Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2009
Islamic revivalism is often believed to be solely committed to the Islamization of society, viewing politics as merely an instrument in the struggle to realize its aim. The record of Islamic revivalist movements—as exemplified by one of the oldest and most influential of them, the Jamaʿat-i Islami, or Islamic party of Pakistan—however, brings this presumption into question. The nature of the linkage between Islamic revivalism as a particular interpretive reading of Islam and politics is more complicated than is generally believed. Political interests, albeit still within an Islamic framework, play a more important and central role in the unfolding of revivalism—even overriding the commitment to Islamization—than is often ac knowledged. Participation in the political process eschews a blind commitment to Islamization and encourages adherence to organizational interests, and as is evi dent in the case of Pakistan, to the democratic process, characteristics that are not usually associated with Islamic movements. The dynamics and pace of this pro cess are controlled by the struggles for power within an Islamic movement as well as vis-à-vis the state. It is through grappling with these struggles that the commit ment to Islamization is weighed against the need to adhere to organizational and political interests; this is the process that governs the development of Islamic re vivalism. Beyond this general assertion, the manner in which the struggle for power unfolds, the variables that influence it, and the nature of its impact on the development of revivalism need to be explored further.
Authorʾs note: This paper is in large measure based on extensive personal interviews with the leaders and members of Jamaсat-i Islami, Islami Jamiсat-i Tulaba, the Muslim League, Pakistan National Alli ance, and the officials of the Zia regime all conducted in Pakistan in 1989–90, during a stay funded by the American Institute for Pakistan Studies. Shaul Bakhash, John L. Esposito, Shahla Haeri, and the anonymous reviewers of IJMES made useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and their con tribution is gratefully acknowledged.
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