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When the State is Untrustworthy: Public Finance and Private Banking in Porfirian Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2005

NOEL MAURER  and
ANDREI GOMBERG
NOEL MAURER
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor in the Business, Government, and the International Economy (BGIE) unit at the Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163. E-mail: nmaurer@hbs.edu.
ANDREI GOMBERG
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Economics, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Camino a Santa Teresa 930, 10700 México, DF, MEXICO. E-mail: gomberg@itam.mx.
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Abstract

All sovereign governments face a commitment problem: how can they promise to honor their own agreements? The standard solutions involve reputation or political institutions capable of tying the government's hands. Mexico's government in the 1880s used neither solution. It compensated its creditors by enabling them to extract rents from the rest of the economy. These rents came through special privileges over banking services and the right to administer federal taxes. Returns were extremely high: as long as the government refrained from confiscating all their assets (let alone repaying their debts) less than twice a decade, they would break even.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , December 2004 , pp. 1087 - 1107
Copyright
© 2004 The Economic History Association

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