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Side-payments versus security cards: domestic bargaining tactics in international economic negotiations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

H. Richard Friman
H. Richard Friman
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science atMarquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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Abstract

The literature on international economic cooperation has devoted relatively little attention to domestic bargaining tactics and their determinants. Recent scholarship has tended to stress the utility and frequency of side-payments while discounting other prominent bargaining tactics and a broader understanding of tactical choice. This article argues that policymakers choose among domestic bargaining tactics to garner support when faced with situations in which other government officials or societal interest groups block the ratification of international economic agreements. Focusing on offers of side-payments and attempts at issue redefinition, the article's findings suggest that differences in domestic resistance to proposals of material compensation and in external security threat may explain choices between those tactics in domestic bargaining.

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International Organization , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , Summer 1993 , pp. 387 - 410
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 1993

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References

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 10–14 April 1990, the 25th world congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, 21–25 July 1991, and the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES), University of Chicago. I thank Lorraine Eden, David Garnham, Peter Gourevitch, Virginia Haufler, Jack Jacobsen, David Lake, Joseph Lepgold, Charles Lipson, John McAdams, Eric Nordlinger, John Odell, Duncan Snidal, Susan Strange, Duane Swank, the participants at PIPES, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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15. See ibid.; and Walton and McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. For an earlier discussion of the dynamics of two-level games as applied to international relations, see Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O., “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 226–54Google Scholar.

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18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., pp. 457–58. Although offering a more detailed conceptualization of the costs of side-payments, Riker notes that the costs are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to calculate; see The Theory of Political Coalitions, pp. 115–19.

20. For a broader focus on the dynamics of persuasion as applied to the United States, see Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley), pp. 42–63Google Scholar.

21. See Murdock, Clark A., “Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security, and Vulnerability,” in Knorr, Klaus and Traeger, Frank N., eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), pp. 67–98Google Scholar; Buzan, Barry, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1991)Google Scholar; Keohane, , International Institutions and State Power, pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

22. The systematic analysis of why prominent beliefs might change is beyond the scope of this article. For examples of such analyses, see Odell, , “From London to Bretton Woods,” p. 298Google Scholar; Goldstein, Judith, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Odell, John, U. S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Sikkink, Kathryn, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

23. See Ikenberry, G. John, “Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil Decontrol,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 151–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lake, David A., “The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-hegemonic Era,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 33–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In contrast, the growing literature on the impact of gaiatsu (foreign pressure) on Japanese domestic bargaining suggests that rather than policymakers recasting domestic issues as foreign policy concerns, foreign governments can recast domestic issues in a given country by raising them to the international agenda. For example, see Leonard J. Schoppa, “Two-level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but not Others,” this issue.

24. For example, see Aggarwal, Vinod K., Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Friman, H. Richard, Patchwork Protectionism: Textile Trade Policy in the United States, Japan, and West Germany (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Blaker, Michael, ed., The Politics of Trade: U. S. and Japanese Policymaking for the GATT Negotiations (New York: Columbia University East Asia Institute, 1978)Google Scholar; Winham, Gilbert R., International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Curtis, Thomas B. and Vastine, John Robert Jr, The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade (New York: Praeger, 1971)Google Scholar; Evans, John W., The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Preeg, Ernest H., Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1970)Google Scholar.

25. For example, see Henning, and Destler, , “From Neglect to Activism,” pp. 317–33Google Scholar; Destler, and Henning, , Dollar Politics, pp. 33–47Google Scholar; and Funabashi, , Managing the Dollar, pp. 65–86Google Scholar.

26. Walton, and McKersie, , Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, pp. 118–19Google Scholar.

27. Ibid., pp. 317–19.

28. Riker, , The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 113Google Scholar.

29. Skocpol, Theda, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 9Google Scholar.

30. A predominant theme in the literature links capacity with state structure (see ibid., pp. 15–18). The extent to which choices among bargaining tactics are determined by the structure of state institutions is explored below.

31. Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, pp. 110–11Google Scholar. Similarly, Schattschneider notes that the array of conflicts of differing degrees of intensity splitting American society offers opportunities for policymakers. By “enlarging the scope of conflict” over different priorities, public officials can “modify private power relations.” See Schattschneider, E. E., The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 40 and 67–68Google Scholar.

32. See Ikenberry, G. John, “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 219–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gowa, Joanne, “Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 15–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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34. Walton, and McKersie, , Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, pp. 118–19 and 317–19Google Scholar.

35. Lake and Ikenberry both draw on the prior work of scholars including Otto Hintze, Theda Skocpol, and J. P. Nettl. See Lake, , “The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-hegemonic Era,” p. 39Google Scholar; Ikenberry, , “Market Solutions for State Problems,” p. 177Google Scholar; and Ikenberry, G. John, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of the American Government (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 35–36. In addition, see Gowa's argument that by their very nature state institutions can influence the public character of political goods, in “Public Goods and Political Institutions,” pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

36. Walton, and McKersie, , Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, pp. 118–19Google Scholar.

37. Ikenberry, , “Market Solutions for State Problems,” p. 167Google Scholar. Rather than institutional position, the key factor here appears to be the participation by President Carter in the Bonn Summit negotiations.

38. See “Carter Broadcast Energy Address,” and “Carter Pledges Oil Decontrol, Wants Windfall Profits Tax,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 April 1979, pp. 661–62 and 619–20, respectively.

39. Lake, , “The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-hegemonic Era,” p. 40Google Scholar. Lake moves closer to specifying conditions by noting that the executive acts on strategic trade preferences (shaped by international economic structure). Thus, the choice to recast domestic issues as foreign policy concerns would be more likely when the executive needs to bring domestic support in line with those strategic concerns. However, given the nature of narrow domestic interests, Lake notes that with rare exceptions these strategic preferences will always conflict with those of “politically mobilized groups in society” (p. 38). Thus, the foreign policy executive “will use its position” to recast domestic issues as foreign policy concerns (p. 40). In short, the variables do not appear to vary.

40. They did so by noting the decline in U. S. economic and political influence in Latin America relative to the increasing influence of Britain. See Lake, , “The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-hegemonic Era,” pp. 42–45Google Scholar.

41. Walton and McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. For similar arguments, see Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior; Odell, , “From London to Bretton Woods,” pp. 290–92Google Scholar; and Tollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” pp. 426–27Google Scholar.

42. Walton, and McKersie, , Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, p. 13Google Scholar.

43. In these cases, distributive tactics included threats of sanctions and concealment while integrative tactics included trust building and openness. See Odell, , “From London to Bretton Woods,” pp. 290–91Google Scholar.

44. Walton and McKersie, however, do also discuss combining issues (such as recasting the issue of a union shop in terms of broader issues of union security) as an integrative strategy, in Walton, and McKersie, , Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, pp. 154–55Google Scholar.

45. See ibid., p. 16; Raiffa, Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 180–83Google Scholar; and Pruitt, , Negotiation Behavior, pp. 148–53 and 182Google Scholar. For arguments linking side-payments to a greater incidence of Pareto-optimal outcomes, see Raiffa, , The Art and Science of Negotiation, pp. 180–83;Google ScholarBuchanan, and Tullock, , The Calculus of Consent, pp. 153 and 186Google Scholar; and Tollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” pp. 426 and 437Google Scholar.

46. Grieco, , Cooperation Among Nations, p. 231Google Scholar. See similar arguments inTollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” p. 426Google Scholar; and Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,” pp. 239–41Google Scholar.

47. Both Raiffa and Pruitt devote little attention to this question. Walton and McKersie note in passing that the “institutional framework” and “actual situation” can make certain tactics “more appropriate or available.” Similarly, although Buchanan and Tullock stress legal, ethical, and moral constraints on the domestic use of direct side-payments, they contend that indirect side-payments are limited primarily by their “availability.” When discussing active versus passive strategies in intraorganizational bargaining, Walton and McKersie also briefly discuss cost considerations (including organizational sanctions and personal discomfort) as shaping choices in intraorganizational bargaining. See Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation; Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior; Walton, and McKersie, , A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, pp. 121–22 and 341–44Google Scholar; and Buchanan, and Tullock, , The Calculus of Consent, pp. 154,157, and 209Google Scholar.

48. See Riker, , The Theory of Political Coalitions, pp. 115–19Google Scholar; and the sources cited in note 47.

49. See, for example, Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); andGoogle ScholarMilner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

50. Friman, , Patchwork Protectionism, pp. 35–89Google Scholar.

51. The treatment of the two concepts in the literature tends to be inconsistent. Whereas Keohane separates the two (After Hegemony, p. 91), Axelrod and Keohane use the term “linkage” to describe both issue linkage and side-payments (“Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,” p. 239). Oye separates the terms but also combines them when discussing linkage strategies of backscratching and blackmail. See Oye, Kenneth A., “The Domain of Choice: International Constraints and Carter Administration Foreign Policy,” in Oye, Kenneth A., Rothchild, Donald, and Lieber, Robert J., eds., Eagle Entangled: U. S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (New York: Longman, 1979), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

52. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 91Google Scholar. Also seeOye, , “The Domain of Choice,” p. 13Google Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence, 2d ed. (Glenview, III.: Scott, Foresman, 1989), pp. 65–67 and 253–54Google Scholar.

53. Tollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” pp. 426–27Google Scholar.

54. Oye, , “The Domain of Choice,” p. 13Google Scholar.

55. Ibid, p. 14.

56. Ibid., p. 16.

57. Ibid, pp. 16–17.

58. See Tollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” p. 445Google Scholar; and Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 91Google Scholar.

59. Keohane, ibid.

60. For example, see Blaker, Michael, ed., The Politics of Trade: U. S. and Japanese Policymaking forthe GATTNegotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); and Katzenstein, Between Power and PlentyGoogle Scholar.

61. See Tollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” p. 445Google Scholar; Keohane, , “The Demand for International Regimes,” pp. 155–57Google Scholar; Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 31Google Scholar; and Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 90–91Google Scholar. In this regard, Keohane also raises the concept of “issue density” to describe the way in which issues tend to cluster “within a given policy space”; seeKeohane, , “The Demand for International Regimes,” pp. 155–57Google Scholar.

62. In making this argument, linkage theorists tend to draw heavily on the bureaucratic politics literature. See, for example, Allison, , Essence of Decision; and Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1974)Google Scholar.

63. Destler, I. M., Fukui, Haruhiro, and Sato, Hideo, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese–American Relations (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and Destler, I. M., Sato, Hideo, Clapp, Priscilla, and Fukui, Haruhiro, Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U. S.–Japan Relations (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1976)Google Scholar.

64. See, for example, Tollison, and Willett, , “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations,” pp. 445–46Google Scholar.

65. Policymakers either will make the initial proposal themselves or will consider proposals made by domestic actors seeking compensation due to concessions required by the international agreement.

66. Similarly, Vernon, Spar, and Tobin, in their analysis of U. S. foreign economic policy, note that initial policy proposals often lead to the emergence or potential “blocking forces.” See Vernon, Raymond, Spar, Deborah L., and Tobin, Glenn, Iron Triangles and Revolving Doors: Cases in U. S. Foreign Economic Policymaking (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

67. However, Gowa's arguments on collective action and interest group mobilization suggestthat the side-payment's public character may shape the actual extent of mobilization. See Gowa, “Public Goods and Political Institutions.”

68. For example, see Krasner, Defending the National Interest.

69. See Ikenberry, , Reasons of State, pp. 26–30Google Scholar; Katzenstein, , Between Power and Plenty; Friman, Patchwork Protectionism, pp. 35–63Google Scholar; and Milner, Helen, “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States During the 1970s,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 639–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

70. Winham, , International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, pp. 287–97Google Scholar.

71. Ibid., p. 287.

72. Ibid., pp. 287–97.

73. See Putnam, , “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” p. 429Google Scholar; and Putnam, Robert D. and Henning, Randall, “The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination,” in Cooper, et al. , Can Nations Agree?, p. 76Google Scholar.

74. Putnam, and Henning, , “The Bonn Summit of 1978,” pp. 38–41,56–58, and 89Google Scholar.

75. Ibid., pp. 39 and 63–65.

76. President Carter appeared to overcome the risk of political backlash by recasting price decontrol as a step toward increasing national security. See ibid., pp. 92–93; Ikenberry, , “Market Solutions for State Problems,” pp. 172–75Google Scholar; “Carter Broadcast Energy Address”; and “Carter Pledges Oil Decontrol, Wants Windfall Profits Tax.”

77. See, for example, Bacharach, Samuel B. and Lawler, Edward, Bargaining: Power, Tactics, and Outcomes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981), pp. 112–14Google Scholar; and Murdock, , “Economic Factors as Objects of Security,” p. 70Google Scholar.

78. The broad operationalization of external security threat is intended more to roughly trace changes in threats than to offer a precise ordinal or quantifiable scale.

79. Page, Benjamin and Shapiro, Robert, ”Changes in American Policy Preferences, 1935–1979,” Public Opinion Quarterly 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 24–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, cited inHolsti, Ole R., “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (12 1992), pp. 439–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The quotation is drawn from p. 446.

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81. Holsti, , “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” p. 447Google Scholar. Jervis, Robertsuggests a similar pattern; see his classic work Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). Jervis notes that the more extreme the external threat, the more similar the perceptions and responses of statesmen, states, or decision makers (pp. 19–20)Google Scholar.

82. Mueller, John E., War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 208–9Google Scholar.

83. Mueller notes that the extent to which the effect lasts depends on how well the President handles the event; see ibid., p. 212. In contrast, Brown suggests that presidential performance matters less than the extent to which the public has access to information. Yet, as suggested above, dramatic events may reduce the impact of such access. See Brown, Gordon, “Presidential Action and Public Opinion About U. S. Nicaraguan Policy: Limits to the Rally Round the Flag Syndrome,” PS: Political Science and Politics (12 1989), pp. 793–800Google Scholar.

84. See Lowi, Theodore J., The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.. 1979), pp. 144–45Google Scholar; and Lowi, Theodore J., The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 170–73Google Scholar.

85. See Holsti, , “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” p. 451Google Scholar; Peffley, and Hurwitz, , “International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs,” p. 435Google Scholar; andGaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 52Google Scholar.

86. Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 57Google Scholar.

87. To borrow an illustration from Jervis, although one can try to persuade fellow patrons that they are at risk by yelling “fire,” greater opportunities to shape opinion exist when smoke or, especially, flames are visible. See Jervis, , Perception and Misperception, p. 20Google Scholar.

88. This article does not explicitly address questions of cross-sectoral variation. For example, when policymakers are faced with comparable domestic opposition to ratification of several international economic agreements at once, the hypothesis implies that an external security threat would lead to a similar choice in bargaining tactics. This is more likely to be the case the more extreme the external security threat. At lower levels of threat, however, a focus on intervening variables such as “issue density” (see note 61) may help to explain cross-sectoral variation.

89. For those “few key sectors” not swayed by issue redefinition to support the onset of negotiations (by granting presidential authority under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act), President Kennedy turned to side-payments to gain domestic support. A primary concession was the separate negotiation of voluntary export restraints on cotton textiles negotiated under the Short and Long Term Textile Arrangements. See Curzon, Gerard and Curzon, Victoria, “The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT,” in Shonfield, Andrew, ed., International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959–1971, vol. 1, Politics and Trade (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 178Google Scholar; Preeg, , Traders and Diplomats, pp. 52–53Google Scholar; and Friman, , Patchwork Protectionism, pp. 103–110Google Scholar.

90. See Preeg, , Traders and Diplomats, p. 46Google Scholar; Curzon, and Curzon, , “The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT,” p. 177Google Scholar; and Curtis, and Vastine, , The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade, p. 3Google Scholar, respectively.

91. Curzon, and Curzon, , “The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT,” p. 177Google Scholar. Also see Evans, , The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy, pp. 133–59Google Scholar; and Preeg, , Traders and Diplomats, pp. 45–46Google Scholar.

92. These last stages are discussed in detail in Evans, , The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy, pp. 265–79Google Scholar; and Preeg, , Traders and Diplomats, pp. 178–203Google Scholar.

93. Curtis, and Vastine, , The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade, p. 231Google Scholar. Also see Shonfield, Andrew, “International Economic Relations of the Western World: An Overall View,” in Shonfield, , International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959–1971, pp. 1–140Google Scholar. Neither of these scholars sees the Vietnam war as countering this trend. Timing may be important here. While the Kennedy Round agreement was completed in mid–1967, the Tet Offensive and the increase in the severity of the Vietnam challenge began in early 1968.

94. See, for example, Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, pp. 188–254Google Scholar; Eckes, , A Search for Solvency, pp. 202–16;Google ScholarFrieden, JefFry A., Banking on the World: The Politics of American International Finance (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 66–70Google Scholar; andKeohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 6Google Scholar.

95. The following relies heavily on the detailed historical analysis of the AAFA in Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective.

96. Ibid., p. 178.

97. Gardner notes that in discussions over the future of the Lend–Lease Act in late 1944, the British and American governments had agreed that the program would remain in place until the end of the war in Japan but had assumed that the war would last at least eighteen months after the end of the war in Europe; see ibid., pp. 182–83.

98. Special assistance for Britain-the “key currency” proposal-had been debated and rejected by the Department of Treasury during the discussions over Bretton Woods; see ibid., pp. 132 and 183.

99. Ibid., pp. 184–86.

100. Ibid., pp. 193–94.

101. Ibid., pp. 150–53 and 195–97. As an international side-payment to the British, U. S. negotiators also “wiped out” $20 billion in Lend-Lease charges. See ibid., pp. 204 and 208–9.

102. Ibid., pp. 150–53 and 195–97.

103. For details on the specifics of the AAFA, see ibid., pp. 210–23.

104. President Truman had submitted the AAFA to the House and Senate for majority approval. See Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, pp. 238–42Google Scholar; and Frieden, , Banking on the World, pp. 66–67Google Scholar.

105. British policymakers presented an omnibus package to Parliament containing Bretton Woods, AAFA, Lend-Lease compensation, and proposals on commercial policy. Issue redefinition invoked by Lord Keynes was instrumental in overcoming strong parliamentary opposition to ratification. Keynes's defense attempted to recast the agreements as a necessary albeit somewhat unpalatable means to the renewed prosperity and prestige of Britain and a peaceful world. See Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, pp. 225 and 234–35Google Scholar.

106. Ibid., pp. 154–58.

107. Ibid., pp. 242–48.

108. For details on Soviet participation in the negotiations, see Eckes, , Search for Solvency, pp. 141–45 and 205–8Google Scholar.

109. Snyder, Glenn H. and Planck, Charles, “Iran, 1945–1946,” in Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul, eds., Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 556–59Google Scholar.

110. Why was the Soviet security card not the first one used by U. S. policymakers? Two arguments suggest directions for future research. First, Gardner's analysis suggests that the reluctance to turn to the Soviet threat reflected the Truman administration's concerns with public fears of an Anglo-American alliance and a new war raised by Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in early March 1946. Thus, policymakers would be unlikely to invoke this security card if other security cards were available. Second, scholarship on the impact of ideas on foreign economic policy suggests that if a policy worked in the past, then policymakers are likely to use it again. The success of the economic regionalism argument in the Bretton Woods case lends support to this argument. See Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, pp. 238–39Google Scholar; Odell, , “From London to Bretton Woods,” pp. 298–301Google Scholar; and Goldstein, Judith, ”The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U. S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), pp. 31–71, and in particular p. 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

111. See Frieden, , Banking on the World, pp. 66–67Google Scholar; and Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, p. 250Google Scholar, respectively. For insights into Arthur Vandenberg's earlier opposition to the AAFA, see Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, p. 237Google Scholar.

112. Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, pp. 250–51Google Scholar.

113. Milner, , “International Theories of Cooperation,” p. 496Google Scholar.