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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
To the “moderate consequentialism” that has emerged as new moral theology in recent years and is now represented by many moral theologians an alternative is proposed: relational moral theology or relationalism. In moral theology the consequentialist or means-end model cannot bear the weight of being the fundamental model of moral norm-making and decision-making; and a relational model, which is apt for this function, should replace it. Moreover, “moderate consequentialism” developed out of an insufficient reconsideration of the traditional ethical categories, moral and physical evils, which resulted only in slight modification of these philosophical categories. Still needed is the radical reconsideration of evil that introduces a theological understanding of it into moral theology. And once introduced, this theological understanding of evil itself calls for a relational model of moral norm- and decision-making in moral theology.
1 Charles Curran has repeatedly noted the lack of sufficient attention to human sinfulness in Catholic natural law-teaching in the past. Cf. Curran, C. E., “Roman Catholic Social Ethics—Past, Present and Future,” in Curran, , Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue (Notre Dame, IN: Fides, 1972), pp. 122–26.Google Scholar
2 Maguire, Daniel C., The Moral Choice (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), p. 164.Google Scholar See also O'Connell, Timothy E., Principles for a Catholic Morality (New York: Seabury, 1978), p. 171Google Scholar; Keane, Philip S., Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective (New York: Paulist, 1977), pp. 46–47.Google Scholar
3 Peter Knauer, S.J., “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, eds. Curran, C. E. and McCormick, Richard A. S.J., (New York: Paulist, 1979), pp. 6, 16.Google Scholar This volume, hereafter referred to as Readings, is a collection of some of the most important essays on moral norms published between 1967 and 1978.
4 Curran, C. E., “Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,” in Readings, pp. 352–56.Google Scholar Hereafter: “Utilitarianism.”
5 McCormick, R. A., “Reflections on the Literature,” in Readings, p. 318.Google Scholar This article is composed of excerpts from McCormick's, “Notes on Moral Theology” in Theological Studies 33 (1972), 36 (1975), 38 (1977), and 39 (1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 Knauer, p. 26.
7 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, Ethics, trans. Smith, N. H. (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 17.Google Scholar
8 Boff, Leonardo, Liberating Grace, Trans. Drury, John (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1979), p. 4.Google Scholar
9 Cf. Absolutes in Moral Theology?, ed. Curran, C. E. (Washington, DC: Corpus, 1968).Google Scholar
10 Fletcher, Joseph, “Love Is the Only Measure,” Commonweal 83 (1966), 430, 428.Google Scholar
11 Fletcher, Joseph, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), p. 98.Google Scholar
12 See Curran, C. E., “The Relevancy of the Ethical Teaching of Jesus,” in Curran, , A New Look at Christian Morality (Notre Dame, IN: Fides, 1968), p. 9.Google Scholar
13 Cf. Hick, John, “The Problem of Evil,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards, Paul (New York: Macmillan, 1967), III, p. 136.Google Scholar
14 Cf. McCormick, R. A., “Reflections on the Literature,” pp. 322, 330Google Scholar; Janssens, Louis, “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” in Readings, p. 68.Google Scholar
15 Cf. Gustafson, James M., Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 6–12.Google Scholar
16 Cf. Noldin, H.—Schmitt, A., Summa Theologiae Moralis (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1940), 27th edit., I, p. 285.Google Scholar Noldin presents, typically, a treatise “On Sins,” not sin, which begins with this syllogism: “A sin is a morally evil human act; but every human act is free, and every evil act is against the norm of morals, which is the divine law; therefore, a sin is usually defined as a free transgression of the law of God.”
17 Louis Monden, S.J., Sin, Liberty and Law, trans. Donceel, Joseph S.J. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), p. 31.Google Scholar
18 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
19 Schüller, Bruno, “Various Types of Grounding for Ethical Norms,” in Readings, p. 187.Google Scholar
20 Curran, , “Utilitarianism,” p. 352.Google Scholar
21 McCormick, R. A., “A Commentary on the Commentaries,” in Doing Evil to Achieve Good, eds. McCormick, R. A. and Ramsey, Paul (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), p. 261.Google Scholar Like Readings, this volume collects a group of recent important essays on the relation between evil and moral norms. It includes McCormick's 1973 Pere Marquette Lecture, “Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” several responses to it, and McCormick's commentary on the responses.
22 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Norms,” in Headings, p. 124.Google Scholar
23 Ibid., pp. 125-26.
24 Keane, pp. 50-51.
25 O'Connell, p. 162.
26 Fletcher, , Situation Ethics, p. 51.Google Scholar
27 Curran, C. E., “Human Experimentation,” in Curran, , Issues in Sexual and Medical Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 83–84.Google Scholar
28 Cf. Rigali, N., “Toward a Moral Theology of Social Consciousness,” Horizons 4 (1977), 176–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
29 Noldin-Schmitt, , Summa Theologiae Moralis I, 46.Google Scholar
30 Ibid., pp. 77, 79, 83.
31 Cf. Curran, C. E., “Dialogue with Joseph Fletcher,” in Curran, , A New Look at Christian Morality, pp. 171–73.Google Scholar Curran presents here his well-known theory of compromise. “In the face of the sinful situation man must do the best he can …. From one viewpoint the act is good because it is the best that one can do. However, from the other aspect the act is wrong and shows the presence of sin in the given situation….” As Curran's early theory shows by way of contrast, the simple division of evil into moral or nonmoral appears, within a relational perspective, as a great oversimplification, bypassing altogether the transcendental dimension of evil and ignoring the ambiguities of the categorical dimension. In more recent work, however, as his ethics became more consequentialist, Curran had second thoughts about his theory of compromise. Evil appears to be forced again into the either-moral-or-nonmoral dichotomy. Instead of the act that was somehow both “good” and “wrong” in the sin-filled situation, there is only “an act which in ordinary circumstances would be wrong [but] for this person in the sinful situation is not wrong” (“Utilitarianism,” pp. 358-60). At home in relational thinking, moral ambiguity is reduced to the unequivocal mode of “wrong” or “not wrong” in a more rationalistic approach.
32 Maguire (pp. 157-59) perceptively characterizes the question of teleology versus deontology as another misplaced debate, since “teleology and deontology are both integral to moral experience.”
33 Curran, , “Utiliarianism,” p. 355.Google Scholar
34 Ibid., pp. 356-57. Curran's relationality approach evidently would differ significantly from his current middle position of mixed consequentialism: “One might also argue that the relationality approach is not merely a middle approach between the other two but in a sense also opts for a somewhat different understanding of the moral decision making process” (ibid., p. 357). Having adopted a model of relationality and responsibility on the level of the moral life, Curran is manifestly hoping to develop a corresponding approach on the level of moral decision-making. However, he seems to lack a clear notion of how a relational model might differ from his current mixed consequentialism. In fact, he immediately proceeds to refer to his mixed consequentialism as “a relational approach which involves weighing all the values involved” (ibid., p. 359). As will be seen below, this leads to further confusion.
35 Ibid., p. 344.
36 Ibid., p. 345.
37 Daniel Maguire, who recognizes that “modern ethics has not sufficiently dwelt on affective evaluation” (p. 296), stands out among contemporary moral theologians for his work to remedy this problem (pp. 280-308).