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Was the Bank Holiday of 1933 Caused by a Run on the Dollar?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Barrie A. Wigmore
Barrie A. Wigmore
Affiliation:
Partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co., 85 Broad Street, New York, NY 10004.
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Abstract

International, rather than domestic, causes of both the Bank Holiday of 1933 and the calm in the banking system that followed are emphasized here. New information on gold losses by the New York Federal Reserve, rather than domestic currency hoarding, serve to explain the Bank Holiday's specific timing. Expectations that Roosevelt would devalue the dollar stimulated much of the gold loss. I also argue that Roosevelt's restrictions on gold holdings and foreign exchange dealings and his devaluation of the dollar by 60 percent were more important to the stability of the banking system after the Bank Holiday than was deposit insurance.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , September 1987 , pp. 739 - 755
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1987

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