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The duration of an Athenian political trial

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2013

Ian Worthington
Ian Worthington
Affiliation:
The University of New England Armidale, Australia
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Extract

The procedures involved in, and duration of, Athenian trials have been the subject of much attention, and it is the communis opinio that a public trial in Athens lasted for one day only. Yet the evidence for this is mostly circumstantial and difficulties arise when one tries to reconcile a lengthy trial, as evidenced by the existence of very long speeches, with a one-day trial period. The purpose of this note is to question the standard view and to put forward the suggestion that certain trials could extend up to two or three days in length. By way of introduction we may summarize what evidence we have.

According to AP 67.1 only one public (as distinct from private) case per day was tried in a court of law and the modern assumption is that the issue had to be resolved by the end of that day. Therefore, the speeches of both prosecution and defence were of a fixed length of time and measured by the κλεψύδρα. This was a large amphora with a plugged hole at the bottom which was filled with water.

Type
Notes
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 109 , November 1989 , pp. 204 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1989

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References

1 See especially Rhodes, P. J., A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981) 719–28Google Scholar for detailed discussion and bibliography, to which add MacDowell, D. M., CQ2 xxxv (1985) 525–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 τυῦτα δέ ποιήσαντες είσκαλοῦσι τούς άγῶνας, ὀταν μέν τά ἳδια δικάʒωσι, τούς ιδίους, τῷ ἁριθμῷ δ [ἐ]ξ ἑκάστων τῶν δικῶν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, καί δ[ιο]μνύ[ουσι]ν οἰ ἀντίδικοι εἰς αὐτό τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐρεῖν.[ὅταν] δέ τά δημόσια, τοὺς δημοσίους, καί ἕν[α μόνον ἐ]κδικάʒουσι.

3 For example, Lipsius, J. H., Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig 1905) 915Google Scholar with n. 41, Harrison, A. R. W., The law of Athens ii (Oxford 1971) 161Google Scholar with n. 4, MacDowell, D. M., The law in classical Athens (London 1978) 249Google Scholar, Rhodes (n. 1) 719.

4 Harrison (n. 3) ii 162 with n. 1.

5 Lipsius (n. 3) 915; cf. Rhodes (n. 1) 726.

6 AP 67.4 with Aes. iii 197 and Harpocration, s.v. ‘διαμεμετρημένη ήμέρᾳ’, and see the discussion of Rhodes (n. 1) 722–3 and 726–8. MacDowell (n. 1), 526 argues convincingly for an emendation at AP 69.2 in order to make the time allowed for speeches on the assessment of the penalty half that for the speeches in the main trial. This does not affect my argument in this paper since even half of the normal time allotted can still point to extended trials in certain cases.

7 Cf. MacDowell (n.1) 250. For a further argument for the approximate reliability of Young's figures see Rhodes (n. 1) 721 and 726–7 with MacDowell (n. 1) 526.

8 See Rhodes (n. 1) 726–7 and MacDowell (n. 1) 525.

9 AP 67.3 with Rhodes (n. 1) 722.

10 Cf. Rhodes (n. 1) 721.

11 (n. 1) 49.

12 The speed of delivery of individual prosecutors would have varied of course. Keil (apud Rhodes [n. 1] 726) believed that he could deliver a 300 chapter speech in approximately two hours, but this would exclude any additional testimony required to be read out in court by both parties.

13 Additions to speeches after oral delivery and prior to circulation were normal. The logographos would have taken into account the defendant's speech, and also have included material which had not occurred to him at the time as well as lies and distortions of the facts which the jury might have recognised and even reacted against when the time came to vote. Sir Kenneth Dover's comment is apt here (in connection with Aes. ii and Dem. xix): ‘… a substantial gulf is opened between what was uttered and what was put into writing’: Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968) 169Google Scholar, and see also 167–9.

14 Rhodes (n. 1) 719.

15 However, see Harrison, (n. 3) 240 referring to Lipsius.

16 Perhaps it is significant, however, that when the second Arginousae assembly was held the entire case was reheard.

17 In Sparta it seemed that the senators took several days to decide on the penalty in capital cases: MacDowell, D. M., Spartan Law (Edinburgh 1986) 142–3Google Scholar. Professor Rhodes, to whom I owe this reference, points out per epistulam that if cases lasting more than a day in Sparta deserved comment in some ancient sources, then this may support the orthodox view that in Athens cases did not last for more than one day. I am not persuaded. What meagre evidence is cited by MacDowell (one piece is only a fragment and so the entire context is unknown) refers only to capital cases and does not seem to single out the Spartans for any ‘unusual’ judicial practices, and MacDowell disbelieves that cases in Sparta lasted for several days (ibid. 142–3). In fact, if Spartan senators did take days on end to decide the penalties how did the state prevent bribery?

18 There is a reference to τούς ήρημένους συνηγόρους in the trial of Antiphon: [Plut.] X.Or. 833 f.

19 I am grateful to Professor P.J. Rhodes for communicating with me on an earlier draft of this paper and to the anonymous referee for his suggestions.