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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
A Lesson of the Reagan years is that a workable consensus between Congress and the presidency is essential to the execution of an effective and sustainable foreign policy. In a democracy, no consensus ever will be absolute; but if there is not at least general agreement on both the goals and the means to be employed, almost any policy is likely to fail. For instance, divisiveness undermined Reagan administration designs on Nicaragua. For a policy to succeed, a workable consensus must precede any long-term commitment of US resources, troops, or prestige.
Furthermore, even if a consensus is achieved, the goals and the means employed to attain them must be realistic. The experience of US policy in Panama exemplifies this. Uniting such diverse figures as neo-conservative Reagan administration official Elliott Abrams, ultra-conservative Senator Jesse Helms, and liberal Senator John Kerry, the US objective of ousting General Noriega enjoyed extensive bipartisan support.