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Britain, Russia, and the Revival of “Entente Diplomacy”: 1934

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2014

Donald N. Lammers
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Extract

In the annals of European diplomacy the year 1934 belongs to Louis Barthou. Coming to office in the Doumergue ministry formed in the wake of the bloody rioting of February, Barthou brought to the Quai d'Orsay a combination of clear vision, steady purpose, and nicely judged audacity which gave to French policy in the 1930s almost all the little luster it can fairly claim. Put shortly, Barthou's plan was to safeguard the French against the menace of German nationalism by reconstituting as nearly as possible the Triple Entente of prewar years. The spirit which animated him may be traced to his former mentor, Raymond Poincaré, but the design was his own, and the approaches to Britain and Russia which it entailed demanded far more insight and finesse than Poincaré had showed in the years of his postwar premiership.

Historians, faced by the whole horrific record of the Hitler regime, have tended to treat Barthou's effort approvingly despite its eventual ill success. The accounts they have produced so far, however, have been focussed on Franco-Soviet or Anglo-French relations. The Anglo-Soviet side of the diplomatic triangle, never a match for the other two in prominence, has not come in for much sustained attention. Yet relations between Britain and Russia, developing in the context powerfully shaped by Barthou's initiative, were never more cordial and hopeful than over the years 1934-35; in view of the fateful consequences of their later deterioration, it is surely worth inquiring closely into the circumstances and implications of their original improvement.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , May 1967 , pp. 99 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1967

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References

1. Scott, William E., Alliance against Hitler: The Origins of the Franco-Soviet Pact (Durham, N.C., 1962)Google Scholar, chs. viii-ix. Scott gives a careful, balanced account of Barthou's activities and refers to the earlier literature.

2. Ibid., pp. 56-73.

3. Ibid., pp. 74-152. Russia's entry into the League was apparently desired solely because without it Soviet aid could not be extended across the territory of member states.

4. New York Times, Dec. 26, 1933.

5. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 147–48Google Scholar.

6. Ibid., pp. 105, 150-52, 167-68. Barthou had recently (Mar. 1933) spoken against the Franco-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in the Senate. Earlier he had helped construct the cordon sanitaire, had attacked the Soviet delegation at Genoa (1922), and had prosecuted French Communists vigorously while serving as Minister of Justice.

7. Lammers, D. N., “The Engineers' Trial (Moscow, 1933) and Anglo-Soviet Relations,” South Atlantic Quarterly, LXII (1963), 256–67Google Scholar.

8. Cmd. 4513, Parliamentary Papers, 1933-34, XXVII, 759Google Scholar. Between 1929 and 1933 the British market absorbed an average of 25 per cent (by value) of annual Soviet exports.

9. See, for example, Cooper, A. Duff, “Shall We Recognize Russia?” Fortnightly Review, CXXXII (new series, CXXVI) (1929), 433–38Google Scholar; Boothby, Robert, I Fight to Live (London, 1947), pp. 70–87Google Scholar.

10. For circumstantial details see Maisky, Ivan M., Vospominaniia sovetskogo posla, II, Mir ili voina? (Moscow, 1964), 37-38, 72-74, 268–72Google Scholar. Portions of this memoir first appeared as Kto pomogal Gitleru? (Moscow, 1962) [Eng. trans., London, 1964]Google Scholar. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood was among the prominent Englishmen sought out by Maisky during this period. When they met at Harold Laski's, Maisky ventilated his doubts about Britain's attitudes toward Germany and, especially, Japan. In reply Cecil said that “the controversy with Russia over India had created a considerable element of distrust between us, and that the controversies were still going on. I reminded him of the language used in Russia with regard to stirring up rebellions in foreign countries, etc., and pointed out that that was not calculated to increase good relations.” Cecil also suggested that matters generally “would be very much easier if Russia were actually a member of the League,” to which Maisky answered that his government might want to join “in the relatively near future.” Though Cecil admitted the persistence of strong anti-Russian feeling in England, he insisted that any large anti-Soviet combination with Germany and Japan “was completely out of the question.” BM, Add. MSS, 51101, Record of Conversation with the Russian Ambassador, Feb. 5, 1934, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Toward the end of March Cecil saw Maisky again and was told that the Soviets would welcome from the British or French foreign office a private expression of interest in their joining the League — though Maisky's own view was “that so long as Simon remained Foreign Minister there was no prospect of better relations between England and Russia.” BM, Add. MSS, 51101, Record of Conversation with Maisky, Mar. 28, 1934, ibid.

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15. The speeches were reported in Pravda (Moscow), Jan. 17 and Feb. 5, 1934Google Scholar; see also D.B.F.P., VII, No. 566.

16. Ibid., VII, Nos. 570, 585, 590, 597, 602, 606.

17. Ibid., VII, Nos. 577, 579.

18. Ibid., VII, Nos. 576, 582.

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23. Times, May 16, 1934; SirSimon, J., 286 H. C. Deb. 1536 (Mar. 5, 1934)Google Scholar, and 288 H. C. Deb. 150 (Apr. 10, 1934)Google Scholar; see also the messages from the British delegation at Geneva, D.B.F.P., VII, Nos. 588-89.

24. On the Anglo-French relationship see Wolfers, Arnold, Britain and France between Two Wars (New York, 1940)Google Scholar; Jordan, W. M., Britain, France and the German Problem (London, 1943)Google Scholar; Furnia, A. S.'s idiosyncratic The Diplomacy of Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to World War II (Washington, 1960)Google Scholar.

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26. For reports of French dissatisfaction, which British moderates now appeared to share, see Economist, Feb. 10, 1934.

27. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 355.

28. According to Herriot, Êdouard, Jadis (Paris, 1952), II, 396Google Scholar, Barthou told the cabinet on March 8 that “La presse britannique évolue vers la France.”

29. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 385. This British action shows the effects of the Foreign Office “Memorandum on Germany's Illegal Rearmament and Its Effects on British Policy” of Mar. 21. Ibid., VI, No. 363. Its author(s) concluded: “the old question of French security must now be viewed, not merely as hitherto in its generalised form as part of an international Convention on Armaments, but in its more concrete form as an ingredient in the future organisation of British security against the impending menace created by Germany's uncontrolled rearmaments.” See also ibid., VI, Nos. 368, 379; Colvin, , Vansittart, pp. 34–35Google Scholar.

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31. Scott, , Alliance, p. 167Google Scholar. Slightly variant accounts are in Géraud, André (Pertinax), “France, Russia and the Pact of Mutual Security,” Foreign Affairs, XIII (1935), 229Google Scholar; and D.B.F.P., VII, No. 580.

32. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 195–97Google Scholar, shows that the French expected no substantial military assistance from Russia but prized her capacity to divide Germany's attention and deny Hitler the resources of the Ukraine.

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34. Milton Loventhal has kindly given me prepublication access to a set of documents which he means to identify as foreign policy resolutions of the Politburo during 1933-35. Consistent in style with other Soviet material and credible in content, these copies were reportedly conveyed to Nazi purchasers in Vienna, from whence they were sent to Berlin. Those I have examined amply confirm Soviet misgivings about Western policy and permit the accurate dating of certain decisions (or at least their formal presentment) known or inferred from other sources. May 24, for instance, is the crucial date for the developments referred to in the text. On German efforts to keep alive the “Rapallo policy,” see D.B.F.P., VII, No. 605; and D.G.F.P., II, Nos. 171, 210, 425.

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36. According to the Politburo resolution of May 23, 1934 (above n. 34).

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41. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 429.

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44. Times, June 30, 1934; Tucker, , Attitude of the British Labour Party, p. 168Google Scholar; Dalton, Hugh, Memoirs, II, The Fateful Years 1931-1945 (London, 1957), 44-45, 53–55Google Scholar.

45. D.G.F.P., II, Nos. 486, 491, 504.

46. Ibid., II, No. 502; D.B.F.P., VI, No. 450.

47. Ibid., VI, Nos. 454-55, 465.

48. Cameron, E. R., “Alexis Saint-Léger Léger,” in The Diplomats, pp. 383–84Google Scholar.

49. Having thus prepared the way, the French transmitted their version of the Eastern Pact on June 27. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 472.

50. The exchanges cited in n. 16, above, had failed to give satisfaction.

51. Maisky, , Vospominaniia, II, 259–60Google Scholar. The timing of Vansittart's initiative is worth remark; it came on the same day as the Clerk-Léger conversation (above, n. 47), and only two days after Simon had sent Clerk the rather discouraging instruction to volunteer no observations on the Eastern Pact, “particularly as it may never reach maturity.” D.B.F.P., VI, No. 461.

52. Ibid., VI, No. 510. Beloff, Max, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941 (London, 1947–1949), I, 112Google Scholar, following Bilainkin, G., Maisky: Ten Years Ambassador (London, 1944), pp. 123–24Google Scholar, dates the first conversation July 18, which deprives it of its point as a preliminary to Barthou's London visit. Maisky and Vansittart had a second friendly talk on August 9. D.B.F.P., VII, No. 611.

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54. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 487-89. According to van Zuylen, P. (les Mains libres [Brussels, 1950], p. 308)Google Scholar, Barthou had been willing late in May to accept disarmament, “moyennant la conclusion d'un Locarno d'Est et l'absence de tout désarmement français avant cinq ans.”

55. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 499-501, 503.

56. Scott, , Alliance, p. 182Google Scholar.

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61. F.R.U.S. 1935, I, 254.

62. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 512, 515.

63. 292 H. C. Deb. 2339 (July 30, 1934)Google Scholar. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug. 3, 1934, surveyed the French press and reported that only “Pertinax” read the speech pessimistically, as a disavowal of British interest in the region east of the Rhine.

64. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 537, 544, 551. After the Dollfuss murder Barthou resolved to keep Germany out of the Franco-Russian agreement. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 182–89Google Scholar.

65. D.B.F.P., VII, Nos. 609, 613, 558.

66. Ibid., VII, No. 609, n. 1.

67. Ibid., VII, Nos. 610, 616, 617. The American Ambassador in Moscow, William Bullitt, told Chilston that there was “general and genuine astonishment” at the British Government's forthright support for the Pact and that “the change of attitude of the Soviet government towards Great Britain and its undoubtedly better feeling were very marked.” Ibid., VII, No. 613.

68. Ibid., VII, Nos. 618-31. Robert Dell has left accounts in New Statesman, Sep. 22, 1934, and The Geneva Racket 1920-1939 (London, 1941), pp. 211–16Google Scholar, where Simon's role is harshly treated. The account in Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs 1934 (London, 1935), pp. 389–404Google Scholar, is full and fair.

69. Gottschalk, Louis, Understanding History (New York, 1950), p. 242Google Scholar.

70. D.G.F.P., series C, IV, Nos. 189, 201, 221, 234, 243, 253, 262, 462, 562.

71. This argument is implicit in such works as Furnia, Diplomacy of Appeasement; Gilbert, M. and Gott, R., The Appeasers (London, 1963)Google Scholar; Rowse, A. L., All Souls and Appeasement (London, 1962)Google Scholar. It becomes explicit in Soviet studies such as Trukhanovski, V. G., Vneshniaia politika Anglii na petvom etape obshchego krizisa kapitalizma (1918-1939 gg.) (Moscow, 1962)Google Scholar, and Volkov, F. D., SSSR-Anglia, 1929-1945 gg.: Anglo-Sovetskie otnosheniia nakanune i v periode vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow, 1964)Google Scholar.

72. See, for example, Colvin, , Vansittart, pp. 40–41Google Scholar; and Watt, D.C., “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment,” J.M.H., XXVIII (1956), 161 ffGoogle Scholar. Watt, D. C., Personalities and Policies (London, 1965), pp. 117, 130, 163–67Google Scholar, has reformulated the phasing of “appeasement” in a way which brings his position close to the one taken here.

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74. Maisky, , Vospominaniia, II, 279–84Google Scholar.

75. Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), pp. 255–56Google Scholar.

76. Eden, Anthony (Earl of Avon), Memoirs, II, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 119Google Scholar.