Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2020
This article analyzes the increased visibility and frequency of public weeping by the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Building on the literature that conceptualizes populism as a particular political style, I argue that crying in public can be understood as a populist performative act of legitimation, serving to dramatize the basic components of the populist discourse. I also contend that the increased frequency of public weeping by Erdoğan relate to two major dilemmas that populists in power encounter. Both dilemmas stem from the growing discrepancy between populist rhetoric and practice, diminishing the credibility of the populist leader. Signaling emotional authenticity, Erdoğan’s tearfulness serves to communicate a message of closeness to the people and sustain the anti-elite rhetoric at a time when his political power and economic wealth increasingly set him apart from the politically and economically marginalized. It also attempts to justify authoritarian practices while sustaining the claim to rule in the name of popular power and mobilize constituents against the opposition.
1 “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Esma'ya Yazılan Mektuba Ağladığı Anlar,” YouTube video, 9:11, Ülke TV, 1 January 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIq4dadI8WE (accessed 12 July 2020).
2 See the online appendix for the full list of recorded instances of Erdoğan's crying in public.
3 “Bakan Davutoğlu Hıçkırarak Ağladı,” Haber Vaktim, 21 November 2012, https://www.habervaktim.com/haber/273986/bakan-ahmet-davutoglu-hickirarak-agladi.html (accessed 1 June 2018); “Bülent Arınç Hem Ağladı, Hem de Ağlattı,” Sabah, 7 November 2014, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2014/11/07/bulent-arinc-hem-agladi-hem-de-aglatti (accessed 12 July 2020); “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ve Başbakan Yıldırım Ağladı,” Hürriyet, 29 July 2016, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ve-basbakan-yildirim-agladi-40175845 (accessed 12 July 2020); “İçişleri Bakanı Soylu Canlı Yayında Ağladı,” CNN Türk, April 14, 2017, https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/icisleri-bakani-soylu-canli-yayinda-agladi (accessed 12 July 2020).
4 Lutz, Tom, Crying: The Natural and Cultural History of Tears (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 230–31Google Scholar.
5 Dixon, Thomas, Weeping Britannia: Portrait of a Nation in Tears (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), 291.Google Scholar In general, there is a gender bias in the media coverage of female politicians’ public emotionality. Female politicians are ridiculed more when they show emotions in public because it perpetuates stereotypes of women as weak, unstable, and manipulative. For more see Lutz, Crying, 234; and Vingerhoets, Ad, Why Only Humans Weep: Unravelling the Mysteries of Tears (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 132CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 “Ak Parti ‘Timsah Gözyaşları’na Çok Kızdı,” Milliyet, 21 July 2010, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/ak-parti-timsah-gozyaslarina-cok-kizdi-1266440 (accessed 12 July 2020).
7 “Çiller Ağladı,” Cumhuriyet, 5 March 1994.
8 “Turgut Özal: 1992 (Gözlerinin Dolduğu Anlar),” YouTube video, 4:31, fthstglbrhm, 17 March 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wjaxu5Zb9E (accessed 12 July 2020).
9 John Keane, Democracy and Media Decadence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.
10 For instance, see “Seven Times Barack Obama Cried during an Emotional Eight Years,” BBC, 11 January 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/38582921/seven-times-barack-obama-cried-during-an-emotional-eight-years (accessed 12 July 2020). For a longer discussion of the British case see Dixon, Weeping Britannia.
11 See, for instance, We Love Erdogan (@ErdoganWeLove), “Thank God, we have a leader who is worried about the problems of ummah,” Twitter, 9 February 2017, 6:30 a.m., https://twitter.com/ErdoganWeLove/status/829699080888647680 (accessed 12 July 2020); and “Erdoğan’ın İzleyenleri Ağlatan 5 Duygusal Anı,” YouTube video, 14:13, M. Taha Yıldız, 31 August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odAPrVvnwOc (accessed 14 August 2018).
12 See “15 Temmuz Belgeseli” at https://www.tccb.gov.tr/faaliyetler/15temmuz (accessed 12 July 2020).
13 “Milletin Adami Erdoğan Belgeseli 1.Bölüm,” YouTube video, 49:40, Ülke TV, 10 April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ysQjQOFOFs (accessed 12 July 2020).
14 Moffitt, Benjamin, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016)Google Scholar; Brubaker, Rogers, “Why Populism?” Theory and Society 46 (2017): 357–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pierre Ostiguy, “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198803560 (accessed 10 April 2018).
15 Spruyt, Bram, Keppens, Gil, and Van Droogenbroeck, Filip, “Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It?” Political Research Quarterly 69, no. 2 (2016): 335–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rico, Guillem, Guinjoan, Marc, and Anduiza, Eva, “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes,” Swiss Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (2017): 444–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Salmena, Mikko and von Scheve, Christian, “Emotional Roots of Right-Wing Political Populism,” Social Science Information 56, no. 4 (2017): 567–95Google Scholar.
16 Roman Gerodimos, “The Ideology of Far Left Populism in Greece: Blame, Victimhood and Revenge in the Discourse of Greek Anarchists,” Political Studies 63, no. 3 (2015): 608–25; Ostiguy, “Populism”; Dominique S. Wirz, “Persuasion through Emotion? An Experimental Test of the Emotion-Eliciting Nature of Populist Communication,” International Journal of Communication 12 (2018): 1114–38.
17 Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, ed. Michael Freeden and Marc Stears (Oxford, UK: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199585977.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199585977-e-026 (accessed 10 April 2018); Brubaker, “Why Populism?” 358–59.
18 Bonikowski, Bart, “Three Lessons of Contemporary Populism in Europe and the United States,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 23, no. 1 (2016): 12Google Scholar.
19 Brubaker, “Why Populism?” 361.
20 Ibid., 363–67.
21 Ostiguy, “Populism.”
22 Moffitt, Global Rise of Populism, 43–45.
23 James M. Jasper, The Emotions of Protest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).
24 Mercer, Jonathan, “Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity,” International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014): 522CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
25 Pearlman, Wendy, “Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 2 (2013): 391–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Ostiguy, “Populism.”
27 Brubaker, “Why Populism?” 370.
28 For a longer discussion, see Moffitt, Global Rise of Populism, 70–80. Most politicians are compelled to endorse some elements of the populist style and discourse as a result of the growth of visual and digital media.
29 Nadia Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism,” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 120.
30 There is substantial literature on the populism of the AKP. For some examples, see Aytaç, S. Erdem and Öniş, Ziya, “Varieties of Populism in a Changing Global Context: The Divergent Paths of Erdoğan and Kirchnerismo,” Comparative Politics 47, no. 1 (2014): 41–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yabancı, Bilge, “Populism as the Problem Child of Democracy: The AKP's Enduring Appeal and the Use of Meso-Level Actors,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no. 4 (2016): 591–617CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Toygar Sinan Baykan, The Justice and Development Party in Turkey: Populism, Personalism, and Organization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
31 Michael Ferguson, “White Turks, Black Turks, and Negroes: The Politics of Polarization,” Jadaliyya, 29 June 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12484/white-turks-black-turks-and-negroes_the-politics-o (accessed 12 July 2020). Black Turks is a disparaging term used to refer to people who are of lower class and rural origin. See Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 46–48.
32 Bahadır Türk, Muktedir: Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).
33 For instance, see the beginning of the documentary “Milletin Adamı Erdoğan Belgeseli,” YouTube video, 49:40, Ülke TV, 10 April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ysQjQOFOFs&t=1809s (accessed 12 July 2020).
34 Büke Koyuncu, “Benim Milletim . . .” Ak Parti İktidarı, Din ve Ulusal Kimlik (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 165.
35 “Bir Liderin Hikayesi,” YouTube video, 22:32, AK Parti, 8 May 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xN9Gu_dR-dg (accessed 12 July 2020).
36 “Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Kürsüde Ağladı,” YouTube video, 5:39, Stratejistt, 20 July 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBZcG5IV6EI (accessed 12 July 2020).
37 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın Gözleri Doldu,” A Haber, 11 April 2017, https://www.ahaber.com.tr/webtv/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-gozleri-doldu (accessed 12 July 2020).
38 Yabancı, “Populism as the Problem Child,” 599.
39 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Amerika'da Kuran-ı Kerim Okuyor,” YouTube video, 2:42, Micihit TV, 3 April 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZtNYA8aAwM (accessed 12 July 2020).
40 Hegghammer, Thomas, “Non-Military Practices in Jihadi Groups,” in Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists, ed. Hegghammer, Thomas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 185CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 William C. Chittick, “Weeping in Classical Sufism,” in Holy Tears: Weeping in the Religious Imagination, ed. Kimberley Christine Patton and John Stratton Hawley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 132–44.
42 Gary L. Ebersole, “The Function of Ritual Weeping Revisited: Affective Expression and Moral Discourse,” in Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretations, ed. John Corrigan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 2004), 212.
43 Hegghammer, “Non-Military Practices,” 185–86.
44 Özlem Savaş, “The Muslim ‘Crying Boy’ in Turkey: Aestheticization and Politicization of Suffering in Islamic Imagination,” in Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image, ed. Christiane Gruber and Sune Haugbolle (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), 111.
45 For more see Esra Özyürek, “Feeling Tells Better than Language: Emotional Expression and Gender Hierarchy in the Sermons of Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi,” New Perspectives on Turkey 16 (1997): 41–51.
46 One also can consider crying in public in the context of popular culture, particularly that of arabesk. Films and songs of the arabesk genre express the urban poor masses’ feelings of frustration, suffering, helplessness, humiliation, and defiance in a highly emotional style. Given Erdoğan's strong appeal among the urban poor, crying in public may have a similar cultural resonance to arabesk films and songs in which tearful men, like Ferdi Tayfur and İbrahim Tatlıses, are not a rare sight. Analyzing this relationship between public tearfulness and arabesk is beyond the confines of this study. For more on arabesk and its emotional repertoire, see Martin Stokes, The Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Meral Özbek, “Arabesk Culture: A Case of Modernization and Popular Identity,” in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). Toygar Sinan Baykan briefly discusses Erdoğan's popularity among arabesk singers, connecting it to the low-populist appeal of the AKP (Justice and Development Party, 81–82).
47 “Emine Erdoğan Arakan'da Gözyaşlarını Tutamadı,” TRT Haber, 10 August 2012, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/emine-erdogan-arakanda-gozyaslarini-tutumadi-51547.html (accessed 12 July 2020).
48 “Bakan Yalçın Topçu O İdamı Anlatırken Ağladı,” Sabah, 3 October 2015, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/10/03/bakan-yalcin-topcu-o-idami-anlatirken-agladi (accessed 12 July 2020).
49 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ı Duygulandıran Şiir,” Sabah, 3 April 2016, https://www.sabah.com.tr/webtv/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogani-duygulandiran-siir (accessed 12 July 2020).
50 Tuğal, Cihan, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 176CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
51 For instance, see “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın ‘Ey Sevgili’ Şiiri Stüdyoyu Ağlattı,” Beyaz Gazete, 28 April 2017, http://beyazgazete.com/video/webtv/televizyon-40/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-in-ey-sevgili-siiri-studyoyu-aglatti-460051.html (accessed 10 June 2018).
52 “Video: Poetic Video Makes Erdoğan Couple Shed Tears in Albania,” Hürriyet Daily News, 14 May 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/video-poetic-prayer-makes-erdogan-couple-shed-tears-in-albania.aspx?PageID=238&NID=82390&NewsCatID=510 (accessed 21 June 2018). In 2016 Erdoğan cried during recitation of the same poem at the commemoration ceremony for the Turkish victory at Gallipoli in World War I.
53 Asmir Gračanin, Lauren M. Bylsma, and Ad J. J. M. Vingerhoets, “Why Only Humans Shed Emotional Tears: Evolutionary and Cultural Perspectives,” Human Nature 29, no. 2 (2018): 114.
54 Lutz, Crying, 43–48.
55 Vingerhoets, Why Only Humans Weep, 132. In contrast, women's crying perpetuates stereotypes of women as weak, emotional, and manipulative. Because of this gender bias, the media is generally more unforgiving of the emotional displays of female politicians than those of males. For more, see Shepard, Ryan, “Confronting Gender Bias, Finding A Voice: Hillary Clinton and the New Hampshire Crying Incident,” Argumentation and Advocacy 46, no. 1 (2009): 67–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
56 Boscagli, Maurizia, “A Moving Story: Masculine Tears and the Humanity of Televised Emotions,” Discourse 15, no. 2 (1992–93): 68Google Scholar.
57 For a similar argument about how displaying knowledge of jihadi culture, including weeping in devotional settings, may indicate trustworthiness and authenticity, see Hegghammer, Thomas, ed., Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 14–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
58 Bonikowski, Bart and Gidron, Noam, “The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996,” Social Forces 94, no. 4 (2016): 1608CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
59 Müller, Jan-Werner, What is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 42–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
60 Esen, Berk and Gümüşçü, Şebnem, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 9 (2016): 1584–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
61 Esen, Berk and Gümüşçü, Şebnem, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime: State-Business Relations in the AKP's Turkey,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 4 (2018): 349–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 Moffitt, Global Rise of Populism, 52–57.
63 Bora, Tanıl, Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 504Google Scholar.
64 For more see Carlotta Gall, “Sermons and Shouted Insults: How Erdogan Keeps Turkey Spellbound,” New York Times, 2 April 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey.html (accessed 14 May 2018).
65 Uzay Bulut, “Turkey's Violence-Tinged Foreign Policy,” Washington Times, 20 February 2018, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb/20/how-recep-tayyip-erdogan-threatens-the-us-with-an- (accessed 14 May 2018).
66 Ishaan Tharoor, “Muslims Discovered America Before Columbus, Claims Turkey's Erdogan,” Washington Post, 15 November 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/15/muslims-discovered-america-before-columbus-claims-turkeys-erdogan/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e2b997f70da8 (accessed 14 May 2018).
67 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ı Ağlatan Hoşcakal Anne Şiiri,” YouTube video, 9:59, Yosma Ozsoy, 17 May 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMovhzYIZOo (accessed 12 July 2020).
68 Ekşi, Betül and Wood, Elizabeth A., “Right-Wing Populism as Gendered Performance: Janus-Faced Masculinity in the Leadership of Vladimir Putin and Recep T. Erdoğan,” Theory and Society 48, no. 5 (2019): 744CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
69 “Erdoğan Roman Buluşmasında Gözyaşlarını Tutamadı,” YouTube video, 1:55, Cafesiyaset.com.tr, 11 April 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zs405qqbgE (accessed 13 July 2020).
70 “Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'dan Önce Türkiye Nasıldı? Cumhurbaşkanı ile Gündem Özel,” YouTube video, 11:45, ATV, 21 June 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8n1k2NFKu4 (accessed 13 July 2020).
71 “Binali Yıldırım Veda Film,” YouTube video, 5:10, Filma Grafi, 4 January 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xgbn8Phn4sA (accessed 4 April 2019).
72 For a discussion of the adverse relationship between populism and democracy, particularly in unconsolidated democracies, see Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, eds., Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steven Levitsky and James Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism: The Case of Fujimori's Peru,” in Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism, 160–81; and Müller, What is Populism? 44–60.
73 Albertazzi, Daniele and Mueller, Sean, “Populism and Liberal Democracy: Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland, and Switzerland,” Government and Opposition 48, no. 3 (2013): 343–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Müller, What is Populism? 41–74.
74 Esen and Gümüşçü, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey”; Esen and Gümüşçü, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime.”
75 Lancaster, Caroline, “The Iron Law of Erdogan: The Decay from Intra-Party Democracy to Personalistic Rule,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 9 (2014): 1672–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Esen, Berk and Gümüşçü, Şebnem, “The Perils of Turkish Presidentialism,” Review of Middle East Studies 52, no. 1 (2018): 43–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
76 Esen, Berk and Gümüşçü, Şebnem, “Turkey: How the Coup Failed,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
77 Esen and Gümüşçü, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime.”
78 Lancaster, “Iron Law,” 1684.
79 See, for instance, “Erdoğan da Binali Yıldırım da Ağladı,” ABC Gazetesi, 29 July 2016, https://www.abcgazetesi.com/arsiv/erdogan-da-binali-yildirim-da-agladi/haber-23433 (accessed 13 July 2020); “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ı Ağlatan Görüntüler,” YouTube video, 6:28, TRT Avaz, 5 August 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOYxl5mkcS4 (accessed 13 July 2020); and “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Ağladı,” Mynet, 15 July 2017, https://www.mynet.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-agladi-110103148170 (accessed 13 July 2020).
80 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 10.
81 Lutz, Crying, 19.
82 Gračanin, Bylsma, and Vingerhoets, “Why Only Humans Shed Emotional Tears,” 119, 127.
83 The video can be found at: http://www.sonirade.com/guncel/erdogan-ezan-okudu-onlar-studyoda-agladi-tikla-izle-h14678.html (accessed 4 May 2018).
84 See, for instance, “Erdoğan Reveals Last Will, Moves Everyone to Tears,” Hürriyet Daily News, 1 June 2015, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-reveals-last-will-moves-everyone-to-tears-83280 (accessed 13 July 2020); and “Erdoğan Diriliş 2017,” YouTube video, 10:19, Dava Adamı, 16 January 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dXaskbIpaA (accessed 13 July 2020).
85 Mabel Berezin, “Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity,” in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 86.
86 “Melih Gökçek Canlı Yayında Ağladı: Bu Gözyaşları Hırsımdan,” T24, 25 June 2013, http://t24.com.tr/haber/melih-gokcek-canli-yayindan-hirsindan-agladi,232695 (accessed 13 July 2020).
87 “Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek Cries During TV Appearance,” Hürriyet Daily News, 28 March 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/video-ankara-mayor-melih-gokcek-cries-during-tv-appearance-64227 (accessed 13 July 2020).
88 Fethi Açıkel makes a similar comment about the ambivalent political discourse of victimhood and suffering. As it expresses a need for compassion and affection, it also communicates a desire for more power and revenge. See Savaş, “Muslim ‘Crying Boy,’” 117–18. Gerodimos, who studies the ideology of far-left populism in Greece, also suggests that the discourse of victimhood was utilized by radical, left-wing groups as a way to legitimize calls for revenge and violence (“Ideology of Far Left Populism,” 618).
89 Ercan Gürses and Alastair Macdonald, “Turkey's Erdogan Needs Thicker Skin, EU's Tusk Says,” Reuters, 24 April 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-eu/turkeys-erdogan-needs-thicker-skin-eus-tusk-says-idUSKCN0XL0L6 (accessed 13 July 2020).
90 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Ağladı,” Mynet, 15 July 2017, http://www.mynet.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-agladi-110103148170 (accessed 13 July 2020). For his speech see, “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan 15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü’nde Konuştu: FETÖ’cülerin Şu An Daha İyi Günleri,” Hürriyet, 15 July 2017, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-15-temmuz-sehitler-koprusunde-konustu-fetoculerin-suan-daha-iyi-gunleri-40521363 (accessed 13 July 2020).
91 Jasper, Emotions of Protest, 46.
92 Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza, “Emotional Underpinnings,” 445–47. The authors compare anger with fear and explain that fear is caused by the perception of an uncertain threat and uncontrollable circumstances. The sense of uncertainty leads to “increased vigilance, information search, and more attentive, systematic processing in judgment making.” Fearful individuals are more likely to avoid risk, which encourages political resignation. See also Pearlman, “Emotions.”
93 For instance see, “15 Temmuz Kadınları Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ı Ağlattı,” Posta, 2 November 2016, https://www.posta.com.tr/15-temmuz-kadinlari-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-i-aglatti-1239297 (accessed 13 July 2020); and “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ı Ağlatan Video,” Haberler.com, 20 June 2017, https://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-i-aglatan-video-9748534-haberi (accessed 13 July 2020).
94 Pierre Ostiguy and Kenneth Roberts, “Putting Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism and the Politicization of the Sociocultural Low,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 23, no. 1 (2016): 47.
95 Shaun Walker, “Tears of a Russian President: Putin Cries at Soft-Rock Police Tribute,” Guardian, 14 November 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/tears-russian-president-putin-cries-police-concert (accessed 13 July 2020); “Vladimir Putin Crying,” YouTube video, 1:10, Mongol TV, 5 September 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fQe86fEjutQ (accessed 13 July 2020).
96 “Narendra Modi in Tears,” YouTube video, 2:33, Mango News, 20 May 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3dJ0dAOTdA (accessed 13 July 2020); “PM Modi Gets Emotional,” YouTube video, 1:01, Times Now, 13 November 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_4dlC-TIr8 (accessed 13 July 2020); Pragya Kaushika, “Wednesday Has Just Begun and Narendra Modi Has Cried Three Times Already,” ThePrint, 20 December 2017, https://theprint.in/report/narendra-modi-has-cried-3-times-already/23707 (accessed 13 July 2020).
97 In 2017, 46 percent of AKP voters stated that they voted for the party due to their support for Erdoğan. This ratio was double the countrywide average of 23 percent. KONDA, AK Parti Seçmenleri (Istanbul: Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, 2018), 26, http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/KONDA_SecmenKumeleri_AkParti_Secmenleri_Mayis2018.pdf (accessed 20 June 2019).
98 Çelik, Ayşe Betül and Balta, Evren, “Explaining the Micro Dynamics of the Populist Cleavage in the ‘New Turkey,’” Mediterranean Politics 25, no. 2 (2020): 160–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
99 KONDA, Türkiye'nin Siyasal Evrenini Duygu ve Duygulanımlar Üzerinden Anlamak: Olağanüstü Hal, Toplum ve Siyaset (Istanbul: Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, 2017), 65–75, 111–12, http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/KONDA_T%C3%BCrkiyenin_Siyasal_Evrenini_Anlamak_Mayis2017.pdf (accessed 20 June 2019).
100 Sixty-five percent of AKP voters stated that the fluctuation of exchange rates was a result of conspiracies of external powers against Turkey. Ninety-two percent believed that the Gezi protests resulted from the provocations of a big conspiracy against Turkey. Three-quarters of AKP voters supported media censorship for the security of the state, 70 percent were satisfied with the functioning of the judiciary and the rule of law, and 62 percent stated that basic rights and freedoms could be restricted when necessary for the struggle against terror and crime. For more, see KONDA, AK Parti Seçmenleri, 41, 60, 69.
101 KONDA, CHP Seçmenleri (Istanbul: Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, 2018), 26–29, https://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/KONDA_SecmenKumeleri_CHP_Secmenleri_Mayis2018.pdf (accessed 13 July 2020); KONDA, HDP Seçmenleri (Istanbul: Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, 2018), 36, http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/KONDA_SecmenKumeleri_HDP_Secmenleri_Mayis2018.pdf (accessed 13 July 2020).