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The humanitarian aspect of the Melian Dialogue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2013

A. B. Bosworth
A. B. Bosworth
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia Nedlands, WA 6009
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Extract

My title is deliberately provocative. What could be less humanitarian than the Melian Dialogue? For most readers of Thucydides it is the paradigm of imperial brutality, ranking with the braggadocio of Sennacherib's Rabshakeh in its insistence upon the coercive force of temporal power. The Melians are assured that the rule of law is not applicable to them. As the weaker party they can only accept the demands of the stronger and be content that they are not more extreme. Appeals to moral or religious norms are quite irrelevant, for in their position the Melians simply cannot afford them—as little as Mr. Doolittle could afford middle-class morality. The message is a hard one, and it has elicited outrage over the centuries from the majority of scholars (usually comfortable citizens of a colonial empire) who tend to prefer the καλὰ ὀνόματα of propaganda to the harsh underlying realities of imperial expansion. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing shortly after a war to protect western values had resulted in a new world order, finds it inconceivable that Athenian generals could discount divinely-inspired hope and insist on the imperative of force or that the Melians, that tiny state, would prefer the nobler to the safer course. In this he is echoed by George Grote, writing in the expansionist days of the early nineteenth century: ‘a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea, if he can—a false plea or a sham plea if he has not better’. Instead, says Grote, the Athenian envoy ‘disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy’; and the inevitable conclusion for him, as it had been for Dionysius, is that the Dialogue is fundamentally bogus, a composition of Thucydides ‘to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis’.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 113 , November 1993 , pp. 30 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1993

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References

1 For bibliography to 1970 see William C. West III, in Stadter, P. A., The speeches in Thucydides (Chapel Hill 1973) 158–60Google Scholar (there is also a review of scholarship in Cagnazzi, S., La spedizione ateniese contro Melo del 416 a.C. [Bari 1983] 85–90).Google Scholar I have found most helpful the two treatments by the late Andrewes, A.: ‘The Melian Dialogue and Perikles' last speech’, PCPS NS vi (1960) 1–10Google Scholar, and in Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A. and Dover, K. J., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (hereafter, HCT) iv (Oxford 1970) 155–92Google Scholar (Andrewes' comments are interlaced with—and usually subvert—the original notes by Gomme). See also Deininger, G., Der Melier-Dialog (Erlangen-Bruck 1939)Google Scholar; de Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian imperialism (trans. Thody, P.: Oxford 1963) 273–310Google Scholar; Liebeschuetz, W., ‘Structure and function of the Melian Dialogue’, JHS lxxxviii (1968) 73–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Macleod, C. W., ‘Form and meaning in the Melian Dialogue’, Historia xxiii (1974) 385–400Google Scholar = Collected Essays (Oxford 1983) 52–67. This material will be referred to by author's name. Other literature will be cited as it is relevant.

2 The most recent addition to the literature, Canfora, L., Tucidide e l'impero (Bari 1992)Google Scholar, begins with a comparison between the Melian Dialogue and the Rabshakeh's intervention at Jerusalem (5–10).

3 ‘Few can read the Dialogue with comfort’ wrote Andrewes, (PCPS vi [1960] 9).Google Scholar The typical verdict is that of Liebeschuetz: ‘An outstanding feature of the Melian Dialogue is the repulsive’ (so Andrewes) ‘form in which the Athenian arguments are expressed. They characterise the Athenians as bullying and arrogant to the weak, boundlessly self-confident, lacking humility even towards the gods’. See also the remarkable effusion of Strasburger, Hermann, Studien zu alten Geschichte (Hildesheim 1982) ii 993Google Scholar, who has the Athenians ‘brainwash’ the Melians by a dialectical destruction of their intellectual and moral foundations and finds consolation in their failure (‘einiger Trost, dass sie nicht gelingt’).

4 Dion. Hal. Th. 40–41; cf. Pritchett, W. K., Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides (Berkeley 1975) 32–4Google Scholar (note the quotation of B. E. Perry at 126 n. 12).

5 I quote from the edition of 1862 (London, John Murray): v 101–3.

6 HCT iv 186, slightly modifying his earlier position (PCPS vi [1960] 5, 9–10). Compare too De Romilly 297, arguing that the Athenians present the ‘basic essence’ of imperialism: ‘They go beyond the Athenians of 416 and reach the very basis of imperialism, with the fixed intention of explaining the laws which govern its development.’ The same view is expressed by Deininger 51–81, esp. 61.

7 Notably the stress on fear as a motive force for imperialism (cf. i 75.3–5; ii 63.1–2; iii 37.2, 40.4; vi 18.2–3; vi 85.1, 87.1–2). De Romilly 289–90 makes much of the restriction of the motivation to fear, but fails to note its particular relevance to the situation of the Melians.

8 Coined (apparently) by Gehrke, H. J., Jenseits von Athen und Sparta: Das dritte Griechenland und seine Staatenwelt (Munich 1986).Google Scholar Cf. Whitehead, David, Aineias the Tactician (Oxford 1990) 2–4.Google Scholar

9 Th. iii 36.5–6. Thucydides implies (36.2) that the initial vote of condemnation was carried in a mood of anger, and the debate may not have been as subtle as its sequel. But contrary opinions were voiced and Cleon's proposal was approved (ἐνενικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι). Thucydides, had he wishes, could have restricted the debate to the merits of execution and enslavement—but Cleon would have ended as victor.

10 Th. vi 8.2–4 (cf. vi 6.2–3). See Kohl, W., Die Redetrias vor der sikilischen Expedition (Meisenheim am Glan 1977)Google Scholar for full discussion of the content of the speeches.

11 Th. v 84.1–2. Thucydides names the generals and gives the Athenian and allied contingents. He also recapitulates Melos' history of neutrality, which had resulted in Athens ravaging her land in the past (e.g. by Nicias in 426 — a rather desultory operation by a force intended for action elsewhere [iii 91.1–4 with Andrewes' comment at HCT iv 156 n. 1]) and ultimately in a state of war. What the state of war amounted to or what Athens' specific grievances were (ἀδικούμενοι νῦν: v 89) Thucydides does not say, and he did not consider it important. What mattered was the military situation of the Melians, and he leaves that in no doubt.

12 I assume that the envoys at Melos were private emissaries sent by the generals, much as Cleon in 422 sent his own delegates to do business with the dynasts of Macedon and Thrace (Th. v 6.2). However, as Simon Hornblower has observed (in conversation and correspondence), the envoys are later termed ambassadors of the Athenians (v 84.3, 114.1). That might suggest that they had been instructed by the Council of Five Hundred, not the generals on the spot, and had some latitude in negotiation. But Thucydides expresses himself quite unambiguously: ‘before inflicting any damage on the land the generals sent envoys to make representation first’. If these envoys were commissioned by the Athenian state, his wording is perversely misleading. On the other hand, as envoys of the generals, they were ipso facto representatives of the Athenians in the invasion force (cf. 84.1: Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν) and are quite properly termed envoys of the Athenians. Indeed, if the Council did send an official delegation, one would expect it at an earlier stage. Once the expedition was launched, there were precise instructions from the demos, which the generals were obliged to implement (cf. Th. iii 3.1, 4.2 on the outbreak of hostilities at Mytilene).

13 From Hobbes' address to his readers. I am quoting from vol. viii of The English works of Thomas Hobbes (ed. SirMolesworth, William: London 1843) xxix.Google Scholar Hobbes' observation is not unique. De Romilly (273), for instance, begins with a concise statement of the context of the dialogue(‘to obtain the surrender of the island’), which she then largely ignores for its ‘wider and more general significance’. So too Amit, M., ‘The Melian Dialogue and history’, Athenaeum xlvi (1968) 216–35Google Scholar, esp. 234–5 (arguing that the Melians then get the better of the debate). The closest approximation I can find to the position expressed by Hobbes and defended in this paper is de Ste Croix, G.E.M., The origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 13–16, 21–2Google Scholar (see also Andrewes, , HCT iv 185, para. 5).Google Scholar

14 Th. ii 70.2–4 (Potidaea). A still more apposite case is that of the fourth century general, Callisthenes, who made a unilateral truce with Perdiccas of Maced and was impeached and executed for his pains (Hansen, M. H., Eisangelia [Odense 1975] 93–4).Google Scholar See in general the comments of Sinclair, R. K., Democracy and participation in Athens (Cambridge 1988) 146–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 As did Nicias at Syracuse (Th. viii 48.3). The behaviour of the demos was not the sole factor in his refusal, but it was undeniably important (cf. vii 14.4).

16 ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἕχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς (v 111.4).

17 Th. vi 84–6. Note the summary at vi 86.3 (we cannot remain in Sicily without your help and we could not hold you in subjugation because of the distance involved; while you have the continuing threat of your powerful neighbour and will succumb if we depart). See also n. 50, below.

18 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις λέγειν ἐκέλευον (v 84.3). Nothing is known of the constitution of Melos or the numbers involved in the oligarchy (cf. Andrewes, , HCT iv 159Google Scholar). The Melian participants are more likely to have numbered dozens rather than hundreds, but even so there would be enough to ensure that the details of the debate were widely known.

19 Xen. Hell. vi 5.4. For the background see Moggi, M., I sinecismi interstatali greci (Pisa 1976) 251–6Google Scholar and my remarks in ‘Αὐτονομία: the use and abuse of political terminology’, SIFC cvi (1992) 123–53, esp. 139–40.

20 The Athenians imply that the assembly (or rather, the commons) would be attracted by their arguments (v 85). That is no doubt true and is supported (but not confirmed) by the fact that there was later treachery in the city (v 116.3: cf. HCT iv 190).

21 v 111.4–5. Even Gomme, (HCT iv 179)Google Scholar conceded that ‘there is almost a sincerity in this appeal’. That puts it rather churlishly.

22 v 102–10, neatly summarised at v 112.

23 E.g. De Romilly 294; Liebeschuetz 75 (‘Thucydides has deliberately drawn the Athenians as wrong and deluded’); Amit, , Athenaeum xlvi (1968) 234Google Scholar (‘in the rhetorical contest it was the Melians who had the upper hand’); Macleod 391–3; Hussey, E., ‘Thucydidean history and Democritean theory’ in Crux: Essays in Greek history presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix (ed. Cartledge, P. and Harvey, F. D.: London 1985) 118–38Google Scholar, esp. 127. A very different picture emerges if one accepts Cagnazzi's reorganisation of the Dialogue (above, n. 1, 10–28), which ascribes v 86–7 to the Melians and v 88–91 in toto to the Athenians. On this reading (which is very hard to swallow) the Athenians begin politely and in conciliatory vein, only to encounter rudeness and intransigence from the Melians (Cagnazzi 29–41).

24 This is well discussed by Macleod (389–90), emphasising the emotive quality of the language but rather understating the force of the Athenian case. The Athenians do not ‘gloss over the fact that survival entails enslavement’. One could object that the Melians gloss over the fact that surrender guaranteed their survival as a civic entity. It was slavery only in the most metaphorical sense, whereas resistance could—and did—bring slavery in its fullest form. In fact no Athenian speaker in Thucydides calls submission to empire δουλεία, though it is conceded that it was a restriction upon ἐλευθερία. In certain circumstances it could be seen as release from actual δουλεία (cf. vi 20.2; vi 82.4).

25 The Athenians dismiss the Melians' foreboding of impending slavery as supposition about the future (ύπονοίας τῶν μελλόντων). That can hardly refer to the terms of settlement which are clearly stated at v 111.4 (above, n. 16); it is what the terms would mean in practice. There is to be no speculation about the limits of autonomy under Athenian rule. The issue at present is security and the practicality of resistance.

26 v 89. See the full discussion below, p.39.

27 See particularly iii 53.3 (adduced by Deininger 10 n. 15): καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ὧδ᾿ ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἂν παράσχοι ώς, εἰ ἐλέχθη, σωτήριος ἂν ἦν. Cf. Macleod, C. W., ‘Thucydides' Plataean debate’, GRBS xviii (1977) 227–46Google Scholar, esp. 222–8 = Collected Essays 103–4.

28 I am not here concerned with the evergreen controversy whether the passage was written in the light of Athens' final defeat in 404 (for the issues see the recent discussion by Rawlings, Hunter R. III, The structure of Thucydides' history [Princeton 1981] 243–9Google Scholar, arguing that the Dialogue would have been structurally central in Thucydides' completed work). Andrewes, (PCPS vi [1960] 3–4Google Scholar; HCT iv 166–7) seems to me correct in emphasising that the thought is quite consistent with composition during the war, before Athens' downfall. Thucydides seems to envisage a disjunction between defeat by Sparta and defeat by insurgent allies and has the Athenians arguing that the first alternative is the more likely. He is not even raising the possibility of coalition between Sparta and Athens' former subjects (cf. Rawlings 244–5, n. 43). The most favoured scenario is probably defeat of Athens in a land war, as the Peloponnesian League had intended during the Archidamian War; she might be forced to surrender while her empire was intact. In that case there is no necessity to conclude that Thucydides had the events of 404 in his mind.

29 v 92. The language (χρήσιμον … δουλεῦσαι … ἄρξαι) is a deliberate echo of the Athenians' last distinction (v 91.2), except that δουλεῦσαι is deliberately substituted for σωθῆναι (cf. Macleod 390).

30 v 93. ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ύμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἄν. This seems a clear statement (pace de Ste Croix [above, n. 13] 21) that the Athenians envisaged the total destruction of Melos if she resisted annexation (cf. iii 56.6 δέδιμεν μὴ διαφθαρῶμεν).

31 μόνοι γε. This is not simply unreal exaggeration (Andrewes, , HCT iv 181).Google Scholar The Athenians do not imply that other people have not been equally deluded. Their emphasis is on the present deliberations. The Melians are uniquely perverse in cherishing their fantasy even after it has been exploded by every rational argument.

32 See (e.g.) Finley, J. H., Thucydides (Cambridge 1942) 211CrossRefGoogle Scholar, comparing the Athenians' insistence that humans believe that the gods endorse the rule of force (v 105.2—hardly ‘superior power sanctions any conduct’ [my italics], with the general statement at iii 82.6 that ‘belief in divine law vanished’ (again a misrepresentation).

33 iv 108.4, echoing the Athenian remarks at v 103.2, 111.2–3 and 113.

34 iv 108.5 (cf. 88.1); compare vi 8.1 (ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθη) with v 85 and 111.3.

35 iv 85.5, 87.2–5 (cf. 87.5: ὰδικοῖμεν, εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ὲπιφέροντες ὑμας τοὺς ὲναντι–ουμένους περιίδοιμεν). There is also an echo of the Athenian arguments at v 95–7 when Brasidas insists that it would fatally weaken the Spartan cause if the first city he approached failed to respond (iv 85.6).

36 iv 114.3 (Torone); 120.3 (Scione); v 9.9.

37 iv 120.3: ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ νησιῶται αὐταπάγγελτοι ὲχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριαν. This fatally echoes and inverts the Athenian declaration at Melos (v 97) and recalls Cleon's indictment of Mytilene (iii39.2). It comes as no surprise that Cleon proposed slaughter and enslavement for Scione (iv 122.6).

38 iv 123.4. The evacuation was apparently far from complete (cf. v 32.1).

39 iv 123.4, 129.3. The Athenian expeditionary force comprised 50 triremes and a fighting force of some 3,000 (Athenian hoplites, archers, Thracian mercenaries and local peltasts)—not perhaps of high calibre but far outnumbering the defenders. Brasidas had taken 3,000 hoplites into Macedon (iv 124.1) and irreparably weakened the resistance to Athens in Pallene.

40 iv 130.6–7. Mende had revolted at a significantly later date than Scione (iv 123.1–2) and should have incurred the same sanctions (πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες: 123.3). Her comparatively lenient treatment must have given some hope at Scione.

41 Hdt. viii 48 (penteconters at Salamis). For a highly speculative calculation of the Melian population (based on Thucydides'; statement [v 116.4] that 500 Athenian colonists occupied its land) see Renfrew, C. and Wagstaff, M. (eds.), An island polity (Cambridge 1982) 140–5Google Scholar with the criticisms of Sanders, G. D. R., ‘Reassessing ancient populations’, ABSA lxxix (1984) 251–62.Google Scholar

42 HCT iv 162–3, 175, 178, 182. See also Deininger 123–30; Macleod 387–92 (citing earlier literature) with GRBS xviii (1977) 233 n. 12; Ostwald, M., From popular sovereignty to the sovereignty of law (Berkeley 1986) 307–10.Google Scholar Others (e.g. de Romilly 298–307 and Andrewes) are much more sceptical.

43 Macleod, for instance, draws formal parallels with the sophistic techniques used by Dionysodorus and Euthydemus against Socrates, but he makes the important concession (391) that the methods are ‘analogous’: Thucydides is doing in the sphere of practical reason what the sophists are doing in logic. I do not accept that. The Athenians do indeed replace one emotive vocabulary with another (see above, p.34), but they do not insist upon a definition of the terms which will automatically bring them victory. Their restriction of the debate to the question of utility derives from the logic of the situation, the military necessity to win capitulation, not from any adaptation of eristic theory. See also Hussey (above, n. 23) 126: ‘The Melian dialogue … is not much of a dialogue.’

44 The parallel is iv 22.1, where the Spartan envoys of 425 propose a conclave to discuss possible conditions of peace, each side quietly discussing the individual terms (καθ᾿ ἡσυχίαν is echoed later at v 86). Admittedly there is a world of difference between ‘haggling over detail’ (HCT iv 159) and debating the survival of a sovereign state. But the fact remains that the Spartans were more comfortable in a restricted forum and felt that they could do fullest justice to their case. The Melians may well have had similar reactions.

45 This does not of course imply that justice only subsists between powers of approximately equal magnitude, as is commonly alleged (cf. von Fritz, K., Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung i [Berlin 1967] 719Google Scholar: ‘von Recht immer nur zwischen einigermassen Gleichmächtigen die Rede sein könne’). Even Deininger (99), for all his sensitive and perceptive handling of the passage, maintains that ‘Recht an ein gewisses Gleichgewicht der Macht … gebunden ist.’

46 The classic discussion is of course Arist. NE v 1131 a 11 ff. See also Pol. iii 1280 a 11 (δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δί καιον εἶναι), 1282 b 18. The corollary is that justice subsists between individuals who are to some degree equal and not between those who are blatantly unequal, as slaves and their owners (cf. Plato, Laws vi 757A).Google Scholar

47 This is a pervasive assumption. Cf. Andrewes, , HCT iv 163Google Scholar (‘the Athenians do assimilate the relation between an imperial power and its subjects to the relation between master and slave’); de Romilly 298 (‘justice … can play a part only when two equally strong’ [my italics] ‘adversaries stand face to face’; Ostwald, M., ΑΝΑΓΚΗ in Thucydides (Atlanta 1988) 58Google Scholar (‘arguments from justice are eclipsed when one side is stronger than the other’, see, however, 41, 54, where the text is given its proper force).

48 As Thucydides makes crystal clear at v 14–16, which is a perfect illustration of the general principle (cf. Deininger 102). The necessity was not equal for the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans and Megarians, who refused the peace (v 17.2).

49 iv 21.3. Thucydides observes that the Athenians themselves had made concessions in 446 because of their need for peace (cf. i 115.1)—ἴση ἀνάγκη again.

50 One might also adduce Euphemus'; explanation of the autonomy of the western islanders (vi 85.2): their security demands alliance with Athens and their strategic position protects their autonomy. Similar considerations advise alliance between Athens and Camarina (cf. vi 87.4: ἀμφότεροι ἀναγκάζονται, ὁ μὲν ἄκων σωφρονεῖν, ὁ δ᾿ ἀπραγμόνως σῴζεσθαι—a somewhat different emphasis).

51 ὅσιοι πρὸς οὑ δικαίους (V 104), on which see Andrewes' note ad loc.

52 i 72.2. The parallel passages were adduced by de Romilly 304–5 (cf. Ostwald [above, n. 47] 41), who draws attention to the rarity of the sentiments in Thucydides' work. Perhaps one answer would be the rarity of the situation which called for such bluntness.

53 HCT iv 174. See also Deininger 105–7; de Romilly 299–300; de Ste. Croix (above, n. 13) 15; Erbse, H., Thukydides-Interpretationen (Berlin 1989) 107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The common misreading of the Dialogue had begun by the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus: ‘The Athenian generals … introduced the law of violence and greed and declared that for the weak justice is the will of the stronger’ (Th. 41, cf. Pritchett [above, n. 3] 34).

54 That (or the feebler sentiment that it is proper for the best to rule) is what underlies Democritus' statement φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήιον τῷ κρέσσονι (B 267 DK6, adduced by Ostwald [above, n. 42] 308). I do not think that Democritus influenced Thucydides. Both probably drew upon a common stock of popular belief. Similarly, when Democritus claims that men construct the image of chance to excuse their own failure to plan (B 119, adduced by Hussey [above, n. 23] 121), he may be echoing the Athenian message to the Melians but it is nothing more than sound common sense.

55 Although he disapproves of the thought, Aristotle admits that most people consider despotic rule acceptable in an international context (Pol. vii 1324 b 5–42); and he mentions the admiration for Sparta voiced by Thibron and other writers because her training produced a large empire (Pol. vii 1333 b 12–22). But even he concedes the basic drive to rule and approves it if military training is used ‘to seek hegemony for the benefit of the subjects, not the despotic rule of all mankind’ (1333 b 38–34 a 2). In its most extended form the principle that one rules whatever one has power over is practically a truism. Cf. Galen, de plac. Hippocr. et Plat. 3.3.5 (v.302–3 Kühn: ἅρχειν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι καὶ κρατεῖν ἐστι δικαιότερον τὸ φύσει κρεῖττον, ἱππεὺς μὲν ἵππου κτλ.

56 iv 61.5. The Plataeans also refer to the universally accepted law that it is proper (ὅσιον) to resist aggression (iii 56.2; cf. Macleod, , GRBS xviii [1977] 223Google Scholar). See Dem. viii 7 for the same sentiment.

57 v 101. This is a very different sentiment from the statement at v 89 that justice obtains where there is equal compulsion. The Athenians are saying that the contest has different objectives for the two sides. For the Athenians questions of honour may be at issue, but for the Melians it is a matter of survival.

58 Compare Nicias' comments at vi 11.6. The Plataeans too refer to the Spartans as the paradigm of ἀνδρ–αγαθία for the Greek world (iii 57.1).

59 Hes. Op. 210–11; Hom. Il. ii 247. See also the parallels adduced by West, M. L., Hesiod: Works and Days (Oxford 1978) 209.Google Scholar

60 Aen. Tact. pref. 3. Cf. Whitehead (above, n. 8) 45, 98–9.

61 Polyb. xxxviii 3.7 (ἀτυχεῖν δὲ μόνους τούτους οἶς διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀβουλίαν ὅνειδος αἱ πρά–ξεις ἐπιφέρουσι) The whole context (xxxviii 1–3) is instructive. For the crowning instance of unreasoning folly see Polyb. i 37.6. Polybius, it should be noted, is not wholly consistent and can write with admiration of acts of desperate resistance (xvi 22a.5: Gaza against Alexander; xvi 32.1–6, 33.4: Abydus against Philip V). At the same time he laments the perversity of fortune (xvi 32.5) and clearly feels that virtue should have been rewarded against all the odds. It is an implicit admission that the events were instances of ἀτυχία, and his encomium is inappropriate.

62 ii 42.4 with Demosthenes' more vivid exhortations at iv 10.1. In both cases these men in action could be said to draw on hope ἐκ περιουσίας (v 103.1)

63 Hes. Op. 498–501; Theogn. 637–8. For further examples see de Romilly 292 and West (above, n. 59) 169. The topos is fully investigated by Corcella, A., ‘Ἑλπίς’ Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia a Bari xxvii/xxviii (1984/1985) 41–100.Google Scholar

64 v 115.4 (resulting in a large haul of foodstuffs), 116.2. Aristophanes (Av. 186—produced in spring 414) speaks of ‘Melian hunger’ as proverbial (cf. HCT iv 189–90).

65 There is a tradition that Alcibiades was in some way connected with the decree, either supporting it (Plut. Alc. 16.5–6) or moving it ([Andoc.] iv 22). We have no means of control and the detail is somewhat suspect (HCT iv 190–1: Ellis, W. M., Alcibiades [London 1989] 49–50).Google Scholar Ostwald (above, n. 42) 310–12 suggests that Teisias was closely associated with Alcibiades, which ‘explains the amoral and highly intellectualized justification of imperialism that we find in the Melian Dialogue.’

66 The ‘city’ (located at modern Rhitsona) was too small to be listed among the Boeotian contingents at Delium (iv 93.4) or in the later list of communities in the Boeotian League (Hell. Ox. 16.3 [Bartoletti]). For the site and relevant testimonia see Fossey, John M., Topography and population of ancient Boeotia (Chicago 1988) 80–5.Google Scholar

67 vii 29.5: καὶ ξυμφορὰ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ ούδεμιᾶς ἤσσων μᾶλλον έτέρας ἀδόκητός τε ἐπέπεσεν αὔτη καὶ δεινή. The positioning of ἀδόκητος is emphatic; the disaster was more unexpected than any other and horrific as well (see Dover's, note at HCT iv 409Google Scholar, underplaying the factor of unexpectedness).

68 That is explicit at vii 30.3: τῶν δὲ Μυκαλησσίων μέρος τι ἀπανηλώθη.

69 Thucydides (vii 29.3) goes to some pains to illustrate this, stressing the secrecy of the Thracian approach, the distance of Mycalessus from the sea and the peaceful conditions which the town had hitherto enjoyed.

70 So Dover, , HCT iv 410Google Scholar.

71 As suggested by Gomme, , HCT iv 178–9Google Scholar (and approved by Andrewes) and many others (notably Connor, W. R., Thucydides [Princeton 1984] 155–7).Google Scholar

72 On migration (to Siris in Italy) see Hdt. viii 62 and on the possibility of capitulation viii 136.2, 140–4; ix 4–9.

73 Hdt. viii 66.2 (forces for Xerxes); 112.2 (indemnity paid to Themistocles): 121.1 (ravaging of Carystian land). The Carystians were left with no love for Athens and had to be dragooned into the Delian League. It required a war (πόλεμος), but once more the Carystians capitulated before it was too late (Th. i 98.3; cf. Meiggs, R., The Athenian empire [Oxford 1972] 69–70).Google Scholar

74 iv 10.1. It should, however, be noted that Demosthenes goes on to enumerate the practical advantages of the Athenian position (10.2: τὰ πλείω όρῶ πρὸς ήμῶν ὅντα). Cf. Gomme, , HCT iii 446Google Scholar.

75 viii 27.2–3: οὐδέποτε τῷ αἰσχρῷ ὀνείδει εἴξας ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύσειν, exactly the Athenians' advice at v 111.3, expressed in almost identical words.

76 viii 27.6–28.5. For the recall see viii 54.3 (with 48.4).

77 viii 27.5, on which see Andrewes', detailed discussion at HCT v 65–7.Google Scholar