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Epistemic Oppression and Ableism in Bioethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2020

Christine Wieseler
Christine Wieseler*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, California State Polytechnic University, 3801 W. Temple Blvd, Pomona, CA91768
*
Corresponding author. cmwieseler@cpp.edu
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Abstract

Disabled people face obstacles to participation in epistemic communities that would be beneficial for making sense of our experiences and are susceptible to epistemic oppression. Knowledge and skills grounded in disabled people's experiences are treated as unintelligible within an ableist hermeneutic, specifically, the dominant conception of disability as lack. My discussion will focus on a few types of epistemic oppression—willful hermeneutical ignorance, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic imperialism—as they manifest in some bioethicists’ claims about and interactions with disabled people. One of the problems with the epistemic phenomena with which I am concerned is that they direct our skepticism regarding claims and justifications in the wrong direction. When we ought to be asking dominantly situated epistemic agents to justify their knowledge claims, our attention is instead directed toward skepticism regarding the accounts of marginally situated agents who are actually in a better position to know. I conclude by discussing disabled knowers’ responses to epistemic oppression, including articulating the epistemic harm they have undergone as well as ways of creating resistant ways of knowing.

Type
Articles
Information
Hypatia , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , Fall 2020 , pp. 714 - 732
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Hypatia, a Nonprofit Corporation

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