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Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Louise M. Antony
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Abstract

I analyze and criticize Naomi Scheman's argument for the claim that psychological individualism—the thesis that psychological states are entities or particulars over which psychological theories may quantify—has no legitimate philosophical backing and is instead an element of patriarchal ideology. I conclude that Scheman's argument is flawed and that her thesis is false. Psychological individualism is perfectly compatible with and may even be required by feminist political theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 10 , Issue 3: Special Issue: Analytic Feminism , Summer 1995 , pp. 157 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © 1995 by Hypatia, Inc.

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