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The Dilemma of the Commoners: Understanding the Use of Common-Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective. By Tine De Moor. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. ix–xv, 1–204. $95.63, hardcover.

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The Dilemma of the Commoners: Understanding the Use of Common-Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective. By Tine De Moor. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. ix–xv, 1–204. $95.63, hardcover.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2016

Gary D. Libecap
Gary D. Libecap*
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Type
Reviews of Books
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 76 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 955 - 958
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 2016 

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References

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