Why are histories of colonialism and religious transformation in Southeast Asia so often told as inextricably interrelated? Why were Buddhist movements identified as both the locus for resistance to colonialism and the central means of constructing colonial modernity? Part of the reason lies in how religion served as both a European technique of colonial governmentality and a local repository of techniques for comprehending and responding to change. More than this, religion seems to have offered a multivalent medium for a variety of innovations. Pali examinations were central to Buddhist reform in colonial Burma at the turn of the twentieth century but also fomented conflicts between the colonial state and monastic factions over the purpose of language study. However, beyond such conflicts, Pali examinations proved fertile grounds for Buddhist laypeople to experiment with multiple interpretations of what Buddhist modernity might mean in Burma.

This study examines Chinese imperial polygamy under two aspects, as institution and actual practice. Institution refers to its existence as a set of rules and expectations, practice to the actual ways in which imperial people carried out polygamy as recorded in both historical and fictional sources. The key to the institutionalization of polygamy had to do with the idea that a ruler did not engage in polygamy because he wanted to, but because he had to in order to fulfill his role as Son of Heaven. He was obligated to extend the patriline and was as if following a hallowed directive. Practice had to do with what rules and expectations could not control or predict, including how a man justified his role as polygamist, his polygamous transgressions, and how he dealt with the main challenge to polygamous harmony, women's jealousy and rivalry.

Having had the privilege of being taught by Chris Bayly as an undergraduate, I can hear Remaking the Modern World in his voice. I can hear it in the form of the dazzling lectures—never showy, but perspective-shifting week after week—that were the kernels from which this book and its predecessor on the nineteenth century both grew. In the late 1990s, that course was still called “The West and the Third World since 1914.” Notwithstanding its then already outmoded title, it was a progressive course: a perspective on global history building out from the detailed study of South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. It was clear even then that Bayly's long immersion in the study of Indian history was not incidental but rather vital to Bayly, the global historian.

Throughout eastern and southern Asia the village stands in a position of critical but often unacknowledged importance. It provides the residence and social focus for an overwhelming proportion of the people living in those parts of the continent lying east of Afghanistan and south of the Soviet borders—perhaps some 72 per cent of the total, or roughly 900,000,000 persons. Or, if only the regions specifically under examination in this symposium—Japan, India, Java, and the Philippine Islands—are taken into account, it will be discovered that some 62, 83, 80, and 75 per cent of their respective populations reside in villages.2 When one speaks of village government or politics in eastern or southern Asia then, a vast preponderance of the area's total population is involved.

During the years 1851 to 1864 a central feature of the Chinese political scene was the Taiping rebellion. This was a peasant movement led by disappointed candidates in the official examinations and unlettered men of native military and organizational genius who capitalized upon the economic distress of the time and the declining ability of the Manchu rulers to take the principal cities of the Yangtze valley and at one point to threaten Peking itself. The rebels maintained their capital in Nanking from 1853 until 1864. From this point they waged intermittent campaigns in the provinces from Hunan and Hupeh east to the sea and thus denied the ruling dynasty the rich lower-Yangtze revenue for more than a decade. The rebellion was active at one time or another in fourteen of the eighteen provinces of the empire. Antidynastic societies not part of the Taiping movement used the embarrassment of the dynasty to disrupt areas which the Taipings did not reach. From the military point of view the Ch'ing dynasty was probably threatened most seriously in 1853 when the rebels got to within thirty miles of Tientsin. But if the Taiping troops were never again able to invade Chihli, neither were the imperial soldiers capable of regaining the Yangtze basin. After 1853 it required eleven years of punitive expeditions, the training of a new type of provincial militia, and incidental foreign aid to put down the rebellion.

This is a study of the role played by Ch'en Ch'eng, who for almost thirty years was Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted and powerful lieutenant, in the relations between Chiang's “Central” government and the so-called tsa-parh or noncentral military forces. The study illustrates both the complexity and importance of Chiang's dealings with the tsa-parh and suggests that Ch'en had the responsibility of coopting them into Chiang's service. This was especially true with respect to militarists from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, who felt that their leadership of the Nationalist movement had been usurped by the Chekiang-Kiangsu group, led by Chiang Kai-shek. Ch'en also emerges as an advocate of fundamental social and economic reform, as well as an important proponent of resisting Japan and, therefore, the united front with the Communists, although, after 1945, he became chief-of-staff to Chiang Kai-shek and, in this capacity, directed Nationalist efforts to destroy the Communists. The article concludes by suggesting that Nationalist efforts to impose a “modern,” meaning a unitary and organically centralized, state on what traditionally had been a politically fragmented society provoked unprecedented antagonism toward the central government on the part of the provinces and prevented Chiang Kai-shek from achieving even that degree of control enjoyed by China's emperors in the past.

The 1857 uprising, by shattering many of Britain's most cherished beliefs about India, introduced a decade of controversy and reappraisal in many fields. At the center of this controversy stood land policy, for the land revenue was the heart of the administrative system, and the form through which outside events made their influence felt most strongly upon the structure of society. In collecting the land revenue, the Government had of necessity to settle responsibility for its payment on some person, and in so doing to define the rights in land of the various classes of society. This had a profound effect on the distribution of power within Indian society. Whichever class obtained the land settlement, and the rights and privileges it entailed, was in effect proprietor of the land, able to reduce all others to dependence upon its generosity. The British could insure the dominance of either peasant or landlord simply by manipulating the Record of Rights and assessment rolls.

The twenty years which have elapsed since the adoption of the 1940 Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic have witnessed important social, economic, and political transformations in the life of the Mongol nation and in the structure of its public authority, especially in the field of local government. All these changes have in a direct way affected the substantive rights and duties of the mass of the citizenry and are intimately tied to the continuing progression of the Mongol society, under the paternalistic guidance of Moscow and its native disciples in Ulan-Bator, along the socalled “non-capitalist path of transition to socialism.” As reflected in the organizational evolution of the instrumentalities of local rule, the record of the legislative and governmental reforms of this period furnishes valuable evidence on the prospective course of the country's future development following the promulgation on July 6, 1960, of a new, “socialist-inspired” Constitution and the inauguration of an era of fundamental reorientation in all areas of public and private activity in pursuance of an official campaign to complete the building of “socialism” in Outer Mongolia.

This is a study of the social and economic functions of Chinese secret societies between the age of rebellions, 1850–1878, and the Boxer Uprising. The rebellions and their ensuing peaceful reconstruction of Chinese society brought important changes to both the secret societies and Chinese society at large. These are analyzed in detail in this essay. By so doing, the essay attempts to throw some light on the mechanism and processes of the structural changes of Chinese secret societies. It also attempts to correct some methodological defects which seem to exist still in the study of Chinese secret societies. One of these is that historians tend to focus their attention only on rebellions while neglecting the activities of the rebel elements in peace time; another is the reluctance to make better use of popular literature as a reliable source of historical information. Widi emphasis on the social and economic functions of these societies in peace time, the essay also helps to dispel the belief that all Chinese secret societies came from one mother body—a monistic myth created by the nationalist revolutionaries of the 1900's.

In the Korean records, the relations between Korea and Japan are termed kyorin, meaning neighborly relations with a neighboring country. That term contrasts sharply with the term used for the relations between China and Korea usually called sadae, serving the great. Korea always demonstrated an attitude of great deference to the Chinese Empire, her communications being often almost servile in tone; whereas, in regard to the Japanese, the position was almost reversed. The Japanese were treated peremptorily; envoys were frequently scorned and their requests considered as coming from a suppliant.

This article discusses Nancy Abelmann's scholarship on the university and includes a new study of the South Korean media discourse on Chinese international students—a work she planned but could not undertake. Abelmann studied the university, viewing it as a window to society's particular desires and anxieties regarding the future. Her research on South Korean university students reveals their personal fervor and struggle to stay afloat amidst the country's rapid modernization and globalization. Her later work on the American university considers the struggles of Asian American and Asian international students, illuminating the new realities of a global educational market and exploring new ethics of sharing the same university. The study in the second part of this article demonstrates how South Korean universities and public discourse have attempted to “optimize” the increasing numbers of Chinese international students as financial and symbolic capital. The shift between 2001 and 2016 from maximizing to distancing shows that Korean universities were straddling a line between the desire to become global institutions and the realization that they are a second-choice destination in the global higher-education market.

Japan's actions during the Boxer crisis which resulted in the siege of. The foreign legations in Peking from June 20 to August 14, 1900, are the subject of debate among historians. Some argue that Japan's actions were “generally sound in dealing with the difficult international circumstances of the time; considering Japan's mission today as a bridge between east and west, they may be regarded as a historical fact of which the Japanese can be very proud.” Those who take this view would claim that Japan tried to balance her sympathy with China with her responsibilities to the powers and that she generally succeeded. On the other hand, others hold that while “Japan played a singularly conscientious role in the allied relief expedition to Peking to rescue the legation staffs in the summer of 1900, … the Tokyo cabinet was certainly not indifferent to its opportunities.” They would argue that, while Japan did not acquire territory in China during the Boxer disturbances, she thought of doing so and took steps to that end. The published archives of the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs show the extent to which she acted in line with the expansive temper of the powers in China at the time. This paper will consider the projects which were undertaken by the Japanese, the motives for them, and the reasons why they were not followed through.

“For forty years,” Sun Yat-sen said in March 1925 in the Tsungli's Will, “I have devoted myself to the cause of the people's revolution with but one end in view, the elevation of China to a position of freedom and equality among the nation.” “But,” he lamented, “the work of the Revolution is not yet done.” For forty years since, Chiang Kai-shek has been at the very center of the Chinese political limelight. During half of this period, from 1928 to 1949, he was to a remarkable degree China itself. But like Sun, he has also failed to consummate the Kuomintang movement and the work of the revolution.

One hundred years ago the patient efforts of Townsend Harris bore fruit and on July 4, 1859, Japan opened her doors to traders from the West. It was a small beginning, for Consul Harris' treaty allowed foreigners to live and trade at only three Japanese ports; two of which, Nagasaki and Hakodate, lacked the hinterland to make them much more than coaling or victualling stations. The third port was a small fishing village of twenty or thirty huts. It was built on a mud bank, backed by an odious swamp and commanded by surrounding hills. The Japanese called the place Yokohama.

Research into the reunification of Korea has focused on the governmental policies of North and South Korea, as well as the policies of countries involved with them. The views expressed within Korean civil society about reunification have not been given much consideration. It is difficult, therefore, to gauge what the Korean people themselves think of reunification and how opinions differ among discrete sociopolitical groups in Korea, such as the conservatives, liberals, and radicals.