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The Taiwanese of Taipei

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Robert M. Marsh
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Extract

Students of Chinese society should devote more attention to urban Taiwan, for several reasons. First, whatever the relative significance of Taiwan and Communist China in the world, Taiwanese social life can at least be studied at first hand over a protracted period, and with relatively little interference. The events on the China mainland since 1950 are often described as “the most large scale experiment in social change in world history.” Yet these events cannot be studied in the way social scientists prefer to do their research. Moreover, the most dramatic social events do not necessarily make the most important sociological problems; important breakthroughs in any science often come from the study of very mundane phenomena. Second, Taiwan is now, with Japan, Singapore and Malayasia, the most industrialized and economically developed of Asian countries. Urban Taiwanese are strategically significant in this context. Since Taiwan as a whole is becoming ever more urbanized and industrialized, knowledge of social life in metropolitan Taiwan today may provide the best clues as to the patterns toward which Taiwan as a whole will tend in the future. Third, Japanese sources describe many aspects of social structure in urban Taiwan a half century or more ago, and thereby provide comparative data on change over time in urban Taiwan. Such data have been little utilized thus far.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , May 1968 , pp. 571 - 584
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1968

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References

1 Caplow, Theodore and Finsterbusch, Kurt, Development Rank. A New Method of Rating National Development, New York: Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research, n.d.Google Scholar

2 Rinji Taiwan kyukan chosakai, dai-ichi bu (Special Research Committee on Old Formosan Customs, First Section), eds., Chosa dai-ikkai hokokusho (First Survey Report) Tokyo, 1903Google Scholar, text a volumes, Chinnese documents 1 volume, (Chinese of North Taiwan).

3 A fuller discussion of sampling and field methods in the study is presented in Marsh, Robert M., “Research on Social Stratification in Taipei,” in Maurice Freedman, ed. Sociological Research on ChinaGoogle Scholar (tentative tide), forthcoming.

4 Research Committee, Japan Sociological Society, Nihon shakai-no kaiso-teki kōzō (The Stratificational Structure of Japanese Society), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1958.Google Scholar

5 Centers, Richard, The Psychology of Social Classes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.Google Scholar

6 Tumin, Melvin M., Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.Google Scholar

7 Svalastoga, Kaare, Prestige, Class and Mobility, Copenhagen: Gyldendals, 1959.Google Scholar

8 Freedman, Ronald, Takeshita, John Y. and Sun, T. H., “Fertility and Family Planning in Taiwan: A Case Study of the Demographic Transition,” American Journal of Sociology, LXX (July, 1964), pp. 16–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 It should be clear that what we call asymmetrical reciprocity is not necessarily the way the Taiwanese themselves view it. Our concern is with one phase of the life cycle—relatively young married sons in relation to relatively old parents. While parents may not do things for their married sons at this stage, both parties probably believe that the parents had done much in bringing up and educating the children, and that from the point of view of this longer time span, what we classify as asymmetrical is seen as symmetrically reciprocity by the actors. The value of our concept is that it allows contrast with the U. S. pattern, in which, despite parents' earlier acts on behalf of children, it is expected that they continue doing for children.

10 Twenty-three percent said “money” and seven percent said “beliefs” are most important, but these answers are ambiguous in terms of our distinction between achievement and ascription.

11 Centers, , op. cit., p. 147.Google Scholar

12 Centers, , op. cit.Google Scholar, has intergenerational mobility data which are not comparable to the six occupational categories used for Taipei and metropolitan Japan. Center's “farmers” category is lacking in the fathers' generation. Fortunately, another national sample of urban males' mobility is available for the U. S., 1957, and has been used here. Jackson, Elton F. and Crockett, Harry J., “Occupational Mobility in the United States: A Point Estimate and Trend Comparison,” American Sociological Review, 29 (February 1964), pp. 5–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Attitudes concerning equal chances to get ahead are not significantly related to actual mobility between father and son.

14 There was no relation between response to this question and response to the previous question; 2/3 of both those who feel everyone has an equal chance to get ahead, and of those who feel chances are unequal, believe their children's chances as “as good as” others.