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The Failure of Democracy in Argentina 1916–1930: An Institutional Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Anne L. Potter
Anne L. Potter
Affiliation:
The author thanks Professors Richard Fagen, Gabriel Almond, George Lanyi, and Harlen Wilson for comments on an earlier draft of this article. She also thanks the Amreican Association of University Women, the Organization of American States and the National Science Foundation for the financial support that made possible the research on which this article is based
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Extract

This article draws attention to the importance of institutional structures to the stability opf demoratic regimes through an examination of the failure of democracy in the case of Argentina between 1912 and 1930. The analysis of a single case does not make a theory. but it seems clear that a focus on the Argentine case does force one to look at institutional factors that have largely been neglected in recent research.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , May 1981 , pp. 83 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1981

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References

1 All the above figures are found in Dario, Cantón, Elecciones y partidos políticos en la Argentina: Historia, interpretatión y balanace, 1910–1966 (Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI, 1973), p. 45.Google Scholar

2 Peter Smith has pointed out that the Sáenz Peña reform was actually more restrictive than these figures would indicate. Due to the high proportion of unnaturalized immigrants in the Argentine population and to the fact that voting rights were granted only to naturalized citizens, Smith estimates that only 40–45 percent of the adult male population was actually enfranchised in 1914. To draw from this the conclusion that the ‘suffrage was effectively extended from the upper class to selected segments of the middle class, to the distinct disadvantage of the lower class, especilly the urban working class’ seems, however, unduly harsh. Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict Among Political Elites (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1914, p. 11. (Emphasis in the original.)Google Scholar

3 Polyarchy: Participation and opposition (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971), Chapter 1.Google Scholar

4 The only other periods of Argentine history that approximate this situatin are the 1962 congressional and gubernatorial elections in which the Peronist party was allowed to run candidates for the first time since Perón's overthrow in 1955, and the second Peronist interlude that began in 1973. Both these periods were terminated by military intervention.

5 See Seymour, Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,’ American Political Science Review, 53 (03 1959);Google ScholarSeymour, Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 27–63;Google ScholarPhilips, Cutright, ‘National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis, American Sociological Review 27 (04 1963);Google ScholarDean, Neubeuer, ‘Some Conditions of Democracy’ American Political Science Review, 59 12 1967).Google Scholar

6 Smith, Peter H., ‘The Breakdown of Democracy in Argentina, 1916–1930’ Paper prepared for delivery at the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, 14–19 09 1970, p. 2.Google Scholar See also Dahl, , op. cit., p. 134.Google Scholar For comprehensive critiques of the hypothesis that economic development and social mobilization cause democratic political development, Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968),Google Scholar and Guillermo, O'Donnel, Moidernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973, Chapter 1.Google Scholar

7 Op. cit.

8 Gino, Germani, Política y sociedad en un época de transición (Buenos Aires, Paidos, 1974), p. 310.Google Scholar

9 Whitaker, Arthur P., Argentina (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 59.Google Scholar

10 Scobie, James R., Argentina: A City and A Nation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 154, 170.Google Scholar

11 Aldo, Ferrer, La economia argentina (Mexico City and Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1963), pp. 132–3.Google Scholar

12 Adolfo Dorfman, Historia de la industria argentina, Quoted in José, Panetteri, Los Trabajadores (Buenos Aires, Editorial Jorge Alvarez, S. A., 1967), p. 201.Google Scholar

13 Germani, , op. cit., p. 269.Google Scholar

14 Ibid., p. 250.

15 Ibid., p. 281. The minimal number of naturalized immigrants is due largely to the fact that unnaturalized residents were not subject to military conscription.

16 The first influential proponent of this thesis that the Radical party was a ‘middle sector’ party was Johnson, John J., Political Changes in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sector (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 94–127.Google Scholar

17 Ezequiel, Gello and Silvia, Sigal, ‘La formación de los partidos políticos contemporáneos:a UCR (1890–1916)’ in Torcuato, di Tella (ed.), Argentina, Sociedad de masas (Beunos Aires, EUDEBA, 1965), pp. 124–76.Google Scholar

18 This thesis is well argued by Peter Smith in relation to Radical policies towards the beef sector. See ‘Los Radicales argentions y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916–1930,’ Desarrollo Económico VII (04–06 1967), pp. 795–829,Google Scholar and Smith, , Carne y polótica en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, Paidos, 1968), pp. 125–31. (Originaltitle in English, Politics and Beef in Argentina) David Rock has critiqued Smith' conclusions that Radical policies toward the repression of strikes were consistently favourable toward the agrarian interests represented by the Sociedad Rural.Google Scholar See Politics in Argentina, 1890–1930: The Rise and Fall of Radicalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 288–300, but the substance of Smith's argument still stands. The thesis is also sup orted by Carl Solberg's analysis of the policies of Radical government toward strikes in the wheat producing region. ‘Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in Argentina, 1912–1930,’ Journal of Inter-American Studies, No. 13 01 1971), pp. 18–52.Google Scholar

19 ‘The Breakdown of Democracy,’ op.cit., pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

20 Banco de la Nación Argentina, Revista económica II, No. 11 (11 1929), pp. 222–3.Google Scholar

21 During 1929, Argentina lost a total of 173.3 million dollars in gold, 64 percent of it before the Wall Street crash of October. Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Bekeley, University of California Press, 1973), p. 102.Google Scholar

22 Between 1929 and 1930 imports declined by 123 million gold pesos. Great Britain Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in the Argentine Republic, October 31, 1931 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1932), p. 26.Google Scholar

23 Great Britain Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in the Argentine Republic, 1930 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931), p. 12.Google Scholar A report prepared by the Banco de la Nación Argentina describes the situation in September of 1930 as follows: …the national budget shows a deficit of approximately 698 million pesos moneda nacional. Of this, 395 million correspond to public works carried out without the proper emission of the public titles that the law authorizes, and 303 million correspond to administrative expenses. It has been necessary to resort, therefore, to the ample use of [bank] credit, be it in the form of direct loans [to the government] or [in the form of loans] that the suppliers of the government have found themselves obligated to request in the face of numerous requests for payment from the government that remain unpaid.’ Revista económica, III (09 1930), p. 142.Google Scholar

24 Provincial President Jos; Félix Uriburu cited this fact in a speech delivered on 13 December 1930. [Anonymous], La obra de la revolución (Buenos Aires, Talleres Gráficos de Linari y cía., n.d.), pp. 35–40.Google Scholar

25 Op. cit., passim.

26 Manuel, Gálvea, Vida de Hipólito Yrigoyen (Bnenos Aires, Editorial Tor, n.d.), pp. 327–8Google Scholar

27 Diario de sesiones del Honorable Cćmara de Diputados de la Nación, 1903 Vol. 1 (12 06 1930), pp. 32–5. Henceforth, DSCD.Google Scholar

28 See La Nación, 06 17, 19, 22, 26, 29, 1930 and DSCD, 1930, Vol. 1 (27 06 1930), p. 268.Google Scholar

29 Ibid., 1930, Vol. 1 (July 16, 1930), p. 5000.

30 The roll-call votes are in ibid., 1930, Vol.s (08 and 29–30, 1930), pp. 77 and 627.

31 Even Yrigoyen's admirers and apologists admit that this was the case. See Félix, Luna, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires, Editorial Desarrollo, n.d.), pp. 353–4, and Roberto Etchepareborda, ‘La segunda presidencia de Hipólito Yrigoyen y Ia crisis de 1930.’ in Academia Naciónal de Ia Historia, Historia Argentina contemporanca, Vol. 1, part 2, ‘Historia de las presidencias’ (Buenos Aires, El Atenco, 2965), p. 359.Google Scholar

32 See Roberto, Etchepareborda, ‘Aspectos políticos de la crisis de 1930,’ Revista de Historia, No. 3 (1958), pp. 36–7; ‘La segunda presidencia Hipólito Yrigoyen y la crisis de 1930,’ op. cit., pp. 367–8,Google Scholar and Luna, , op. cit., pp. 362–4.Google Scholar

33 Menzorias sobre la revolución del 6 de septiembre de 1930 (Buenos Aires, Ediciones Cure, 1957), pp. 83–92.Google Scholar

34 Revista de historia, op. cit., pp. 109–11.Google Scholar

35 The best account of these factors is Robert, Potash, El ejército y la politica en la Argentina 1928–1945 (Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1971), pp. 75–89.Google Scholar Published in English as The Army and Politics in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

36 Huntington, , op. cit., p. 794.Google Scholar

37 See Sarobe, op. cit., and Juan Domingo Perón, ‘Algunos apuntes en borredor sobre: lo que yo ví de la preparación y realización de la revolución del 6 de septiembre de 1930.’ in ibid., pp. 281–310.

38 Ibid., p. 293.

39 Ibid., pp. 282–93.

40 Ibid., pp. 293–4.

41 Perón says of this plan: ‘I can imagine the luck of these ten or twenty men in the truck…, when on stopping in front of Yrigoyen's house the machine guns installed on Scarlatto's roof and in Yrigoyen's own house opened fire and received them with gunshots. While the sections of the Grenadiers who spent the night at Scarlatto's house arrived. And all for what? Perhaps Yrigoyen was so valuable,’ ibid., p. 286.

42 Perón makes some extremely disparaging comments concerning the meetings of the general staff. ibid., p. 287.

43 Sarobe's account of this meeting is in ibid., pp. 115–22.

44 Ibid., pp. 160–1 n.I.

45 ‘The Breakdown of Democracy,’ op. cit., and Argentina and the Failure of Democracy, op. cit., pp. 90–8.Google Scholar

46 This term, meaning originally an illicit alliance between a slave and a free man in ancient Rome, was constantly used by the Personalists from the mid-twenties on to characterize the coalition of Socialists, Conservatives and Antipersonalists that opposed their initiatives in Congress.

47 I say ‘at least twelve’ becuase the political coloration of Tucumán's governor cannot be determined.

48 This was an important election, for it demonstrated that Yrigoyen's 800,000 vote ‘plebiscite’ of 1928 had declined precipitously in only two years. In the Federal Capital, the Independent Socialists achieved 109,323 votes, the Socialists, 83,076, and the Radicals, 83,251. In the nation as a whole, the UCR received 618,411 votes, and its combined opposition received 869,124 votes. Calculated from Dario Cantón, Materiales para el estudio de la sociología poiltica en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, Editorial del Instituto, 1968), Vol. 1, pp. 103–4.Google Scholar

49 The passive resistance of many Personalists to the dictates of the party authorities, noted above, may have meant that his real control of Congress was actually declining.

50 The manifesto and the names of its signatories are reprinted in Sarobe, op. cit., pp. 272–3.Google Scholar

51 The text of the manifesto is reprinted in ibid., pp. 273–4. The names of the signatories are found in ibid., p. 55, n.I.

52 Reprinted in Federico, Pinedo, En tiem pox de la repu'blica (Buenos Aires, Editorial Mundo Forense, 1946), Vol. 3, pp. 9–33.Google Scholar

53 Dahl, , op. cit., pp. 132–40.Google Scholar