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British Myopia and the Collapse of Indian Textile Demand

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Susan Wolcott
Susan Wolcott
Affiliation:
The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122
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Abstract

Britain's textile industry contracted sharply in the interwar period due to the growth of domestic industries in many of its export markets. Lazonick and Mass argue that, because this growth was inevitable, British entrepreneurs should not have focused on the less developed countries. This article questions whether the interwar growth of the Indian textile industry was inevitable. A quantitative study of Indian import demand and production techniques suggests that the rapid growth of the industry was due to exogenous events—postwar British inflation and change in the Indian political regime—rather than to the natural evolution of Indian productivity.

Type
Papers Presented at the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 51 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 367 - 384
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1991

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References

Much of this article is drawn from Chapter 3 of my dissertation. I would especially like to thank my advisers, Gavin Wright and Gregory Clark, and also the participants of the 1990 Cliometrics Meeting for a useful discussion.Google Scholar

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