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CYCLICAL HISTORY IN THE GAMBIA/CASAMANCE BORDERLANDS: REFUGE, SETTLEMENT AND ISLAM FROM c. 1880 TO THE PRESENT*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2007

PAUL NUGENT
PAUL NUGENT
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
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Abstract

This article begins with a quotation from a local informant highlighting a perception in the Gambia/Casamance borderlands that there is a pattern linking the violence of the later nineteenth century with more recent troubles. It argues that there is some merit in this thesis, which is encapsulated in a concatenation of events: systematic raiding by Fodé Sylla led to the creation of a relatively depopulated colonial border zone which was later filled by Jola immigrants from Buluf to the southeast. In the perception of some, it is these immigrants who attracted the MFDC rebels. Mandinkas and Jolas of Fogny Jabankunda and Narang, and Karoninkas from the islands of Karone have therefore been largely unreceptive to appeals to Casamance nationalism. The article also argues that there are more twisted historical connections. Whereas in the later nineteenth century, the Jolas associated Islam with violent enslavement, they later converted en masse. Their attitude towards Fodé Sylla remained negative, whilst the Mauritanian marabout, Cheikh Mahfoudz, was credited with the introduction of a pacific form of Islam that valorized hard work and legitimated physical migration. This legacy has posed a further barrier to militant nationalism. Islam and violence remain linked, but the signs have been reversed.

Keywords

GambiaSenegalIslammigrationviolence
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of African History , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , July 2007 , pp. 221 - 243
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

1 Reflections of Sidi Jabang, Kujube (Casamance), 18 Feb. 2004. On the MFDC rebellion, see Jean-Claude Marut, ‘Le dessous des cartes casamançaises: une approche géopolitique du conflit casamançais’, in François George Barbier-Wiesser (ed.), Comprendre la Casamance: chronique d'une intégration contrastée (Paris, 1994), and ‘Le problème casamançais: est-il soluble dans l'état-nation?’; also Geneviève Gasser, ‘“Manger ou s'en aller”: que veulent les opposants armés casamançais?’, in Momar-Coumba Diop (ed.), Le Sénégal contemporain (Paris, 2002); and Martin Evans, Sénégal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, Chatham House, Briefing Paper 04/02, Nov. 2004.

2 ‘Attaque du poste du douane de Selety: de la barbarie prémeditée’, Le Soleil, 25 Apr. 1990.

3 Judy Rosenthal, Possession, Ecstasy, and Law in Ewe Voodoo (London, 1998), and Rosalind Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade: Ritual and the Historical Imagination in Sierra Leone (London, 2002).

4 Stephen Ellis, ‘Interpreting violence: reflections on West African wars’, in Neil L. Whitehead (ed.), Violence (Oxford, 2004), 119–21.

5 Richards, Paul, ‘To fight or to farm? Agrarian dimensions of the Mano River conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)’, African Affairs, 104, 417 (2005), 571–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 In an as-yet-unpublished paper, Christian Højbjerg argues that contemporary violence along the Liberia/Guinea border follows the contours of an ethnic conflict between Loma and Mandingo dating to the later nineteenth century. ‘Recurrent violence: symbolic and territorial aspects of the Loma and Mandingo ethnic enmity in Liberia and Guinea’.

7 One indicator of the limited take-up is the relative paucity of Africanist contributions to comparative history journals such as Comparative Studies in Society and History.

8 If the Newaye coup attempt of 1960 may be considered as a dress-rehearsal for the Ethiopian revolution in 1974, that is because the contradictions inherent within a modernizing monarchy were a constant. In the Great Lakes, memories of earlier bloodletting contributed to the dynamic that culminated in the Rwandan genocide.

9 The terminology varies in a way that can be confusing. Some maps depict Fogny Jabangkunda as part of Bliss and Karone which is misleading. Similarly, Kombo and Narang are commonly lumped together as Fogny Kombo, as distinct from Fogny proper. However, Kombo and Narang are better treated as distinct entities.

10 This article is based on research in the national archives of Senegal and the Gambia as well as fieldwork interviews in 17 border villages.

11 Charlotte A. Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam and European Expansion (London, 1972), 67. On the case of Pakao, see Matt Shaffer (with Christine Cooper), Mandinko: The Ethnography of a West African Holy Land (Prospect Heights, 1980), ch. 4.

12 Soninke comes from so-ni or ‘sacrifice’ in Mandinka, which is a reference to the offering of libations. In this context, it refers to animists. Martin Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847–1914 (Edinburgh, 1968), 69 fn.

13 Quoted in ibid. 69–70.

14 Fodé Kaba was born in Wuli and spent time with Ma Ba in Rip. After suffering a military setback in Fuladu at the hands of Alfa Molo, he concentrated his military campaigns on Fogny from 1878 onwards. Fodé Sylla was born into a Fula family at Gunjur. A full biography is contained in David Skinner, ‘Islam in Kombo: the spiritual and militant jihad of Fode Ibrahim Ture’ (unpublished paper delivered at the African Studies Association conference, 1990).

15 One writer asserts that Fodé Kaba came to enjoy the status of a ‘folk hero’. Fay Leary, ‘Islam, politics and colonialism: a political history of Islam in the Casamance region of Senegal (1850–1914)’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1970), 123. Ture family histories in the Gambia understandably portray Sylla as motivated by religious principle.

16 On this debate today, see Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, 2001); Paul Collier (ed.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, vol. i: Africa (Washington DC, 2005); and C. J. Arnson and I. W. Zartman (eds.), Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Washington DC, 2005).

17 He defended a particular raid against the Jola village of Jinaki on the basis that he never attacked Muslims, but only the drinkers of palm-wine – alcohol having become the key marker of identity. Christian Roche, Histoire de la Casamance: conquête et résistance, 1850–1920 (Paris, 1985), 219. According to Leary, Sylla placed a ban on palm-wine tapping in the areas which came under his control. ‘Islam’, 112.

18 The Bainunkas, the notional autochthons, have virtually disappeared from the map in this area. Although many Mandinka narratives argue that they were driven away, there is general agreement that large numbers of them probably became Mandinka. The very name ‘Jabang’ is said to be a Bainunka name. Interview with Alhaji Demba Jabang and others, Kartong (Gambia), 6 Apr. 2004. According to Mark, the same is true of ‘Sambou’ and ‘Diatta’. Peter Mark, A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance Since 1500 (Stuttgart, 1985), 19. However, the former name is also claimed as Karoninka. This does tend to underline the point that there was probably a great deal of intermixing between all these groups.

19 Interview with Jerreh Demba and others, Kabadio (Casamance), 19 Feb. 2004. Brikama became the largest town in Kombo in the twentieth century.

20 Hence it may be significant that contemporary informants have great difficulty in naming any Mansa of Fogny Jabangkunda other than the notional founder, Mansa Dambeld. The silences are even more pronounced in the traditions of Narang.

21 In his account of Soninke religion in Gabou, Niane writes of the dialan (or jalang) which were spirits thought to inhabit trees, animals, boulders, snakes and so on, and which often inhabited sacred forests. Djibril Tamsir Niane, Histoire des Mandingues de l'ouest (Paris, 1989). The forests of Narang were thought to be home to these spirits and djinns.

22 French documents observe that Mandinka settlements were indeed targeted. Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS) 13G 372 ‘Casamance: Correspondance du Résident 1892–1894', section of incomplete report by Lieutenant Moreau. Skinner's reading of Mandinka traditions suggests that this might have been because Soninke refugees in villages like Makuda and Diébaly posed an active threat to Sylla's fledgeling polity. ‘Islam in Kombo’, 19. In the Casamance, Sylla is normally portrayed as the aggressor.

23 Many Bainunkas seem to have been absorbed by the Jolas, as with the Mandinkas. Interview with assistant Alkalo Bakary Diatta, Jiboro-Kuta (Gambia), 17 July 2005.

24 Circumstantial evidence in support is that, after the defeat of Fodé Sylla, many of his fighters headed for Karone. ANS 1F8 ‘Délimitation de la Gambie’, Commandant Canard, Kafountine, to the Governor (11 Mar. 1894). Seasonal migration from Karone to Kombo would explain how the Karoninkas became involved with Sylla's cause.

25 Birahim N'Diaye was killed in battle by Sylla in January 1888. Roche, Histoire de la Casamance, 219; Skinner, ‘Islam in Kombo’, 20–1.

26 NAGB [National Archives of the Gambia, Banjul] MP1/1, ‘Papers relating to boundaries of the Gambia colony and protectorates’, extract from minutes of a meeting between Fodé Sylla and His Excellency G. T. Carter, Chief Administrator, at Lamin, 8 Oct. 1888. In 1894, the Narang villages offered soldiers to help arrest Fodé Sylla.

27 NAGB MP1/1, G. T. Carter, Administrator, to J. S. Hay, Administrator-in-Chief, Sierra Leone, 28 Nov. 1888.

28 In 1893, the village of Kartiak lost its rice harvest to the predations of the Wolof chief. ANS 13G 372, Lieutenant Moreau to Commandant de la 2ème Compagnie (19 May 1894).

29 This camp is clearly marked on the 1891 boundary map. NAGB MP1/4, ‘Anglo-French Boundary Commission map (1891)’. The baobab tree where Sylla capitulated as he was attempting to cross the river into Buluf still stands as a symbolic reminder of this turning point. A French account of the surrender may be found at NAGB CSO 1/124, ‘Despatches from Colonial Office, 1894’. He was caught along with 200 troops and a further 200 followers.

30 ANS 1F8, report by Governor, St. Louis, 9 Apr. 1894.

31 Roche, Histoire de la Casamance, 141–3.

32 A British report noted that ‘He moves about from town to town and from these he raids the farms of the adjoining people, principally the Jolahs, who are under the protection of the English government. Parties of 50–60 horsemen are sent out, who surround the villagers while employed on their farms, capturing them, and eventually exchanging them in the interior for horses &c.’ NAGB MP1/1, report from Lt.-Col. W. G. Pratchett to Adjutant General, Horse Guards, London. French officials were forced to intervene to ensure the return of captives on at least one occasion. ANS 13G 372, report by M. Farque, l'Administrateur Supérieur de la Casamance to Directeur des Affaires Politiques, St. Louis (16 July 1894), 10; and ‘Reconnaissances dans le Fogny vers Médina et Tengougoue’, 1894.

33 Fodé Kaba died defending his fortifications against superior forces.

34 Although ‘Akous’ moved in from Banjul to tap rubber, they were considered suspect by the French.

35 NAGB CSO 1/124, Administrator to Secretary of State, 19 Apr. 1894.

36 Whereas the treatment of slaves posed a headache for the British further upstream, very few were found in Kombo itself. This confirms that the Jola slaves were sold on.

37 NAGB ARPS 33/3, ‘The Travelling Commissioners' reports on the Kombo and Foni province’, report by Sangster for 1903–4.

38 ANS 13G 372, draft report by Farque, 1894.

39 ANS 13G 372, ‘Tournée dans le Combo et dans le Fogny’, 26 Feb. 1894.

40 ANS 13G 372, ‘Tournée’, 26 Feb. 1894.

41 ANS 13G/372, incomplete report on Karone summarizing a tour by Moreau in May 1894.

42 ANS 13G/372, Lieutenant Miribel, commandant le poste de Bignona, au Capitaine commandant le poste de Sédhiou (10 Sept. 1894).

43 The western end of this border did not divide any specific communities. It followed the Allahein river from the coast and at the point where it became a straight line driven through Narang, it divided lands which had already been depopulated.

44 The Gambia/Casamance case demonstrates quite clearly that once a colonial border was drawn, it was always likely to acquire a life of its own because of its importance for securing the fiscal contours of the state. See, for example, Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana–Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands Since 1914 (Athens, 2002), ch. 1. But the Gambia/Casamance case differs in that control of trade was matched by the obsession with controlling people.

45 ‘It is not thought desirable by the Ex. Co to whom I have referred this at present – or for two years at any rate – to put any special direct taxation on property or land in the new territory as it is believed that former inhabitants who were driven away by Fodi Silah will return and the increased population will add to the receipts from the import duties, and if any direct tax is imposed, such as that for land, it may prevent immigration which is much desired.’ NAGB CSO 1/124, Administrator to Secretary of State, 19 Apr. 1894.

46 NAGB ARPS 33/3, report on Kombo and Foni Province, 1921–2. Customs duties lobbied at the port of Banjul were the most important source of government revenue. But, unlike in the Gold Coast, the customs service did not bother trying to police the overland routes, and in fact devolved many of the collecting responsibilities onto the Alkalos.

47 ‘I am trying to induce these French Jolahs to come over and settle, although rather wild they are industrious and are good farmers; in their own country they are afraid of conscription, and the system of Poll-Tax is unpopular, so it is possible some of them may consider it worth while to settle in Kombo, where there is plenty of room and where they would soon be followed by others’. NAGB ARPS 33/3, report on Kombo and Foni Province, 14 May 1913.

48 The population of the Gambia jumped from 147,000 to 186,000 between 1912 and 1918. For our purposes, what is more striking is that the population of South Kombo, on the border, more than doubled from 1,012 in 1915 to 2,575 in 1918. Mark, A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History, 99.

49 The village was apparently founded in 1921. Interview with Alkalo Famara Diatta, Donbondir (Casamance), 16 Feb. 2004.

50 The relevant file in the Senegalese archives which deals with this episode is ANS 13G/382 ‘Casamance Affaires Politiques’. Informants in Kujube suggest he may have been a Gabunke from Portuguese Guinea, but given that so many marabouts crossed borders it is difficult to be more precise about his origins. As Harrison has shown, throughout West Africa the French closely monitored the movements of itinerant marabouts who were thought to harbour militant/pro-Turkish sentiments. Christopher Harrison, France and Islam in West Africa, 1860–1960 (Cambridge, 1988).

51 Interview with Sidi Jabang and others, Kujube (Casamance), 18 Feb. 2004.

52 Interview with Sidi Jabang and others, 18 Feb. 2004. Haidara was probably drawn to the relative seclusion of the forest.

53 The most famous case is the movement which surrounded Alinesitoué Diatta. See Robert Baum, ‘Alinesitoué: a Diola woman prophet in West Africa’, in Nancy Auer Falk and Rita M. Gross (eds.), Unspoken Worlds: Women's Religious Lives (Belmont, 2000). See also his ‘Crimes of the dream world: French trials of Diola witches in colonial Senegal’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 37 (2004), 201–28.

54 NAGB CSO 4/108 ‘French subjects liable to military service – escape to British territory’, Commissioner of South Bank Province to Colonial Secretary, Bathurst (3 Apr. 1940).

55 Both sides lived in fear of spies who might seek to cross relatively porous borders, and therefore endeavoured to improve surveillance.

56 Mark, Cultural, Economic, and Religious History, 110–15, sees the difficulties of the 1930s as being a catalyst for conversion at that time.

57 The rates of conversion were, however, much lower amongst the Karoninkas and refugees from Guinea-Bissau (especially Manjagos and Balantas).

58 Mark, Cultural, Economic, and Religious History, ch. 6; Linares, Olga F., ‘Islamic “conversion” reconsidered’, Cambridge Anthropology, 11 (1986), 4–19Google Scholar.

59 This included the father of one of my informants. Farming activity itself stops at a safe distance from the grove for the same reason. Kalamar's secluded well is itself significant because Sylla is said to have triumphed in Kombo by putting charms in the wells of his adversaries. Skinner, ‘Islam in Kombo’, 13.

60 Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms, 63–5.

61 He was not, of course, the only marabout. However, his reputation surpassed that of his peers on the Gambia–Casamance border.

62 Mahfoudz was also the grandson of Mohamed el Fadel, the founder of the Fadeliyya brotherhood. ANS 13G 67 ‘Politique musulmane, activité des marabouts (1906–17)’, File 5 ‘De l'influence religieuse des cheikhs Maures du Sénégal’, notes on Mahfoudz. Interview with Cherif Cheikh Mouhidinne Ibnou el-Arabi Aidara, Darsilami-Cherifkunda (Darouossalam) (Casamance), 17 Feb. 2004. For details on Mahfoudz, see Mark, Cultural, Economic, and Religious History, 110, 111–12; Roche, Histoire de la Casamance, 295–8. On Saad Bou, see David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania 1880–1920 (Oxford, 2000), ch. 8.

63 Whereas Mahfoudz's followers today like to present him as the trusted intermediary of the French, he was subjected to surveillance as a possible subversive. Somewhat contradictorily, he was depicted as being primarily interested in making money. ANS 13G 67 notes on Mahfoudz.

64 Using the Gambian Sample Survey of Strange Farmers (1974–5), Swindell estimated that of the 40 per cent who came from Senegal, most were Jolas from the Casamance who headed for the Western Division (centred on Brikama). Swindell, Kenneth, ‘Migrant groundnut farmers in the Gambia: the persistence of a nineteenth century labor system’, International Migration Review, 11 (1977), 458CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

65 Mark, Cultural, Economic, and Religious History, 9.

66 Interview with Malem Coly and others, Mahamouda (Casamance) 22 July 2005. This comment was made with specific reference to Mlomp, which produced more than its fair share of settlers.

67 Farmers in Touba (Casamance) also exchanged farmlands with the people of Darsilami (Gambia) in order to optimize their portfolio of fields.

68 The chefs de canton were abolished in 1960.

69 Interview with elders and imam of Makuda (Casamance), 16 Feb. 2004.

70 Darsilami should not be confused with Mahfoudz's own town by the same name, which we refer to here as Darsilami-Cherifkunda.

71 In short, he expected to be left in peace.

72 They sought permission from the chef de canton at Badiana, but recall that they were not forced to pay any rent for use of the land. Despite the name, the inhabitants were not part of the Mourides.

73 Interview with Yousupha Colley, Dimbaya (Gambia), 11 Feb. 2004. One document gives 1942 as the date when they moved from Darsilami to Dimbaya. ‘Re meeting – historical facts finding – Tranquille Settlement establishment’ (document signed by Sukuta Sambou, copy in my possession).

74 Olga Linares, Power, Prayer and Production: The Jola of Casamance, Senegal (Cambridge, 1992).

75 Paul Pélissier, Les paysans du Sénégal: les civilisations agraires de Cayor à la Casamance (Saint-Yrieix, 1966), 799. Also Mark, Cultural, Economic, and Religious History, 7.

76 NAGB SEC 11/896 ‘Complaints and petitions’, Seyfo J. M. Bojang to Minister of Local Government (16 Apr. 1969). Much of the tension arose when hamlets expanded to the point where they could stake a credible claim to having their own Alkalos.

77 The inhabitants of the tiny settlement of Tranquil went a stage further, claiming that they were located inside the Casamance and therefore owed no obligation to the Alkalo of Darsilami. ‘Re meeting – historical facts finding – Tranquille’. This affair took a peculiar turn when a native of Mlomp succeeded in becoming the Alkalo and allegedly connived with the chef d'arrondissement in Diouloulou to have Tranquil transferred (unofficially) to the Casamance. At this point, the boundary pillars were mysteriously removed. The taxes were collected as if Tranquil was in the Casamance and the money was then allegedly shared between them. There was an attempted mediation of this dispute in 1967, but the matter has never been resolved.

78 Pélissier, Les paysans du Sénégal, 812.

79 Darsilami-Cherifkunda never become a magnet for converts in the style of the Mourides. The literature on this theme is well worked. Two standard works are Donal Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Origins of an Islamic Brotherhood (Oxford, 1971); and Jean Copans, Les marabouts de l'arachide (Paris, 1988). A recent comparative study which adds a fresh perspective is Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice (Cambridge, 2003), 94–137.

80 Amongst other things Mahfoudz had founded his own village; sponsored the resettlement of Donbondir; helped transform Gambian Darsilami into a new model community; and inspired novel forms of social organization in villages like Makuda.

81 Michael C. Lambert, Longing for Exile: Migration and the Making of a Translocal Community in Senegal, West Africa (Portsmouth NH, 2002).

82 Vincent Foucher, ‘Les “évolués”, la migration, l'école: pour une nouvelle interprétation de la naissance du nationalisme casmançais’, in Diop (ed.), Le Sénégal contemporain.

83 Hence the attempt to pursue the Senegambian confederation as a first step towards erasing the colonial border. The Gambian authorities, and the vast majority of the population, were reluctant to go down that route, and when the confederation was wound up in 1989, that was extremely popular. On discourses of Casamance nationalism, see Mamadou Diouf, ‘Between ethnic memories and colonial history in Senegal: the MFDC and the struggle for independence in the Casamance’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford, 2004).

84 These are estimates from Evans who puts the total number of refugees into the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau at 10,000–13,000. Evans, Sénégal, 4.

85 Ibid. 5.

86 Congolese music was allegedly more ‘African’. Ever since, whenever Darsilami has played Touba at football, the youth of the former have taunted them with this song. I am grateful to Yusupha Jassey for this anecdote.

87 Interview with Sidi Jabang and others, 18 Feb. 2004.

88 In September 2004, the centrality of Bandjikaky was underlined when it was chosen as the site for a peace conference between government mediators and most of the rebel factions. Interview with Alkalo Baboucar Jabang, Diana (Casamance), 20 July 2005.

89 Interestingly, however, the rebels avoided the part of the forest where Darsilami-Cherifkunda was located, possibly for fear of offending Muslim sensibilities.

90 Evans, Sénégal, 10.

91 Unlike Ziguinchor and the tourist zones like Cap Skiring, there is no evidence that northern Senegalese have been muscling in on the border zone. Kafountine is a partial exception. Gerti Hesseling, ‘La terre, à qui est-elle? Les pratiques foncières en Basse-Casamance’, in Barbier-Wiesser (ed.), Comprendre la Casamance.

92 Jean-Claude Marut, ‘Le particularisme au risque de l'Islam dans le conflit casamançais’, L'Afrique Politique (2002), 147–9. For an astute assessment of the religious factor, see Foucher, Vincent, ‘La guerre des dieux? Religions et séparatisme en Basse Casamance’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 39 (2005), 361–88.Google Scholar

93 Interview with Yousupha Colley, Dimbaya (Gambia), 11 Feb. 2004.

94 Roughly the ‘Association of the Kalorn People’.

95 It did not operate in the Casamance. Interviews with Sonkal Jasseh, Abéné (Casamance), 14 Feb. 2004, and Paul Jarjue, Secretary of Kayong Kalorn, Banjul, 3 Apr. 2004.

96 Kayong Kalorn Perspective (undated pamphlet).

97 There is some suggestion that this might explain the connections with Fodé Sylla.

98 They distinctly prefer the term ‘Kalorn’ to ‘Karoninka’ because the latter is a Mandinka term, but the real struggle has been to detach themselves from the Jola category.

99 Many Karoninkas in towns like Darsilami were refugees who had fled the turmoil in the Casamance.