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Institutionalization in the United Nations General Assembly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert O. Keohane
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Extract

Except for the subfield of comparative regional integration, international organization as an area of study is notorious for its lack of systematic and testable theory. This situation has been created less by a deficiency of techniques for quantitative analysis than by the absence of attention to theoretical conceptualization and its necessary accompaniment, the imaginative use of data to test hypotheses. There is little shortage of case studies, abstract theorizing, or sophisticated quantitative techniques, but systematic testing of important concepts is rare. Much of the literature in the field fails even to ask relevant and important theoretical questions. The “Mount Everest Syndrome”–studying international organizations “because they are there”–has afflicted the field for too long.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , Fall 1969 , pp. 859 - 896
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1969

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References

1 In the field of political development see, for instance, Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 04 1965 (Vol. 17, No. 3), pp. 386–430CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the field of comparative regional integration see the excellent analysis by Nye, Joseph S., “Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement,” International Organization, Autumn, 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 855–880CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 I am indebted to Professor Philippe Schmitter of the University of Chicago for the suggestion that institutionalization should be considered as a central concept for the field as a whole.

3 Functionalist and neo-functionalist theory is explicitly aware of this. The best works of functionalist and neo-functionalist writing have examined the interrelationships between the variables listed above without either ignoring political realities or unduly downgrading the importance of organizational characteristics. It is quite possible to be a neo-functionalist, or to adopt the approach exemplified in this article without denying the less one-sided formulations of realist theory. Neo-functionalism and the approach taken here qualify the realist view; neither attempts to deny it entirely. For an outstanding example of the neofunctionalist approach see Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

4 For an interesting discussion of organization theory and international organizations see Miles, Edward, “Organizations and Integration in International Systems,” International Studies Quarterly, 06 1968 (Vol. 12, No. 2), pp. 196–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard first called this article, and the idea of applying organization theory to international organizations, to my attention.

5 For the use of this concept see Eisenstadt, S. N., “Institutionalization and Change,” American Sociological Review, 04 1964 (Vol. 29, No. 2), pp. 235–247CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Huntington, , World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3Google Scholar.

8 Haas, especially pp. 94–96; Polsby, Nelson W., “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review, 03 1968 (Vol. 62, No. 1), pp. 144–168CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Eisenstadt, , American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 237Google Scholar.

8 Huntington, , World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 401Google Scholar.

9 Haas, p. 95, quoting Selznick, Philip, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Evanston, 111: Peterson, 1957), p. 16Google Scholar.

10 Eisenstadt, , American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 235CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Haas, p. 443.

12 Huntington groups autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and coherence together as his four measures of institutionalization. His treatment fails to take into account the difference between capabilities relative to the environment and internal qualities, therefore somewhat confusing his argument.

13 Illustrations of such conflicts were frequent in the Congo crisis in which UN Secretaries-General Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant were forced to act, along with their subordinates in the field, in highly autonomous ways. The subsequent threats to the durability and environmental impact, as well as the long-range autonomy, of the United Nations are well known.

14 For the use of “mixed” on a scale to indicate a variegated pattern see Haas, Ernst B. and Philippe, Schmitter, C., “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” International Organization, Autumn 1964 (Vol. 23, No. 4), pp. 705–737CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Polsby, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1Google Scholar. The connection between indices of personnel patterns and the definition of differentiation in terms of “specific collectivities and roles” seems too clear to require further explication. Other indices (e.g., the establishment of independent headquarters, civil service systems, and professional staff) could also be used. These might be particularly useful for bureaucratic organizations.

10 For a succinct summary see Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press [under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1952), Vol. 2, p. 785Google Scholar.

17 Huntington, , World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 394–399Google Scholar.

18 General Assembly Resolution 377, November 3, 1950.

19 For these indicators see Huntington, , World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 394–399Google Scholar.

20 Ibid., p. 399.

21 Ibid., p. 405.

22 Ibid., p. 405.

23 For an excellent discussion of the rewards and difficulties of interviews as sources of data see Jacobson, Harold Karan, “Deriving Data from Delegates to International Assemblies: A Research Note,” International Organization, Summer 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 3), pp. 592–613CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an example of the faults I am criticizing see Vincent, Jack E., “National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations,” American Political Science Review, 09 1968 (Vol. 62, No. 3), pp. 916–931CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Professor Vincent uses elaborate quantitative techniques to manipulate a relatively small body of extremely questionable data.

24 For the author's views on the limited usefulness of detailed analyses of voting patterns, with less emphasis, however, on the need for quantitative analysis, see “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International Organization, Spring 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 3), pp. 221–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 For a discussion of the United States Mission to the United Nations see Beichman, Arnold, The “Other” State Department: The United States Mission to the United Nations–Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1968)Google Scholar.

26 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is carrying out a study of UN missions that can be expected to be of great interest on this point.

27 For classic expressions of views on this issue seeHammarskjold, Dag, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,” in Kay, David A. (ed.), The United Nations Political System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 142–160Google Scholar; and Hammarskjold, Dag, “Two Differing Concepts of United Nations Assayed: Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1960–15 June 1961,” International Organization, Autumn 1961 (Vol. 16, No. 4), PP- 549–563CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Haas's, treatment of organizational ideology in Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 119–125Google Scholar.

28 See above, pp. 861–862.

29 Focusing on the Permanent Representative has additional advantages in analyzing promotion and length of service. His position at the peak of the mission's hierarchy means that after the first session in which a state is represented it is always possible for a new Permanent Representative to have been promoted from within the mission. This is not true for mission officers at the bottom of the hierarchy.

30 Data on Permanent Representatives' experience was gathered in the summer of 1968 by the author and a research assistant, through the procedure of working backward from the 22nd session, checking official delegation lists for the presence of men who later became Permanent Representatives. Data on committee chairmen's experience was collected by the author in a similar way although the task was less arduous due to the smaller numbers involved. The 23rd session has only been included in this article where the information is readily available from the records, not where a tedious repetition of the checking process would be required.

31 The passage of time will also affect the proportions of new Permanent Representatives with experience and the amount of such experience, even assuming random selection of UN personnel from the whole set of national diplomats. As time elapses, a greater proportion of a country's foreign service professionals will have had General Assembly experience, up until the point at which attrition from the service by experienced men compensates for newly experienced officers. In view, however, of the small proportion of most states‘ diplomats serving at the UN, increases in mean length of service due to this factor will be in most cases below. 5 years for the period between the sixth and the 23rd sessions for states continuously represented during that time.

32 Since 30 percent of Permanent Representatives are new in any given year and 30 percent of these have had no previous UN experience, only about 9 percent of Permanent Representatives in any given year are new to the United Nations.

33 In the 21st session Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member not in great favor among African and Asian states generally, had a representative elected to a chairmanship; a Yugoslav held die “Eastern European” seat in the 22nd session when a Rumanian was President of die Assembly. These are the only ambiguous cases.

34 For data on these and preceding points see Table 3B.

35 In the first period eighteen of 68 states, or 26.9 percent of officeholders, held a bare majority of offices (155 of 305, or 50.8 percent); in the second period twenty of 73 states, or 27.4 percent, held such a bare majority (90 of 177, or 50.8 percent). For the whole period between the first and the 23rd sessions 23 of 87 states, or 26.4 percent, held a bare majority of offices (247 of 482, or 51.2 percent). The concentration of officeholding for top positions–Committee chairmanships and the Assembly presidency—was less. Thirty-four percent of states in the first period and 36 percent in the second included a bare majority of these officeholders.

36 Data on UN delegation sizes is based on the sixteenth-twentieth sessions, inclusive, and appears in Keohane, Robert, “Who Cares About the General Assembly?,” International Organization, Winter 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1), pp. 141–149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 The phrase “eligible states” refers to the fact that permanent members of the Security Council do not provide Assembly officers. On a comparison of officeholding between the three largest eligible states in each region and all the rest only five of the eighteen states in the "three largest" category were not among the 28 states with three officeholders or more.

38 It may be that many delegates from small states, with more than one Committee to follow and little opportunity to specialize, do not seek officeholding responsibilities.

39 Between the sixth session, when experience of Committee Chairmen rose to levels close to those prevalent now, and the 22nd session Committee Chairmen have had, as a group, mean previous service of 4.95 years, compared to 3.92 years for Permanent Representatives. Within the set of Committee Chairmen Permanent Representatives had less experience than non-Permanent Representatives: 4.57 years to 5.39 years.

40 Committee assignments by individual delegate are not listed in the bound volumes of General Assembly records although they do appear as mimeographed documents. It would be laborious, but perhaps worthwhile, to trace Committee assignment patterns by delegates if complete enough records could be assembled. This would indicate specialization/generalization patterns more clearly than our Committee Chairman data.

41 Presumably the promotion norm was not fully recognized in the 21st session, or its incompatibility with the geographical norm was not realized. Otherwise, a Western European would presumably have been chosen Rapporteur in that year. That the promotion norm carried some weight, however, is indicated strikingly by the fact that Mr. Tchernouchtchenko was “compensated” for the loss of the First Committee chairmanship with the chairmanship of the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee in the 23rd session. This also indicates, of course, that Committee “boundaries” are not so well-defined as to prevent trade-offs of this sort between one Committee and another.

42 Polsby, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, p. 168Google Scholar.

43 For discussions of American foreign policy emphasizing intragovernmental coalition politics see Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960)Google Scholar; Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967)Google Scholar; Allison, Graham, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, 09 1969 (Vol. 63, No. 3), pp. 689–718CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The comments of Professor Joseph Nye were particularly helpful in bringing the issues discussed here to my attention.

44 For a discussion of this see Beichman.

45 It should be noted that the substitution of professional diplomats for high-level political figures may result from the decisions of opposition politicians rather than governments. Reportedly, both Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy declined offers of the UN Ambassadorship from President Richard Nixon.

46 Haas, Chapter 13.

47 Nye, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 880Google Scholar.