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Contractarian ideology and the legitimacy of government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2020

Randall G. Holcombe Open the ORCID record for Randall G. Holcombe [Opens in a new window]
Randall G. Holcombe*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL32306, USA
*
Corresponding author. Email: holcombe@fsu.edu
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Abstract

Social contract theory depicts a constitutional contract as the result of a hypothetical agreement among society's members to escape a prisoners' dilemma situation. It depicts citizens as political equals agreeing to be forced into a cooperative strategy rather than a socially suboptimal strategy that gives them the highest personal payoff. Government is the organization that forces everyone to cooperate. However, citizens can never bargain as political equals. An elite few design the rules, and others are forced to comply with them. The contractarian ideology that depicts government as acting in the general public interest legitimizes the actions of government, giving those elite few who hold government power a greater ability to use it to further their own interests, often at the expense of the masses. Within the context of a prisoners' dilemma game, contractarian ideology leads to an outcome that is socially suboptimal, but beneficial for the political elite.

Keywords

Social contract; prisoners' dilemmalegitimacy of governmentThomas HobbesJohn Locke, Jean Jacques RousseauJohn RawlsJames M. Buchanan
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , June 2021 , pp. 379 - 391
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2020

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