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Feminist Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and Moral Luck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Marilyn Friedman
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Abstract

Can men who dominate women nevertheless be happy or lead flourishing lives? Building on Claudia Card's exploration of moral luck, this paper considers the belief that male dominators cannot be happy. The discussion ranges over both virtue theory and empirical research into the “belief in a just world.” I conclude that there are reasons to avoid believing that male dominators cannot be happy or flourish, and that feminism does not need that belief.

Type
Oppression and Moral Agency: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card
Information
Hypatia , Volume 24 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Oppression and Moral Agency: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card , Winter 2009 , pp. 29 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Marilyn Friedman

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