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The Role of Eastern Europe in America's Containment Policy, 1945–1948

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Robert Garson
Robert Garson
Affiliation:
Department of American Studies, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG.He wishes to thank the Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs for its generous financial assistance.
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Extract

Perhaps the greatest irony in the formative period of the Cold War is that the United States had to resign itself to the Soviets' domination of the very area in which it had at first chosen to challenge them, namely Eastern Europe. Yet America's ultimate acceptance of a Soviet hegemony in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary did not mean, as some histories of the Cold War imply in their omissions, that the status of these countries no longer concerned Washington. In the three years following World War II, American policy makers recognized that while they could not secure democracy or the “ open door ” in Eastern Europe, they could still develop policies for the area that could prove challenging to the Soviet hegemony. Their assumptions and expectations will be the subject of this article. It will show that the Truman administration believed that on developments in Eastern Europe depended the ultimate stability of the Soviet State itself. If the United States could arrest the growth of communism in the Soviet satellites, it could test the insistency of Moscow's power.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of American Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , April 1979 , pp. 73 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1979

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References

1 The literature on this period is vast and still growing. Few general scholarly works, however, devote much attention to Eastern European policy from 1946 onwards. See, for example, Feis, Herbert, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York, 1970)Google Scholar; Joyce, and Kolko, Gabriel, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 (New York, 1972)Google Scholar; Gaddis, John L., The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York and London, 1972)Google Scholar; Yergin, Daniel, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1977)Google Scholar; Gardner, Lloyd C., Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949 (Chicago, 1970)Google Scholar; Wheeler-Bennett, John W. and Nicholls, Anthony, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War (London, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Spanier, John, American Foreign Policy since World War II (New York, 1968)Google Scholar.

2 Clemens, Diane S., Yalta (New York, 1970), pp. 177–211Google Scholar; Feis, Herbert, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1967 edn.), pp. 518–29, 571–80Google Scholar; Feis, Herbert, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, 1960), pp. 102–10, 203–34Google Scholar; Davis, Lynn Etheridge, The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton, 1974), pp. 208–52Google Scholar; Lundestad, Geir, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (New York, 1975)Google Scholar, passim. Yugoslavia is also included in “ Eastern Europe ” in this article. The Soviets' precarious influence there is discussed towards the end.

3 See, for example, Barnes to Grew, 23 July 1945; Schoenfeld to Harriman, 6 July 1945, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Conference of Berlin, I (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 400–01, 403–04Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as F.R., relevant date. Also, Davis, , The Cold War Begins, pp. 274–76, 302–04Google Scholar.

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5 During the war Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had been ultimately prepared to surrender their interests in Bulgaria and Rumania as the price for influence in Poland and Greece. Churchill particularly wanted to honour the percentage agreements, drawn up in Moscow in October 1944, which had attempted to delineate the proportions of influence to be wielded in the Balkans. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, was unhappy with the concessions and pressed for firmer support for the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. Byrnes's tactics at the end of 1945 thus represented a shift in America's location of interest. See memo, “ Treatment of Enemy States: The Satellite States,” 5 July 1944, in Harry Howard Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 March 1945; Churchill to Eden, 4 March 1945; Eden to Churchill, 5 March 1945, in Prem 3, 374/9; Churchill to Eden, 17 March 1945, in Prem 3, 374/11, Public Record Office, London. A useful book on British policy in the Balkans is Barker, Elisabeth, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Byrnes to Barnes, 24 Aug. 1945; Byrnes to Barnes, 30 Aug. 1945; Barnes to Byrnes, 3 Nov. 1945; report, Ethridge to Byrnes, 6 Nov. 1945; Ethridge memo, “ Summary Report on Soviet Policy in Rumania and Bulgaria,” 7 Dec. 1945, F.R.: 1945, 5, 308–09, 316–17, 360–63, 365–66, 633–37; Davis, , The Cold War Begins, pp. 306–13, 324–26Google Scholar.

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8 Sargent minute, 8 Dec. 1945; also F.O. to Washington, 10 Nov. 1945, in FO 371/48132; Cabinet minutes, 1 Jan. 1946, 1(46)1 in CAB 128/5, Public Record Office.

9 Gaddis, , The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp. 276–81, 286–90Google Scholar; Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York, 1955), pp. 551–52Google Scholar; Vandenberg, Aruthur H. Jr, ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), pp. 227–29Google Scholar; Byrnes, James F., All in One Lifetime (London, 1960), pp. 338–39Google Scholar; Frances P. Bolton and Karl E. Mundt to Truman, 25 Oct. 1945, in Box 186, President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library.

10 Quoted in Gaddis, , The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 305Google Scholar; also Byrnes, , All in One Lifetime, pp. 346–54Google Scholar; Hess, Gary R., “ The Iranian Crisis of 1945–1946 and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly, 89 (03 1974), 117–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuklick, Bruce, American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia Over Reparations (Ithaca and London, 1972)Google Scholar.

11 Kennan to Byrnes, 22 Feb. 1946, F.R.: 1946, 6, 696–709; Kennan, George F., Memoirs: 1925–1950 (Boston, 1967), pp. 292–95, 547–59Google Scholar.

12 Cabinet meeting notes, 19 Apr. 1946, in Set I, Cabinet meetings, Matthew Connelly Papers, Truman Library.

13 Department of State Policy and Information Sheet, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 15 May 1946, in Box 15, Russia File, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Truman Library.

14 Report to the President, “ American Relations with the Soviet Union,” in Krock, Arthur, Memoirs: Intimate Recollections of Twelve American Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Richard Nixon (London, 1970), pp. 421–82Google Scholar.

15 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 178–79Google Scholar; Gaddis, , The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp. 306–09Google Scholar; Byrnes, , All in One Lifetime, p. 349Google Scholar. Washington's new ideological orientation had its parallel in Britain. Although Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, disowned Churchill's Fulton speech, he did authorise a Foreign Office reassessment of British policy towards the Soviet Union. This task fell to Christopher F. A. Warner, who headed a special committee on Soviet affairs. In a secret memorandum, entitled “ The Soviet Campaign Against This Country and Our Response to it,” Warner argued, as did Kennan in Washington, that further concessions to the Soviet Union would only weaken Britain. He urged the development of an ideological offensive against communsim and called upon Foreign Office officials to consider ways of implementing a new policy. Interestingly, Warner's proposal for an ideological crusade met with only limited support. Britain could not afford to provide financial assistance to anti-revolutionary régimes abroad, and so could not easily elevate the contrast between East and West into a major issue. Furthermore, the British were tarred by their imperialist record and could not effectively talk of the lack of self-determination in other countries. On the whole, respondents to Warner's proposal preferred particular policies tailored to the specific needs of individual areas. There was little support for imitating America's general offensive against communism. One diplomat from Bangkok advised Britain to eschew “ sub-rosa anti-Bolshevik witch-hunts ” and to “ face the fact that for vast numbers of people all over the world ” Moscow had its positive attractions. Unlike their American counterparts, British representatives in Eastern Europe also advised against a propaganda campaign with Russia as it would simply harden the dedication of communists and estrange those in Eastern Europe who were trying to maintain a foot in both camps. Although Britain's articulated policy was not quite so cautious, it did believe that its relations with the Soviets should be shaped by its specific interests in an area and not by overt political propaganda. As Sir Nigel Ronald, Assistant Undersecretary of State, argued: “ it is well to remember that one is dealing with a tiger, not arguing with a professor of epistemology.” See Warner memo, “ The Soviet Campaign Against This Country and Our Response to it,” 2 April 1946, in FO 371/56832; Thompson to Sargent, 19 July 1946; Nichols to Sargent, 3 Aug. 1946; memo, Ronald to Committee on Policy Towards Russia, Oct. 1946 in FO 371/56787; Helm to FO, 20 July 1946; Bland to Sargent, 31 July 1946, in FO 371/56786, Public Records Office.

16 Memo, Nimitz to Forrestal, 23 July 1946, in Box 15, Russia File, Clifford Papers; see also Davies, Vincent, Postwar Defense Policy and the United States Navy, 1943–1946 (Chapel Hill, 1962), pp. 223–24Google Scholar; Millis, Walter and Duffield, E. S. (eds.), The Forrestal Diaries: The Inner History of the Cold War (London, 1952), pp. 146, 174Google Scholar. The build-up of United States vessels in the Mediterranean was rapid. Between the end of the war and Feb. 1946, only three warships had entered the Mediterranean on routine manoeuvres. In Sept. 1946 Forrestal announced the creation of a permanent force there and by Feb. 1947, 32 warships had paid visits to the area.

17 Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, 26 July 1946, in Box 15, Russia File, Clifford Papers.

18 Paterson, Thomas G., Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore and London, 1973), pp. 101–02Google Scholar.

19 Record, 11th meeting, CFM, 7 May 1946, F.R.: 1946, 2, Council of Foreign Ministers (Washington, D.C., 1970), 266–70Google Scholar.

20 Paterson, , Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 109Google Scholar.

21 Record, 28th meeting, CFM, 27 June 1946, F.R.: 1946, 2, 629–33, 649–50; memo, Norton to Lovett, 19 May 1948. F.R.: 1948, 4, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C., 1974), 607Google Scholar.

22 For other discussions of loan policy see Paterson, , Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 101–02Google Scholar; Kolko, , The Limits of Power, pp. 186–90Google Scholar.

23 Steinhardt to Byrnes, 25 Jan., 20 Apr. and 30 July 1946; Byrnes to Acting Secretary of State, 30 Aug. 1946, F.R.: 1946, 6, 178–80, 189–90, 209–10, 216–17; also, draft, “ Czechoslovakia: Regional Issues Guide,” 25 Nov. 1946 in Box 9, Charles Hulton Papers, Truman Library; Lundestad, , The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943–1947, pp. 160–68Google Scholar; Ullmann, Walter, The United States in Prague, 1945–1948 (New York, 1978), pp. 39–47Google Scholar.

24 Lane to Byrnes, 16 Apr. 1946; Byrnes to Lane, 22 Apr. 1946; Lane to Byrnes, 25 Apr. 1946; Byrnes to Acheson, 17 May 1946, F.R.: 1946, 6, 425–27, 432–33, 436–37, 451–52.

25 Memorandum of conversation, 18 Dec. 1946, in RG 59,711.600/12–1846, US Department of State Archives, National Archives.

26 Barnes memo, 14 Feb. 1947, F.R.: 1947, 4, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union (Washington, D.C., 1972), 147–48Google Scholar.

27 For developments in Eastern Europe see Lee, Arthur G., Crown Against Sickle: The Story of King Michael of Rumania (London, n.d.)Google Scholar; Seton-Watson, Hugh, The East European Revolution (London, 1950)Google Scholar; Dedijer, Vladimir, The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948–1953 (New York, 1971)Google Scholar; Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw, The Rape of Poland (New York, 1948)Google Scholar; Auty, Phyllis, Tito: A Biography (Pelican Books edn., Harmondsworth, 1974)Google Scholar; also, Schoenfeld to Marshall, 9 Apr. 1948, in RG 59,871.00/4–948, US Department of State Archives.

28 For example, Kolko, , The Limits of Power, pp. 385–90Google Scholar; Freeland, Richard M., The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism, pp. 277–79Google Scholar; Paterson, , Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 217–20Google Scholar; Yergin, , Shattered Peace, pp. 334–38Google Scholar. The revisionists cannot claim originality for their interpretation. From Bucharest, Burton Berry wrote that “ the American move to bolster Greece and Turkey is likely to bring ever growing repression upon the political opposition in an area just beyond the now drawn diplomatic battle line.” Berry to Marshall, 10 Apr. 1947, in RG 59,871.00/4–1047, US Department of State Archives.

29 Melbourne to Marshall, 14 Aug. 1947, in RG 59,871.00/8–1347, US Department of State Archives. Not everybody in the Eastern European capitals agreed with this sentiment. But the administration reflected this view in its declining interest in Eastern European affairs. See Chapin to Marshall, 17 Mar. 1948, F.R.: 1948, 4, 307–10.

30 Report of conference on the Implementation of the Treaties of Peace, 14–21 June 1948, F.R.: 1948, 4, 353–62.

31 John D. Hickerson, Oral History Interview, Truman Library; Jones, Joseph M., The Fifteen Weeks (21 Feb.–5 June 1947) (New York, 1955), pp. 252–54Google Scholar; Freeland, , The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism, pp. 164–76Google Scholar; Yergin, , Shattered Peace, pp. 314–15Google Scholar; Kennan, , Memoirs, pp. 340–53Google Scholar; Kolko, , The Limits of Power, p. 363Google Scholar; Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Signet Books edn., New York, 1965), pp. 139–41Google Scholar.

32 Report by National Security Council, “Control of Exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe,” 17 Dec. 1947, in Box 203, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers; Department of Commerce memo, 9 Mar. 1948; memorandum by Secretary of State, 26 Mar. 1948; memo of conversation by Koch, 16 Mar. 1948, F.R.: 1948, 4, 523–28; Democratic National Committee, “Questions and Answers on Foreign Policy,” in Box 6, Eben A. Ayers Papers, Truman Library. See also, Paterson, , Soviet American Confrontation, pp. 63–71, 102Google Scholar. The figures for Eastern Europe include aid through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

33 Truman talk to American Society of Newspaper Editors, 17 Apr. 1948, in Box 6, Ayers Papers.

34 Report to National Security Council, “ United States Objectives with Respect to Russia”, 18 Aug. 1948, in Box 204; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “ Review of the World Situation”, 26 Sept. 1947, 14 Nov. 1947 and 17 June 1948, in Box 203, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers.

35 Marshall to Embassy in France, 24 Feb. 1948, F.R.: 1948, 4, 736. On the Czech crisis see Korbel, Josef, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938–1948: The Failure of Coexistence (Princeton, 1959), pp. 136–235CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Luza, Radomir, “ Czechoslovakia Between Democracy and Communism, 1945–1948 ” in Mamatey, Victor S. and Luza, Radomir (eds.), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948 (Princeton, 1973), pp. 393–412Google Scholar; Vesely, Jindrich, Prague 1948 (Paris, 1958), pp. 87–93Google Scholar; Skilling, H. Gordon, “ The Prague Overturn in 1948,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, 4 (1960), 88–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ullmann, , The United States in Prague, pp. 146–57Google Scholar.

36 CIA, “ Review of the World Situation,” 10 Mar. 1948, in Box 203, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers; Steinhardt to Marshall, 29 Feb. 1948, F.R.:1948, 4, 742.

37 Freeland, , The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism, p. 271Google Scholar; Kolko, , The Limits of Power, pp. 395–96Google Scholar. A rather different interpretation can be read in Leigh, Michael, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937–1947 (Westport, 1976), pp. 160–168Google Scholar.

38 The Czech crisis also served to confirm Truman's conviction that America's concentration on Western Europe was in its best interests. He told a crowd at a St. Patrick's Day observance in New York on the same evening that “ we can have confidence in the righteousness of our cause.” Truman, , Memoirs, 2, 277–79Google Scholar; Public Papers of the Presidents; of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington, D.C., 1964), pp. 182–90Google Scholar.

39 CIA, “ Review of the World Situation,” 17 Dec 1947, in Box 203, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers. On developments in Yugoslavia, see Dedijer, , The Battle Stalin Lost, pp. 78–110Google Scholar; Auty, , Tito, pp. 291–98Google Scholar; Djilas, Milovan, Conversations with Stalin (London, 1962), pp. 129–65Google Scholar; Kousoulas, D. George, “ The Truman Doctrine and the Stalin-Tito Rift: A Reappraisal,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 72 (Summer 1973), pp. 427–39Google Scholar.

40 Report to the National Security Council, “ Attitudes of this Government toward Events in Yugoslavia,” 6 July 1948, in Box 204, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers.

41 Draper to Royall, 6 July 1948; Marshall to Royall, 7 July 1948, F.R.:1948, 4, 1085–87; CIA, “ Review of the World Situation,” 14 July 1948, in Box 204, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers; Kolko, , Limits of Power, p. 400Google Scholar. Averell Harriman also advocated an American initiative to support Tito in his quarrel with Russia. See Marshall to Smith, 21 July 1948, F.R.: 1948, 4, 1093–94. Marshall's instincts proved to be correct. A year later, in July 1949, Yugoslavia signed a trade agreement with the United States and agreed at the same time to close its borders with Greece, thus denying refuge to Greek guerrillas.

42 Report to the National Security Council, “ Attitudes of this Government toward Events in Yugoslavia,” 6 July 1948, in Box 204, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers.