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‘Rewarding Impatience’ Revisited: A Response to Goodrich

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2006

Lisa Blaydes
Lisa Blaydes
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles, blaydes@ucla.edu
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Extract

In “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC” (International Organization, Spring 2004) I presented a theoretical model that suggested that in strategic situations where a bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners' dilemma, impatient actors earned better outcomes than their more patient rivals. I also modeled the division of cartel profits in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons, and found that there is some threshold level for which states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better production offers than those that do not. The critique presented in Goodrich deals with the final section of the article, which presents the results of statistical analysis testing the implications of these theoretical models.I am grateful to Jeff Lewis, Drew Linzer, and Ken Schultz for suggestions and advice. Many thanks to Thomas Plümper for sharing the computer code for his procedure to analyze fixed effects with time-invariant covariates in Stata. The usual disclaimers apply.

Type
Comment and Response
Information
International Organization , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , April 2006 , pp. 515 - 525
Copyright
© 2006 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

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References

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