo. 206.

37 Mon. Habsb. 11, 215 ff.

38 The assessment of the more or less permanent English ambassador in the Low Countries, Thomas Spinelly. On 21 July he wrote to Wolsey informing him that the Spaniards had recovered Navarre, and that it looked as if the French would lose Milan, ‘the whiche successe withoute the kinges hyghnes particypacion wolbe after my pure mynde as evyll as other myght to the same enswe by any declaracion or delyberacion taken in the presente afferres. And it is to be consydered, if the oppinion of wysemenn is themperor allone cannot at the wors lake the seyd hounorable peaix, that the condicions therof beyng the kinges hyghnes yoyned with him wol grettely be the better.’ Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fo. 86.

39 He was certainly very eager to see him, insisting on a meeting as soon as he arrived, despite the resident ambassador's view that this was inconvenient, S.P. 1/22, fo. 210; Mon. Habsb. 11, 219.

40 Cal. S.P. Spanish II, 337, for an assessment not unlike the one given here. On 26 May 1521, Juan Manuel, the imperial ambassador at Rome wrote to this effect: no great choice of allies is left to the king of England for there is no one except the emperor who could be of any use to him; thus, if an alliance with Henry is valuable to the emperor, it is at least as valuable to Henry.

41 It is this uncertainty about the terms, and the sense in which all was still to play for, which provides the answer to the question posed by Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, pp. 84 ff.Google Scholar: why, if all he wanted was an imperial alliance, did not Wolsey just send over more ambassadors – major negotiations at a delicate stage? Of course, there is also the point that ‘the cover’ was an integral part of Wolsey's policy because it bought time.

42 Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 288–90.

43 In particular, point 4 suggests that, following a marriage alliance, there should be a two-year truce to allow England time to prepare for war, and for Charles to return to Spain. But, in fact, Charles's return was decided at Bruges, and when the treaty of Windsor was signed he was already on his way. What first suggested to me that the document was misplaced is that in it the assumption is made that France still possessed the duchy of Milan, which after November 1521 was not the case.

44 This may suggest a date close to Haneton's mission in very early July. At that date, Navarre had not been recovered by the Spanish, so that this provision would have restored it to them. If the document is to be dated after November 1521, it would require the restoration of Milan to France – not presumably a very likely way of gaining an imperial alliance.

45 Three of the six points specifically mention this.

46 Scottish affairs did impinge on Wolsey's calculations at this time. Following the death of James IV at the battle of Flodden, and the accession of his baby son, the situation there was very complicated. The essential point, however, is that by using their influence with the duke of Albany, heir presumptive to the Scottish throne, the French were attempting to dominate the country. One of the advantages of the treaty of London was that they had agreed to restrain Albany. But in November 1521 they allowed him to return, as part of their attempt to put pressure on England.

47 One of the five commissions that Wolsey took with him to Calais did give him authority to treat with Francis I for a closer alliance. There was also one enabling him to settle differences between Francis and the emperor, and another to treat for an alliance with these two and the pope. The remaining two were concerned with the imperial alliance. These commissions have been used as evidence that Wolsey's main commitment was to peace (Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, p.86)Google Scholar but they do not seem to contradict in any way the argument presented here.

48 S.P., Henry VIII, 1, 27.

49 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fo. 257; Caligula E, III, fo. 7 V; Galba B, VI, fo. 222.

50 Cotton MSS, Caligula E, in, fo. 7 V; Cal. S.P. Spanish, 11, 355, pts 7, 8. The imperial ambassadors argued that the amount of money settled on Mary should be one tenth of the marriage portion she brought with her. They, therefore, objected to Wolsey's demand for 20,000 marks p.a., as the portion was only 100,000 marks. The figure reached at Bruges was less favourable to Mary (a portion of 400,000 crowns, her dower 50,000 crowns p.a.) but still above the Imperialists' assessment of the going rate; the actual figure by my calculation had dropped from £13,000 p.a. to £10,000 p.a.

51 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fo. 257.

52 Public Record Office, E. 30/866.

53 Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 223–4.

54 Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 109–18; Cal. S.P. Spanish, II, 355 for all references to the treaty of Bruges.

55 Cal. S.P. Spanish, 11, 358 for Gattinara's comment on Juan Manuel's worries about the English efforts to secure a truce: ‘I should much like the King of England to be persuaded to declare against France.’ Manuel's letter is dated 6 Sept. 1521.

56 S.P., Henry VIII, 1, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 34; Cotton MSS, Caligula E, III, fos. 7–8; S.P. 1/23, fos. 17–21, for the disagreement about who should command the force. Henry wanted an aristocrat, Wolsey Sir William Sandys; in other words, Wolsey was anxious to play the whole thing down, though at one stage he did rather rashly promise to lead the force into battle himself, S.P., Henry VIII, I, 31.

57 S.P., Henry VIII, 1, 47, 51, 54, 58, 62, 68; Cotton MSS, Galba B, VII, fos. 53–60 V; S.P. 1/23, fo. 70.

58 Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, pp. 86, 89 ff.Google Scholar, for both disputes, and the argument that they indicate a major divergence over policy between the two men.

59 S.P., Henry VIII, 1, 49, 50; VI, 85.

60 Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 223–4.

61 Le Glay, 11, 473; Mon. Habsb., 11, 236.

62 Mon. Habsb. 11, 308, 316, 319.

63 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fos, 269–71, for Wolsey's argument that the present war was hindering the eventual anglo-imperial success; S.P., Henry VIII, 1, 84; Cotton MSS, Caligula E, I, fos. 274–4 V; Galba B, III, fo. 110, for his view that if the war was going well, a truce should be delayed; Mon. Habsb. 11, 486, for general rejoicing at imperial success.

64 Le Glay, 11, 556, 557, for their impossible demands.

65 Cotton MSS, Caligula D, VIII, fos. 118, 125–6, 127–31 V, 165–7, 168–9 V, 172–5, 176–7; Vitellius B, XX, fo. 259; S.P. 1/23 fos. 113–5; Le Glay, II, 563, 579, for negotiations with Francis I. Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fos. 258–8 V, 263 V, 269–71; Galba B, VII, fos. 138, 140–1, 145–6 V, 147–8, 149–9 V, 150–1, 153, 154–5, 156–7; S.P. 1/23 fo. 123; Mon. Habsb. 11, 426, 432, 445, 448, 453, for negotiations with the emperor.

66 Mon. Habsb. 11, 441.

67 Ibid. 432–3.

68 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fo. 259. From ‘so that almost…’ is crossed out in the original MS.

69 Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, p. 92Google Scholar.

70 S.P., Henry VIII, 1, 90.

71 E. 30/866; Mon. Habsb. 11, 466, 470.

72 Arguably an even greater one if peace had been his aim – though in the end unsuccessful. One of the difficulties of the ‘peace’ theory is that it requires Wolsey to be deceiving not only the French, but also the pope, the emperor, and even Henry VIII. Perhaps this was beyond even Wolsey's considerable powers of deception?

73 Goring, J. J., ‘The general proscription of 1522’, E.H.R. LXXXVI (1971), 681–705CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a useful summary see Elton, G. R., Reform and reformation, pp. 87 fGoogle Scholar.

74 ‘The statesmen in Rome, however, are persuaded that the Cardinal will do what is most lucrative for himself,’ Juan Manuel to Charles V, 13 June 1520, Cal. S.P. Spanish, 11, 281.

75 Pollard, A. F., Wolsey, pp. 303 ff.Google Scholar, for some details about this, and also his assessment of Wolsey's character. The Fontana edition is especially useful as it contains Elton's, G. R. introduction, otherwise to be found in Studies in Tudor and Stuart politics and government (London, 1974), 1, 108 fGoogle Scholar.

76 The notion that concern for the papacy dominated Wolsey's action was the central thesis of Pollard's study of Wolsey, which first appeared in 1929. It has been, in my view, most successfully challenged by Chambers, D. S. in ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the papal tiara’, B.I.H.R. XXVIII (1965), 20–30Google Scholar, and by Scarisbrick, J. J., Henry VIII, pp. 46 ff., 107 ffGoogle Scholar. The restatement, though with much additional research in the papal archives and with a considerable playing-down of Wolsey's personal ambition to become pope, has been made by Wilkie, W. E. in The cardinal protectors of England: Rome and the Tudors before the reformation (London, 1974), pp. 114 ff.Google Scholar, and accepted by Elton, G. R., Reform and reformation, p. 86Google Scholar.

77 I refer to questions of foreign policy affecting the imperial alliance, not to such matters as the presentation to Leo X of Henry VIII's Assertio Septem Sacramentum: those were discussed.

78 Haneton and the resident imperial ambassador were not to inform the English of it, unless they were proving obstinate, Mon. Habsb., 11, 215. Apparently they were not, for it was not until 25 July that Wolsey wrote to Henry that from something in the imperial ambassador's letter he suspected that there was some agreement between them and the pope, ‘which as yet be kept to theym selfes secrete’.

79 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, IV, fos. 102–6 V, 121–4 V, 137–9, 141–4. For a contrary view see Wilkie, W. E., Cardinal protectors, p. 121Google Scholar: ‘the progression of events during the following months was the direct result of the new understanding between de' Medici and Wolsey which Clerk's arrival in Rome was intended to implement’.

80 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, IV, fos. 148–8 V.

81 Ibid. fos. 149–54.

82 Ibid. fos. 145–7.

83 Cal. S.P. Spanish, 11, 359. The imperial ambassador's reports provide a running commentary on papal suspicions of Wolsey from the time of Clerk's arrival; ibid. 11, 353 ff.

84 Cotton MSS, Vitellius B, XX, fo. 270. The emperor's concern for Italy was going to be much more damaging for Wolsey, and, indeed, the policy begun at Calais and Bruges would eventually flounder on this issue.

85 Mon. Hasb. 11, 459.

86 Wernham, R. B., Before the Armada, pp. 89 ff.Google Scholar, for this explanation.

87 S.P., Henry VIII, VI, 86.

88 Modern historians have had difficulty taking it seriously, a notable exception being Smith, L. Baldwin in Henry VIII, the mask of royalty (London, 1971), especially pp. 161 ffGoogle Scholar.

89 ‘But if I had served God as diligently as I have done the King, he would not have given me over in my grey hairs. Howbeit this is the just reward that I must receive for my worldly diligence and pains that I have had to do him service, only to satisfy his vain pleasures, not regarding my godly duties.’ These are Wolsey's words on his death bed as reported by Cavendish, , taken from Two early Tudor lives, etc. (Yale, 1962), p. 183Google Scholar.

90 Wolsey received not only praise, but also St Albans abbey.