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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 July 2017
When, in the 1850s, the second duke of Buckingham was editing the correspondence of his grandfather, the second Earl Temple and first marquis of Buckingham, he was clearly puzzled by what was revealed by that part of it which related to Temple’s vice-royalty in Ireland and the issue of ‘ renunciation ’ He wrote of the ‘ curious struggle ’ in the cabinet, ‘ the immense disproportion between cause and effect ’ and the ‘ clamour and misunderstanding ’ which he confessed it was ‘ difficult to understand ’, Today there is still some confusion about renunciation as an issue in English politics and it is the primary object of this article to dispel it. That it has secondary objects is solely the result of the discoveries, suggestions and conclusions of the many historians who have contributed to our understanding of Anglo-Irish relations in the later eighteenth century. It is now clear, for example, that Ireland was one of the most complex theatres in Britain’s external affairs in that period. To some extent this was due to the close geographical and mental proximity between the two countries which enabled politicians to travel and correspond easily from one to the other, a circumstance which led to policies being in a continuous state of formulation and, equally, under continuous scrutiny—in contrast to Britain’s foreign and colonial relations where language and more considerable geographical problems gave policy makers more time to deliberate, and incidentally, reduced the number of interested parties around Whitehall. Similarly there was a contrast between the quality and effectiveness of the official procedures that were adopted for the arrangement of Anglo-Irish relations and those which were followed in other spheres of Britain’s external affairs. Viceroys enjoyed a higher status than ambassadors and sometimes imagined they possessed an almost complete control over their domain. As a consequence they were often not subjected to detailed written instructions as was Earl Fitzwilliam in 1795, and in some cases managed to construct policies without the knowledge or concurrence of the official spokesman for Irish affairs in the cabinet (the home secretary), as did the marquis of Buckingham during the regency crisis in 178g.
1 The court and cabinets of George III (London, 1853), i, 118-21
2 O’Connor, Theresa M. discusses renunciation in the context of the struggle within the Irish patriot movement in her article ‘Flood and Grattan 1782-3’ in Cronne, H. A., Moody, T W and Quinn, D. B. (ed.), Essays in British and Irish history (London, 1949), pp 169–84.Google Scholar
3 McDowell, R. B., ‘The Fitzwiliam episode’, above, xv, 121–2 Google Scholar.
4 It was Pitt, William Grenville and Buckingham who together decided that the Irish parliament should not be prorogued and that the Irish opposition’s address to the prince of Wales to accept the regency of Ireland should not be received; see H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 396-7, 401-6, 410-44, 417; Court and cabinets, ii, 108-12.
5 Sheffield City Library, Wentworth Woodhouse muniments.
6 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 491-3.
7 Beckett, J. C., ‘Anglo-Irish constitutional relations in the later eighteenth century’, above, xiv, 20–38 Google Scholar. I would like to thank Professor Beckett for his invaluable advice during the preparation of this article.
8 Professor Norris is surely wrong in arguing that Temple decided to remain with Lord Shelburne because he was offered a free hand in Ireland and was keen to protect his electoral interest in Buckinghamshire from the prime minister’s attentions; see Norris, J. M., Shelburne and reform (London, 1963), p. 244 Google Scholar. Temple had decided to accept office before he was offered the Irish post, while in later wrangles over the precise reasons why it had been accepted neither party referred to a free hand. Shelburne claimed that it was ‘in a great measure at his [Shelburne’s] request’, while Temple argued that he was attracted by the special challenges of the post. William Eden, later Lord Auckland, said that he thought Temple saw the post as good training for higher responsibilities; Temple to Thomas Grenville, 4 July 1782, Grenville to Temple, 27 Nov. 1782 ( Court and cabinets, i, 50-3, 67, The Correspondence of Rt Hon. John Beresford (London, 1854 Google Scholar; hereafter referred to as Beresford corr.), i, 233).
9 See H.M.C, Fortescue, i, 358, 360.
10 The history of parliament 1754-1790 (London, 1964), ii, 545 Google Scholar.
11 Fortescue MSS: ‘commentaries on my own political life and public transactions connected with it’. Lord Grenville’s papers were recently purchased by the British Museum but I consulted them before that took place through the kindness of Mrs G. G. Fortescue. I shall therefore refer to them as the Fortescue MSS.
12 Ireland was bound to observe the navigation act as long as it was in force in England, so claimed William Eden; see The parliamentary history of England, xxiii, 604. He was doubtless referring to (I) 21, 22 Geo. Ill, c. 48, ‘An act for extending certain of the provisions contained in an act, entitled, an act confirming all the statutes made in England’
13 Pari, hist., xxiii, 20-8; Lecky discusses the policy of the Rockingham government on this matter; see Ire., ii, 304-8, 328-9.
14 Parl. reg. Ire., i, 360.
15 Ibid., i, 407.
16 Ibid., i, 418-9.
17 Shelburne to E. S. Pery, 9 July 1782 (H.M.C. rep. 14, app. ix Emly MSS), pp 169-70).
18 Parl. reg. Ire., i, 466-7.
19 Beresford con. , i, 221.
20 My calculation of the Ponsonby’s strength in 1782 from ‘Sketches of the members of the Irish parliament in 1782’, ed. Sayles, G. O. in R.I.A. Proc, lvi, sect, c., no. 3, is 38 Google Scholar. On 2 Dec. Temple referred to John Ponsonby’s 11 ‘pocket ‘members and 27 followers (Temple to Townshend, 2 Dec. 1782, in N.L.I., Townshend MS 51, B9).
21 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 98, Beresford corr., i, 225; Journal and correspondence of Lord Auckland (London, 1861; hereafter referred to as Auckland corr.), i, 344-5.
22 Sayles, as above, passim.
23 B.M. Add, MS 38716, ff 102, 104, quoted by Professor Beckett, as above, p. 30.
24 Pari, hist., xxiii, 35-8.
25 H.M.C. Emly, as above.
26 Grenville to Temple, 7 Dec. 1782 (Court and cabinets, i, 79-84).
27 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 97; B.M. Add. MS 40179, f 17; Temple to Grenville, 12 Dec. 1782 (H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 170), P.R.O., H.O. 100/3, ff 300-5, 348-9.
28 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 97.
29 Ibid., i, 157. Gooke similarly found Grenville ‘laborious’ in his routine but lacking the qualities of a statesman, Auckland corr., i, 336.
30 B.M. Add. MS 24138, ff 101-2.
31 Court and cabinets, i, 197-8.
32 Ibid., i, 66-70; P.R.O., H.O. 100/3 ff 235-40, 348-9. An analysis of the ‘state’ of the Irish parliament which was certainly completed before Dec. 1782 reveals that the total number of government supporters was calculated to be 172 of which number 50 were members of large factions. The number of likely opponents, if the existing parliament met again, was 74 and the author included some of the supporters of the duke of Portland and the Ponsonbys and all the Floodites in that number. There were 14 ‘doubtfuls’, 19 ‘independents’ and 19 who were usually absent from the house; a total of 300. Assuming the constancy of the individual placemen the only way that Temple’s administration could be defeated was by a defection of the great factions to the opposition and their alliance with the independent members, an event which must have seemed just possible if, as he expected, the volunteer associations exerted their authority in the constituencies; see Sayles as above. On the whole, however, it seems most likely that Temple exaggerated the danger.
33 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 177; Temple to Townshend, 2 Dec. 1782 (N.L.I., Townshend MS 51, B9).
34 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 157; H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 168.
35 Ibid., i, 165, 169; P.R.O., H.O. 100/3 ff 253, 265.
36 See my article ‘Genevese exiles in County Waterford’ in Cork Hist. Soc. Jn., lxxv, 29-35.
37 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 187-9; Temple to Townshend, 30 Dec. 1782 (B.M. Add. MS 40177, no. 21).
38 Grenville to Temple, 4 Feb. 1783 (Fortescue MSS, ‘Correspondence, 1783, 1788, bound in vellum’). On 2 Feb. Temple claimed that he had not been asked his views on Anglo-Irish trade in any of the official dispatches. It is difficult to prove or disprove this statement as Town- shend’s papers are scattered between four different sources and H.O. 100/3 and 8 do not contain all the dispatches, but none that I can trace request comprehensive information before that date; see also P.R.O., H.O. 100/8, f 167. Professor Harlow discusses the conversations between Shelburne and Grenville on Irish commerce in The founding of the second British empire, 1763-1793 (London, 1952), i, 544-6.
39 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 158; H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 174, 180. Shannon was vice-treasurer with a pension of £2,000 and influenced the votes of 3 peers and 19 M.Ps; see Sayles, as above p. 276.
40 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 187; the king and Townshend were not keen on this idea; P.R.O., H.O. 100/3, ff 235-40.
41 Temple to lords of treasury, 12 Feb. 1783 (B.M. Add. MS 40177).
42 Court and cabinets, i, 66-70; P.R.O., H.O. 100/3, ff 235-40, 348-9.
43 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 162.
44 Townshend to Temple, 30 Nov. 1782 (P.R.O., H.O. 100/3, f 307).
45 Court and cabinets, i, 66-70.
46 Ibid., pp 66-70, 72.
47 The case was Barry v. Nugent; see The English reports, king’s bench division, xcix, 601-2; see also Townshend to Temple, 30 Nov. 1782 (N.L.I., Townshend MS 51, B8).
48 Mornington to Grattan, 9 Dec, Fitzpatrick to Ogle, 20 Dec. 1782 (Life and times of Rt Hon. Henry Grattan (London, 1839), iii, 35-40Google Scholar).
49 Court and cabinets, i, 70-2.
50 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 165-8; P.R.O., H.O. 100/3, ff 300-5.
51 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 85-6.
52 See p. 506.
53 H.M.C, Fortescue, i, 169-70.
54 Court and cabinets, i, 93-8; Pari, hist., xxiii, 322-4.
55 Court and cabinets, i, 93-8; Pari, hist., xxiii, 324-5. In his auto biographical notes Grenville referred to his action as ‘irregular’ but beneficial to the ‘public interests’; Fortescue MSS, as above.
56 Court and cabinets, i, 125; H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 180-3.
57 Court and cabinets, i, 99, 124. Grenville and Pitt went through 3 bills on 9 Jan.
58 N.L.I. Townshend MS 51, E2. This change of policy was the subject of repeated discussions by the cabinet and Grenville and despite strong pressure neither Pitt nor Grenville were prepared to retract from it, see for example, Grenville to Pitt, 9 Jan. 1783 (Fortescue MS, ‘Correspondence 1783, 1788, bound in vellum’).
59 Grenville to Townshend, 20 Jan. 1783 (N.L.I., Townshend MS 51, E13).
60 Townshend to Temple, 19 Jan., Temple to Townshend, 25 Jan. 1783 (N.L.I., Townshend MS 51, В13, MS 52, ff 21-2); H.M.C, Fortescue, i, 184-6, 191.
61 Court and cabinets, i, 162-5.
62 Life of Grattan, iii, 54-5, 57-9.
63 There are numerous references to this correspondence in Court and cabinets, i, but see particularly 131, 153, 232-7. Temple was particularly concerned about the correspondence between the attorney general, Yelverton, and Fitzpatrick and between the under-secretary in the war department, Charles Francis Sheridan, and his brother Richard. See also H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 197-9.
64 Court and cabinets, i, 234-5.
65 Ibid., pp 235-8. The reporter’s version of what Portland said was: ‘With regard to the present bill, it was fully his opinion that it should be passed into law: what had already been done, as well as what he under stood to be the opinion of Ireland, made it necessary’, see Pari, hist., xxiii, 745. Grenville claimed that he had memorised the exact words and that the newspaper reports were inaccurate.
66 23 George III, c. 28.
67 Ire., ii, 333-4.
68 Life of Grattan, ii, 363.
69 H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 191.
70 Harlow, as above, i, 545.
71 H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 159.
