Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2011
Investigation of Florentine legislation concerning the practice of usury in the fourteenth century leads the researcher to the conclusion that a general theory cannot be constructed unless more facts are made known. It is to be hoped that an exposition of factual data will lead to an inquiry into those “shades and nuances” of meaning that are symptomatic of historical change. I do not believe that the present state of knowledge on this problem allows more than a descriptive historical approach, followed by a suggestion of possible levels of understanding and strategies of further inquiry. There are many reasons for taking this position. First, the documents available to the researcher are less than adequate for the formulation of a general theory. To cite only one instance, the judicial records of the period before 1343 were burned in the revolution of that year. Second, case histories of those individuals cited by the court or the councils as usurers have not been written. Finally, the Consulte, which contain the opinions of the advisory councils of the Priorate, do not aid the researcher in understanding the motives that animated the passage of legislation. With these limitations firmly in mind, I should like to present certain facts that I suspect can be understood only dimly within die framework of our present knowledge of Florentine life in the Trecento. One further disclaimer must be made: this paper does not purport to consider the state of juridical consciousness nor the legalistic matrix that provided the framework in which the events narrated took place.
1 For a consideration of methodological problems involved in economic history, see Lopez, R., “Italian Leadership in the Medieval Business World,” The Journal of Economic History, VIII (1948), 63–68Google Scholar. Sapori, A., Le Marchand italien au moyen âge (Paris: A. Colin, 1952), pp. 3–115Google Scholar, presents an excellent general bibliography of Italian economic history and an incisive discussion of sources.
2 The Atti of the Captain, Executor, and Podesta previous to July of 1343 were destroyed. Our present opinions about the history of Florence are distorted because scholars do not take into account the fact that the apparent rise in the incidence of political conflict after 1343 may be largely a reflection of the survival of certain types of sources. That there appears to be relatively little political strife from 1328 to 1342 may in part be accounted for by the absence of judicial documents for that period. All documents cited in this paper are from the Archivio di Stato in Firenze.
3 Cf. my article, “The Attitude of the Communal Courts Towards Usurers (1343–1379),” to be published in the Archivio storico italiano.
4 Periodically the Priors called upon certain citizens to give their opinions on pending legislation. Their advice was recorded in a series of volumes entitled “consulte.” The speakers usually confined their remarks to an estimate of the amount of the fine that the pawnbrokers should be compelled to pay. Occasionally, however, some insight can be gained into the fiscal status of the pawnbrokers through the counsel given by these men.
5 Cf. Nelson, B., “The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Business and the Ecclesiastical Law of Restitution, 1100–1550.” The Tasks of Economic History (supplemental issue of The Journal of Economic History), VII (1947), 104–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 During the time of the Ciompi, the form and content of the statutes regulating pawnbroking were identical with those of the earlier period. Provvisioni, 68, cc. 37r-38r. In the subsequent period, when the Florentine government suppressed the pawnbrokers in territories under Communal jurisdiction, the inhabitants of these districts petitioned Florence to revoke the ban and permit the pawnbrokers to continue to ply their trade. Provvisioni, 78, cc. 258r-59r.
7 For similar treatment of the pawnbroker in northern Europe, see Roover, R. de, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948), p. 163Google Scholar. In Florence, the magistrates charged men who loaned money on pawns with failure to pay their license fees. The money paid by the accused was called a “fine” because canon law prohibited the authorities from granting licenses to usurers. This prohibition was simply evaded by creating die impression that the purpose of the license was to penalize the grantees for practicing usury. Thus the license fee was transformed into a penalty. Cf. Atti Esecutore, 17, cc. 33-33r; Atti Capitano, 12, c. 12.
8 In 1343, the maximum legal rate was established at 30 per cent. Cf. my article, “Walter of Brienne and the Regulation of Usury,” to be published in the Archivio storico italiano. In the year 1343, fifty individuals were operating as licensed pawnbrokers.
9 Atti Podestà, Reg. 1186, cc. 73–74. A certain Francischus Balduccii was fined for making loans at 41⅔ per cent interest per year for the purpose of gambling. His name does not appear among the licensed usurers. From 1349 to 1379 there were 141 licensed pawnbrokers in Florence whose names were recorded in the judicial records of the Commune.
10 Panella, A., “Politica ecclesiastica del commune fiorentino,” Archivio storico italiano, II, Part IV (1913), 281–283Google Scholar. The thesis of this article is that the lower guildsmen were responsible for the legislation against the church courts. There is, however, no study of the effect of this legislation on the pawnbrokers.
11 Villani, G., Cronaca, ed. F., Dragomanni (Florence, 1844), XII, 43Google Scholar.
12 Statuti XI, Book v, rub. 128.
13 Atti Podestà, Reg. 1525. The documents in this register are unnumbered. A man who claimed to be the victim of a usurious contract had his appeal rejected by the court of the bishop in January of 1360.
14 Provvisioni, 63, c. 73. The question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is outside the scope of this article. It is important to note, however, that because usury cases were de foro misto, they could be tried either in the secular or ecclesiastical courts. The officials of the Monte were in charge of the consolidated public debt of the Commune. Cf. Barbadoro, B., Le Finanze della republica fiorentina (Florence: Olschki, 1929), pp. 629–64Google Scholar.
15 Provvisioni, 65, cc. 119–20r.
16 ibid., 57, c. 12.
17 ibid., 59, c. 26.
18 ibid., 61, c. 74.
19 ibid., 65, cc. 121r-22r.
20 Bartolus Cambi's Monte credits were 558 florins in 1347. This placed him in the highest 5 per cent of the Commune's creditors. Monte, Santa Croce, c. 167. His name is not recorded among the licensed pawnbrokers. Several of his relatives were members of the Cambio. Perhaps he speculated in large-scale extralegal credit transactions.
21 In February of 1379 his son Cambio was listed as one of the principal creditors of the Republic. Cf. Prestanze, 388, c. 36r.
22 Provvisioni, 65, cc. 128–30r.
23 For a discussion of the action taken by the government on the payment of interest, see B. Barbadoro, Le Finanze, pp. 670–73.
24 Atti Esecutore, unnumbered volume (February 24, 1356). There is no record of a decision in this case.
25 This was the legal maximum of 30 per cent. Cf. note 8.
26 Provvisioni, 43, c. 93.
27 ibid., 57, c. 12.
28 For the difference between certa and incerta usury, see B. Nelson, “The Usurer and the Merchant Prince,” pp. 110–16.
29 When Florence and the papacy were on good terms, the Priorate required the approval of the Bishop of Florence or his procurator in cases involving the restitution of usury (certis et incertis). Provvisioni, 52, cc. 154—56r (May 12, 1365).
30 For an excellent article showing the extent to which the relations between church and state influenced Pisan legislative enactments concerning usury, see Cristiani, E., “Note sulla legislazione antiusuraria,” in the Bollettino storico pisano, XXII (1953), 3–53Google Scholar.
31 For material on the activities of the Monte officials at the end of the Trecento, see Sapori, A., Studi di storia economica medievale (2nd ed.; Florence: Sansoni, 1947), pp. 95–115Google Scholar.
32 Cf. note 30.